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Every organization is inevitably exposed to ups and downs during its lifecycle 
(Krueger and Willard, 1991; Burbank, 2005) and failure is not a sudden event (Agarwal 
and Taffler, 2008). The ecological theory of organizations states that in a continuous 
process of firms, those who survive are better capable to compete. Kahl (2001) defines 
“fittest firms” as the ones that have greater chance to survive. In this way, the financial 
distress process should be understood as a selection mechanism by means of which 
good performers survive and bad performers do not. In this same line, Sheppard and 
Chowdhury (2005) consider that failure is a firm’s misalignment with its environment.   
The research on financial distress has been closely tied to the determination of 
failure prediction models. Failure is considered to be the result of an evolutionary 
process, where the underlying idea is the possibility that the crisis can indeed be 
anticipated (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  
Pioneer prediction models such as the one proposed by Altman (1968), built the 
basics of the research based on prediction. Those researches were mainly centered on 
minimizing classification errors and maximizing goodness of fit measures using certain 
variables throughout a wide period of time. In this context, prediction models were 
evaluated based on their percentage of success in the classification of the control sample 
companies (Smith and Graves, 2005). The existence of an error in the classification of 
those companies, which did not fail even though were being described as failed, was 
considered as a failure of the proposed model. Nevertheless, these results leave an open 
door to consider the possibility that the companies can indeed survive a difficult 
situation or even subsist in a permanent crisis situation. This approach would allow 
considering the possibility that the failure process can sometimes not be an 
evolutionary-degenerative process, but it can revert so that the companies are able to 
subsist, even though still indicating certain situations that can determine their survival. 
In this sense, prediction models not only provide some essential information in order to 
take actions against the given default probability, but also warn about a future outcome 




This “passive” use of the financial distress prediction models has been highlighted 
by Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) who affirm that stakeholders should have a more 
active participation instead of being simple onlookers of a given “probability of 
default”. Basically, this default probability should be considered as vital information by 
the managers not only to improve business strategies in order to manage a distressed 
situation and return to a healthy financial situation, but also to develop investment 
strategies for potential investors or auditors assessing a going-concern qualification 
(Barniv et al., 2002). 
Failure is a reversible process and not necessarily degenerative if the company is 
able to detect signs of underperformance and to achieve an effort in its economic 
performance. In this sense, managing a crisis situation is a fundamental issue as it is not 
a spontaneous process. However, as Barniv et al. (2002) affirm, it is more difficult to 
establish final outcome patterns of a financial distress situation than to discriminate 
between healthy and distressed firms because firms facing a distressed financial 
situation usually share a series of common patterns which make it difficult to estimate a 
possible outcome of this situation. These patterns become obvious in indicators such as 
sales, equity or profit. Among the distressed firms, there are little divergences in the 
financial weakness indicators in the different failure processes (Ooghe and Prijcker, 
2008). The dissimilarities between the failure stages and the turnaround effectiveness as 
well, become evident on the how quickly the indicators evolve and on the ability of the 
management to react when distress signals are detected. Ignoring these alert signals may 
lead to a continuous decline process which may end up in failure without even trying 
any recovery strategy (Burbank, 2005).  
The reorganizations during a financial distress situation are not a simple matter 
and the probability of a successful exit is very low. However, the percentage of firms 
that succeed in getting through decline cannot be disregarded. Barniv et al. (2002) 
found that 50% of the sample firms which filed bankruptcy from the Office of the 
General Council of SEC resolved their situation as emerged firms. One third of the 
financially distressed firms in Kahl’s (2001) study survived as independent companies. 
Yet, we should consider that the exit from a difficult condition, as Moulton and Thomas 




Moreover, not all the successfully exiting firms manage to keep the new situation 
stable. For some firms, operating in a crisis situation constitutes their normal state of 
environment with crisis periods that can attenuate or loose up. Anyway, being able to 
maintain this kind of condition is also a manner to survive. In this sense, Kahl (2002) 
states that the financial distress should be considered a long term process that makes 
firms end up debilitated even after having recovered from decline. This weakness is 
observed in poor performance that inevitably may again drag the firms to a new 
financial distress situation. In this sense, Hotchkiss (1995) attested that during the first 
five years after exiting a bankruptcy, 35% to 40% of firms show negative operating 
income and up to one third of the firms that manage to ease their distress through debt 
restructuring re-enter a financial distress situation a few years later.  
Several studies have shown that different factors may determine the exit from a 
crisis situation (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Pearce and Robbins, 1993, 1994; Barker and 
Duhaime, 1997; Cascio et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1999). These factors may have a 
direct influence on the recovery process or on the capacity of the company to develop 
appropriate redirection strategies. The initial severity degree is considered an important 
hurdle in implementing successful actions. In this line, Smith and Graves (2005) found 
that, among all variables of the study, severity and firm size were the only variables 
significantly important during a turnaround process. Other authors (Robbins and Pearce, 
1992; Pearce and Robbins, 1993; Harker and Harker, 1998) state that strategies oriented 
towards cost reduction and efficiency improvement were safe bets for a favorable 
outcome. However, Castrogiovani and Bruton (2000), Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) or 
Smith and Graves (2005) affirm that no positive relation could be found between certain 
strategies and successful outcome. These results indicate that severity, through its 
influence on the selected strategy, could be an indirect factor in the turnaround process 
(Robbins and Pearce, 1992). 
More consensual results were obtained when stating that the performance in-
distress is fundamental for the outcome of the difficult situation. In particular, it is 
observed that successful companies show better returns when compared to unsuccessful 
firms (Routledge and Gadene, 2000; Pearce and Doh, 2002; Kahl, 2001). 
On the other hand, the accounting information evidencing certain financial 




survival status of a firm. When a crisis situation comes about during the lifecycle of a 
firm, it is fundamental to maintain the support and trust of the shareholders. Prahalad 
and Hamel (1994) consider that good corporate social behaviors can assure firm’s 
future success enhancing the support and the confidence of the stakeholders. In this 
line, we can raise the following question: Can responsible behavior act as a mitigation 
factor of the firms’ ongoing concern when certain financial distress situation takes 
place? If CSR investment creates firm reputation for stakeholders, allowing to 
contribute on the honesty and reliability of the firm (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Schnietz and Epsteinm, 2005), then it can mitigate the image offered by the 
deteriorated financial statements and add financial value to the firm. 
In front of a crisis situation a long recovery process initiates whose outcome is not 
guaranteed and it implies a wide range of strategies and actions which need to be 
coherent with the weaknesses the firm presents (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Pearce and 
Robbins, 1993; Castrogiovanni and Bruton, 2000; Smith y Graves, 2005; Pretorius, 
2008).  Maintain the support of shareholders is fundamental to insure the financial 
situation of a company or to obtain additional funds in order to implement strategies 
that will lead the entity towards a redirection of the situation with the support of other 
groups. In the long run, the survival of a company is strictly related to the capacity of 
the firm to adjust its values to the expectations of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; 
Becchetti et al., 2007). Thus, social responsible actions can allow consolidating the 
support if they guarantee and/or improve the valuations that different groups attribute to 
the firm. Although investors are prudent towards the presence of the risk a crisis 
situation implies, authors such as Devinney (2009) defend that responsible behavior can 
reduce the specific risk of a company, becoming one of the reasons why managers of 
firms involve in social responsible initiatives. Responsible behavior reduces the risk 
perception meanwhile it strengthen the image of the company and the latter achieves 
better discount rates and lower cost of capital charges (Feldman et al., 1997; Miles y 
Covin, 2000; Heal, 2005; Goss, 2007; Ghoul et al. 2011). 
The expectations of investors for the future conduct of a firm based on financial 
information are modified when the extra financial information is considered. It is 
interesting to know to what extent this modification of expectations occurs in firms that 




the investors. Firms that encounter themselves in a difficult situation can suffer sales 
and revenue decline because customers start losing their trust on them. In this case, CSR 
practices may reward this initial distrust of customers so that they still find it attractive 
and reliable to continue their purchase relationship with the firm. In this sense, Ruf et 
al. (2001) show that there is a continuous positive relationship between CSR and sales 
increase. Others (Heal, 2005) list a series of CSR practices advantages that make a firm 
more attractive to investors, such as conflict reduction with the firm, waste reduction, 
brand value generation, employees’ productivity or lower cost of capital. 
This is the approach followed by Goss (2009) when showing that, starting by 
considering CSR as a “proxy” of good corporate governance, there is a negative and 
robust relationship between CSR and financial distress where this latter one is 
calculated as the probability of default following Merton’s Model. Goss (2007) 
concluded that there was a relationship between CSR and distress, that is, information 
about CSR practices complements and brings in additional information to that offered 
by financial data. However, a clear demonstration on the fact that CSR investment 
reduces distress risk could not be established. 
Starting from this premise, it is interesting to consider the possibility of managers 
of companies that, in certain moment of time, face difficult situations to invest in CSR 
actions as a walkway to create favorable expectations that mitigate the results offered by 
their financial indicators. In this sense, authors such as Ho and Taylor (2007) argument 
the existence of incentives for companies presenting unfavorable results to emit social 
and environmental information in order to redirect their route. In a more specific way, 
studies such as those of Goss (2007) and (2009) conclude that there is a positive 
relationship between CSR conduct and crisis situations, without obtaining any evidence 
that responsible behavior reduces the final default risk.  
This research has its starting point in the observation of the business reality in the 
United States of a set of firms that in a certain moment of time show a situation of 
distress. In particular, it was observed that in the year 1993, a number of 753 firms 
presented some symptoms proper of an instable situation, more or less severe, classified 
through the identification of certain symptom-indicators. A part of the analyzed 
situation would imply, from the point of view of the financial theory, questioning the 




analyzed, all the companies, but two, were active in the market after 10 years. This fact 
provides sufficient evidence of a high survival rate, in spite of having suffered a severe 
crisis. Yet, the evolution of this set of firms throughout the 10 year period is different. 
Some firms manage to resolve their situation of crisis while others follow a 
degenerative pattern, similar to a disease with degenerative effects. It is interesting the 
fact that a considerable percentage of companies appear to maintain themselves in the 
limit line between crisis and stability, with periods of health and disease, so that it could 
be affirmed that there is some “species” of company for which surviving in crisis 
constitutes their habitual way of existence. 
The former arguments incite proposing the following questions: 
- What patterns characterize the firms facing a crisis situation in a certain moment 
of time and which factor could determine the evolutionary process? 
- Which strategies do firms in a crisis situation implement in order to resolve or 
ease this situation? 
Following these issues, this study is structured in seven chapters and it mainly 
consists of two parts. In the first part, we examine whether the evolution of a distress 
situation depends on the initial features of the same or if it concerns certain firms’ 
characteristics, and the determinant factors of the final outcome. In the second part, we 
consider the similarities and differences between distressed and healthy firms, 
considering their attitude and actions on social responsibility, as a way out of decline. 
However, it is to be highlighted that the purpose of this study is not centered on 
predicting failure. It rather focuses on analyzing the factors and the patterns determining 
the recovery process. 
Chapter I offers the theoretical framework of the first part of this research 
exposing the model of recovery and the different factors influencing the final output of 
the distress process.  
Chapter II is dedicated to a descriptive analysis of the sample firms that present a 
crisis situation and they are represented in a consensus map according to symptom of 
distress widely accepted in the literature, separating between reaction variables and 
recovering variables. The purpose is to analyze the similarities and differences between 




position given by: i) initial economic and financial situation; ii) reaction path and iii) 
strength of the final situation. 
It is in Chapter III where the existing differences or similarities between the two 
groups of firms are empirically studied in order to determine the relevant associations 
between variables and the final outcome. We consider that healing distress (Post-
distress Status) should assess not only if a firm manages to solve its critical state but 
also the quality of the final position by considering the risk to re-enter into distress. We 
create a Fitness indicator that discriminates between well-performers, which just exit 
distress, and best-performers, which are located in a new healthy scenario minimizing 
the likelihood to fall again in distress.   
 
The second part of this study starts in Chapter IV. Although many studies have 
focused on the relation between financial and economic performance of firms and their 
actions on corporate social responsibility (CSR), few of them analyze CSR actions of 
firms facing decline. Managers of companies that in certain moment of time face a 
distressed situation could be incentivized to invest in social responsible actions among 
their recovery strategies. These latter could be used to complement efficiency strategies 
oriented towards obtaining profits associated with investments, to reduce the costs in 
certain actions in order to develop cost reduction strategies, or to create favorable 
expectations that could mitigate the weak performance results given by their financial 
indicators.  
Many studies dealing with the CSR matter and firms’ financial and economic 
performance have been proof of the positive association between CSR actions and 
financial performance, but others found evidence that this relation was negative or 
neutral. It is in Chapter V where we analyze whether companies facing financial distress 
situations incorporate investment in responsible behaviors among their strategies as a 
mechanism to create favorable expectations that mitigate the weakened image given by 
certain financial indicators.  
In Chapter VI we analyze the responsible behavior patterns in order to determine 
identity marks of the different companies and explore if the profiles of their conduct 




Finally, Chapter VII studies if a recognized situation of financial distress has an 
impact on CSR strategies and modifies the attitude of a set of firms towards responsible 
behavior. We use CSR information of healthy and distressed firms to evidence feasible 
changes in CSR attitudes induced by distress position and we determine the relevant 
variables in the CSR behavior, once the symptoms of distress have been identified, for 
the overall assessment as well as the valuation in each individual CSR dimension, 
taking into account the sector where companies develop their normal activity. 
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Chapter I. Evolutionary process of financial distress 
1.1. Status of decline: facing a financial distress situation 
Throughout the years, and also taking as reference the initial works of Beaver 
(1967) and Altman (1968), the research in financial distress has been oriented towards 
the determination of the structures that differentiate the failed companies from the not 
failed ones. The purpose of these studies was to reveal the alert status lying underneath 
(Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Altman et al., 2007; Altman, 1984; Dimitras et al., 1996; 
Cybinski, 2001; Ravi and Ravi, 2007). These researches differed with respect to the use 
of different statistical techniques for the creation of models or the use of distinct 
predictive variables. However, most of them were characterized by using paired 
samples of healthy and financially distressed companies (Barniv et al., 2002). In 
addition, they have not been free of critics associated to the used models, the variables 
or the sample selection (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Cybinski, 2001; Laitinen, 1991). 
These investigations have reached some interesting conclusions regarding firm distress. 
Many of these contributions are consequence of the approaches that tried to resolve 
some of methodological deficiencies of the initial studies, such as the use of 
deterministic techniques that did not allow to analyze the failure as a continuous process 
(Luoma and Laitinien, 1991; Catanach and Perry, 2001; Shumway, 2001), the problems 
to distinguish the outcome of the companies in crisis (Barniv et al., 2002; Gilbert et al., 
1990; Poston et al., 1994) or the non-consideration of failure as a situation in any point 
where a company can have serious problems that introduce some uncertainty and risk in 
its future (Turetsky and Mcwewn, 2001). 
In this sense, in the last years, various researches have introduced a variant on the 
prediction models by considering that the failure processes are continuous and that they 
are not identical for all the companies (Bardos, 2001). Articles like those of Laitinen 
(1991), Luoma and Laitinen (1991), Shumway (2001) or Laitinen (2005) consider some 
scenes that had already been introduced by other authors like Argenti (1976): failure has 
different phases and each phase has different features. The failure state is identical for 
all the companies that fail, but its evolution is different and the explanatory variables 
commonly associated to the failure process vary according to the phase the company is 
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in (Laitinen, 1993 and 2005). This approach can be found in other studies that 
“catalogue” companies based on the process that leads to a certain outcome (Laitinen, 
1991; Bardos, 1995; Abad et al., 2007; Ooghe and Prijcker, 2008). As a result, failure is 
identified as a final state that begins with situations in which a company declares to 
have difficulties or problems (Luoma and Laitinen, 1991). Nevertheless, the difficult 
situations are evolutionary. This means that they can degenerate, remain still (which 
would go against the survival theory) or they can be solved independently of the 
difficulty degree of the problem. Hence, there exists a state of “safety” where 
companies which at some time presented some serious problems of continuity have 
been able to resolve them. 
Pretorius (2008) already evidenced that the literature uses a wide variety of terms 
associated to failure (i.e. bankruptcy, liquidation, insolvency, crisis, decline in 
performance, crashing, distress, etc.). Although the term financial distress is generally 
linked to an objective situation as bankruptcy status, receivership, creditors’ voluntary 
liquidation, bond default, filing for Chapter 11 or disappearance of the company 
(Altman, 1968; Barniv et al., 2002; Beaver, 1967; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008), it should 
to be considered in a broader sense.  
The conditions that produce financial distress do not have to be the same as those 
of a bankruptcy situation (Turetsky and Mcwewn, 2001; Aragonés and González 
Sánchez, 1991). Thus, crisis should be understood as a situation of threat for the 
viability of the company where certain financial events reflect a variety of enterprise 
adversity (Turetsky and Mcwewn, 2001). In general, it could be understood as those 
situations where survival of a company and the fulfillment of its objectives are 
threatened (Jiménez Cardoso et al., 2007). Crisis situations are associated to financial 
instability (financial crisis) and/or economic (profitability crisis). In these cases there 
exists some “incapacity” to generate resources and/or to fulfill the payment of debts in 
time. This “incapacity” can be transitory and of a major or minor gravity. It can be seen 
through a series of symptoms that are independent of the causes and of the 
consequences. These symptoms constitute the alert that the health and the future of the 
company is at risk.   
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The symptoms that detect a company in crisis are common in most of the studies 
that have investigated on this subject. Certain variables show that the economic and 
financial information in the annual statements reflects some problems in the health of 
the company. Some of these variables are Negative Net Income (in some cases Negative 
Operating Income), Negative Working Capital, Negative Cash Flow (in some cases 
Operating Cash Flow), Negative Equity or Negative Retained Earnings in previous 
years (Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Geiger et al., 1995; Mutchler and Williams, 
1990; Mutchler, 1985). Ponemon and Shick (1991) perform an inverse selection. They 
select those companies that did not have problems, so, these companies had positive Net 
Income, sufficient Current Assets, positive Operating Cash Flow and positive liability 
ratios. Negative operating cash flow is considered by many authors as an indicator of 
the liquidity position of the company, thus, of the decline of the same and of the 
probability of financial distress (Anandarajan et al., 2001; Bell and Tabor, 1991; John, 
1993) 
Poston et al. (1994) also classified companies in crisis those that had a solvency 
ratio less than unity. Martin (2000) associates the return on equity with the companies 
that can be in a difficult situation (and susceptible to receive a qualified audit opinion). 
This ratio responds to financial characteristics as well as non-financial ones. Another 
criterion could be when a company shows less Operating Income than its financial 
expenses (Jostarndt, 2006) or when it has a deficient interest coverage ratio (Kahl, 
2001). Smith and Graves (2005) use a Z-score model developed by Taffler (1983) to 
identify firms in financial distress situation. The use of recognized models is an option 
chosen by authors such as Chou et al. (2010) besides Altman Z-score, KMV index or 
the Zmijweski Probit index, the latter one also used by Anandarajan et al. (2001).  
In most of the papers a crisis situation existed when several symptoms of the 
previous were combined. However, in some works (Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; 
Mutchler and Williams, 1990; Mutchler, 1985) a company was considered in a difficult 
situation when fulfilling only some of them. Along with the previous criteria it is 
frequent to use the auditors’ qualified opinion report to list a company in crisis 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Ponemon and Shich, 1991) or to better expose the 
difficult situation it is passing through (Mutchler and Williams, 1990). 
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The previous variables are simply symptoms that a crisis situation may take place. 
The differential matter is the latent factors (Catanach and Perry, 2001) that lie beneath, 
that is, the weaknesses and deficiencies in the management of the company that are 
transformed in that incapacity from an economic or financial point of view. In this 
sense, Geiger et al. (1995) group the failed companies in three types according to their 
symptoms: frequent negative Cash Flow, frequent Operating Losses or negative 
Working Capital. By doing this they assume that different underlying structures can 
exist in crisis processes. This distinction between symptoms and causes can be easily 
seen also in the different papers that have studied company crisis. For instance, ratios or 
variables were used as numerical indicator of the deficiencies and then were introduced 
as explanatory variables of certain models. Neophytou and Mar Molinero (2005) 
consider latent variables that describe several aspects of a company and frequently they 
refer to dimensions like: liquidity, risk, returns, quality of the assets, activity or 
management. 
There is no longer a direct relationship between symptoms and failure. The 
outcome depends on external variables (economic environment) and internal or 
structural variables (management decisions). In this sense, some authors suggest that 
small companies seem to fail because of financial problems while big companies fail 
due to problems associated to management (Bruno et al., 1987). Gilbert et al. (1990) 
indicated that the resolution of a problem may be influenced by non-financial factors 
while Poston et al. (1994) uphold the identification of variables, other than financial 
ratios, discriminating distressed firms that will survive against those that will not. 
1.2. Overcoming a financial distress situation: The model 
Even though some weak crisis situations tend to show a natural evolution 
throughout the “exit” and may be solved by simply making “routine” decisions, 
recovery process is not a “spontaneous” event.  The distressed firms will face a long 
term scenario involving a continuous effort of adaptation to the diverse situations 
through which a firm passes during the upturn. The effort invested in this process will 
allow the reestablishment of stakeholders’ trust, while the variables related to solvency 
and profitability gain stability (Burbank, 2005). Companies that do not have a long term 
Chapter I. Evolutionary process of financial distress  
17 
 
orientation and just adopt patch strategies do not usually reach successful exits 
(Pretorius, 2008).  This approach allows us to consider that the financial distress could 
be “managed” so that they can no longer be considered as evolutionary-degenerative by 
nature but simply evolutionary. 
Pioneer studies, such as that of D’Aveni (1989), affirm that managerial problems 
can be cause of decline and, at the same time, periods of decline can produce strategic 
and managerial problems. D’Aveni and Mcmillan (1990) show that the behavior of 
managers in surviving firms and failing firms is different in periods of crisis. The same 
idea is defended by Aragonés and González Sánchez (1991) affirming that managerial 
decisions affect the success or failure derived by a company crisis. Also, Luoma and 
Laitinnen (1991) established that the causes of the failure are often associated with an 
inadequate management which can be observed through the deterioration of financial 
ratios. On their side, Burbank (2005) points out that, together with other factors, the 
management shortcoming and an ineffective board of directors, are some of the causes 
of business failure. Ooghe and Prijcker (2008) denote that the management of a firm 
together with its general and immediate environment can be the causes of bankruptcy. 
These authors identify four types of failure processes and in three of them the role of 
management, due to inexperience, incompetence or lack of vision, is a critical factor. 
Also, Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) assert that highly risky structures can return to a 
healthy scenario depending on decision management’s success. Therefore, 
disequilibrium in the management could have an influence in the incapacity of the 
company to encounter the appropriate strategies towards a crisis situation (Pretorius, 
2008). 
Kahl (2001) considered the processes of company crisis as a selection mechanism 
so that the best companies have a greater probability to survive. In his work it was 
demonstrated that the behavior of the companies during a financial crisis is crucial for 
the process of “exit” from this situation. Nevertheless, variables like size, liabilities or 
the complexity of the debt do not seem to affect the survival probability. These 
questions point out that the “management” in difficulty situations can differentiate the 
final result of the evolution process more than the firm’s specific financial 
characteristics.  
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In general, many studies consider that there are many variables that may affect the 
final outcome of a distress process, highlighting the improvement in the efficiency, 
improvement in economic performance, size, and changes in the directive board or the 
severity degree of the initial situation (Smith and Graves, 2005). Among these factors, 
company size or severity of distressed state are important conditions that may affect the 
reaction capacity as well as the effectiveness of the measures taken by managers.  
1.2.1. Distress enhancers  
Severity 
Similar to a disease process, the gravity of the initial crisis position not only 
conditions the measures to take but also their success possibilities. Firms that face 
worse starting situation need to make greater efforts. It is the idea followed by authors 
such as Pearce and Robbins (1993) or Arogyaswamy et al. (1995), when referring to the 
declining stemming stage as the first step to revolve a crisis process. The objective of 
this stage is to stop the declining situation, stabilizing the company and provide 
confidence to the stakeholders. In this sense, the effort and the time of this phase would 
be directly proportional to the starting severity degree.  
Robbins and Pearce (1992) also recognize the contingency of the initial severity 
situation in the turnaround process. In this sense, affirm that there exists a relationship 
between retrenchment strategies and performance in firms having a severe starting 
situation while this relationship is not observed in firms facing a weak crisis state. 
Although Smith and Graves (2005) indicate that the gravity of the starting situation is 
strongly associated with the probability of recovery, Kahl (2002) sustains that the 
financial distress diagnosis is an imperfect indicator of the economic feasibility of a 
firm. Perhaps, following Moulton and Thomas (1993), the initial gravity status has an 
influence over the process of recovery more than on the final resolution. Thus, severity 
determines the rate of recuperation, so that the harder the severity, the greater the effort 
to react and the slower the process of healing the levels of solvency and profitability. 
This effort during the process, and not the starting situation, may be the main 
determinant of the final outcome.  
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In some cases, severity has been linked to the existence of continuity of a decline 
situation. In this sense, Moulton and Thomas (1993) use what they call the rate of 
decline of failing firm, which is the number of years with negative net incomes previous 
to entering financial distress. These authors found significant the relationship between 
the rate of decline of failing firms and recovery process, such that the higher the rate the 
slower the process. With a similar approach, Pearce and Doh (2002) make use of the 
decrease in ROE below the average of industry for a minimum of three four-month 
periods, considering a criterion consistent with the U.S. Government definition of an 
economic decline. However, in a general way, the literature associates severity degree 
to solvency and profitability indicators. In this way, continuous negative results, 
inability to generate income by means of operating activity, continuous solvency and/or 
liquidity problems or incapacity to generate cash flow which reflect problems in the 
health of the company, are widely accepted as measures of severity degree (Mutchler 
and Williams, 1990; Gilbert et al., 1990; Ponemon and Shick, 1991; Poston et al., 1994; 
Geiger et al., 1995; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Davydenko, 2007).  
Reaction capability 
The possible effect of severity on the initial state may be mitigated if the firm 
counts on appropriate resources which increase the probability of a successful recovery. 
The structural reaction capability may ease the recovery process to a safe position 
cushioning the possible actions to implement. The capacity to obtain additional funds or 
generate additional incomes to implement treatment strategies can soothe the prior 
pressure imposed by a deteriorated financial distress position. In this sense, Barker and 
Duhaime (1997) associate successful turnaround processes with increases in sales that 
make companies have more options to undertake change strategies. Similarly, Pearce 
and Doh (2002) affirm that firms in distress that used debt and supported their sales to 
improve profitability successfully solved their difficult situation. They also state that 
changes in activity and in leverage level are associated with different phases of a 
turnaround process. In turn, Jostarndt (2006) identifies three factors which could be 
helpful to measure the risk of becoming financially troubled. An excessive leverage 
level, a poor firm performance, and an industry downturn may inhibit firms from 
obtaining the right amount of cash flow to operate normally.  Firm operating 
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performance trend dominates as the reason causing financial distress showing that a 
firm may fail but not only for financial reasons. This allows the author to consider an 
association between financial distress and economic distress. However, concerning debt 
structure Kahl (2001) did not find evidence on if the debt level or the debt structure of a 
firm influences the final outcome of a crisis situation. In the same sense, Smith and 
Graves (2005) consider that the amount of free assets available (Assets/Liabilities) have 
an impact on the capacity to stop a decline process. Yet, their study did not find this 
variable statistically significant in the final outcome.  
Size 
Severity Status and Reaction Capability, as initial restrictions, could be moderated 
by firm size when considering the exit from a crisis situation (Moulton and Thomas, 
1993; Barniv et al., 2002;   Schutjens, 2002). In particular, Moulton and Thomas (1993) 
found that bigger sized firms have a higher possibility to exit a crisis situation. Altman 
and Hotchkiss (2006) found that one of the most obvious factor that discriminates 
between firms that successfully restructure and those that liquidate, after being 
classified inside Chapter 11, was the firm’s size. In the same line, Smith and Graves 
(2005) also evidence that size is the only variable, together with severity, that 
determines the probability to heal a financial distress. Nevertheless, other works observe 
that this variable did not present any clear relation with the survival chance (Kahl, 
2001). In the same line, neither did Ooghe and Prijcker (2008) find evidence that there 
is a clear relationship between size and the different failure processes, identified 
according to the analyzed patterns. Possibly, firm’s size does not determine the final 
resolution of a distress situation but it influences the reaction capability to confront it, 
moderating /strengthening the drawbacks when additional support should be guaranteed 
and restructuring decision must be made.  
Performance in-distress 
Regardless of the initial state restrictions, the adopted strategies and the behavior 
of companies during a financial crisis are crucial for the “exit” process (Sun and Li, 
2007).  A crisis situation usually disguises certain weak points that should be fixed. An 
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inappropriate diagnosis of the firm’s weaknesses in order to act and react quickly may 
lead to a fast deterioration of the financial indicators (Barker and Duhaime, 1997). 
Beaver (1966) already stated that if a difficult situation was properly detected, measures 
that lead to an improved position could be taken, avoiding so a state of ultimate failure.  
The underlying weaknesses can be classified as operational, lack of efficiency in 
the company’s performance, or strategic, when a firm shows a weak competitive 
position (Barker and Duhaime, 1997). Despite the type of weakness, a series of 
strategies and action plans should be implemented aiming to reduce these detected flaws 
of the company (Krueger and Willard, 1991, Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Pearce and 
Robbins, 1993; Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Castrogiovanni and Bruton, 2000; Smith and 
Graves, 2005; Pearce and Doh, 2002; Pretorius, 2008).  
In this context, some papers focusing in the turnaround process highlight the 
strategies followed by the managers of firms in difficult situation to return to a healthy 
scenario, such as retrenchment strategies or downsizing strategies (Robbins and Pearce, 
1992; Pearce and Robbins, 1993 and 1994; Barker et al., 1997). As a result, the 
possibility of improving the economic-financial indicators depends on the type of 
restructure selected (Cascio et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1999). In this sense, many studies 
have evidenced that strategies oriented towards efficiency improvement are 
fundamental for a successful result of the crisis management process (Robbins and 
Pearce, 1992). Among these strategies, research has specifically focused on the so-
called retrenchment, downsizing or cut-backs, as mechanisms for efficiency 
improvement by means of cost and assets reduction.  
Improving efficiency through some actions like cost cutting and/or asset reduction 
is crucial in recovery process, having a positive impact on firm’s performance despite 
the underlying weaknesses (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Pearce and Robbins, 1993; 
Harker and Harker, 1998). The operating performance during the recovery process 
drives a successful evolutionary route towards a new healthy scenario (Kahl, 2001; 
Routledge and Gadenne, 2000). Firms facing a distress situation and carrying out a 
retrenchment strategy are more likely to survive, even though the performance was 
statistically not greater than that of not retrenched firms (Castrogiovanni and Bruton, 
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2000). In this sense, Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) showed that the strategies applied by 
firms successfully recovering were not that different from the strategies applied by 
firms that did not recover. So, the implementation efficacy was the cause of these 
differences, even though more intensive restructuration was done by firms that could 
not redirect their situation. 
The effectiveness of efficiency oriented strategies is supported by the results 
showing that firms resolving a situation of financial distress are statistically more 
profitable than those who did not settle (Campbell, 1996; Routledge and Gadenne, 
2000; Pearce and Doh, 2002). These authors found that operating efficiency was the 
only variable used in distinguishing successful turnarounds from unsuccessful ones that 
significantly persisted during the recovery process. Kahl (2001) also stated that, in-
distress, operating performance has a strong positive relation with the survival prospect. 
In particular, the author shows that an improvement in the standard deviation of ROA 
during a crisis period can increase the survival probability up to 0.62. However, other 
authors such as Barniv et al. (2002) or Laitinen (1993) found that the ROA coefficients 
were statistically not significant in predicting the outcome of a crisis situation.  
The post-distress status 
The main objective of a firm facing a distress situation is to heal the crisis state. 
Some researches, oriented to modeling the variables that influence a recovery process, 
identify the final stage of this process when a firm objectively exits a failure situation 
emerging as an independent firm, leaving Chapter 11 classification or keeping a defined 
period of positive income (Smith and Graves, 2006; Barniv et al., 2002; Altman and 
Hotchkiss, 2006; Kahl 2001). However, the accomplishment of this objective should 
have one necessary quality condition. The new post-failure position should be achieved 
in suitable conditions that would permit an appropriate and continuous growth and 
performance rate. In this sense, Pearce and Doh (2002) consider that a decline phase is 
over when the company presents, during a minimum of three four-month periods, an 
increase in ROE above the average of the industry. In this way, the existence of a 
continuous exit situation is required.   
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A financial distress process could place a firm in a weak position, even if it had 
managed to solve its difficulties, inciting a poor performance that inevitably makes it 
enter again in an emergency situation (Kahl 2002). If a firm does not emerge profitably 
in the restructuring phase, in order to achieve a long term success, the probability of a 
successful exit process is very low (Burbank 2005).  In this sense, Hotchkiss (1995) 
showed that up to one third of the firms that relieve their conditions by means of debt 
restructuring tend to go into a financial distress situation few years afterwards. With 
regard to post-distress position, Robbins and Pearce (1992) affirm that industry 
indicator variations should be considered in order to better identify the good performers 
or the exceptional good performers during turnaround. Despite of the assessment of 
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) stating that the firms overcoming a Chapter 11 situation 
perform below firms of the same industry that did not pass through that same situation, 
Kahl (2001) found that the post-distress operating performance of firms getting through 
a crisis situation is similar to the industry performance. 
1.2.2. The model of recovery 
When a firm is facing a distress situation and considering all the above analyzed 
dimensions, severity and reaction capability should be understood as initial conditions 
that will impose restrictions in selecting the strategies which will drive the performance 
during recovery, thus, determining the final resolution of long term financial distress 
process as shown in Figure 1.1.  
The left side of the diagram gathers the initial determining factors to initiate the 
recovery process, outlining the firm’s ability to improve its future and overcome the 
difficult situation. Severity Status offers valuable information about the initial degree of 
gravity of a firm’s situation. This degree will condition the actions to be taken in a 
deteriorated situation and the possible outcome as well. Reaction Capability measures 
the firm’s capacity to apply such actions through: i) the possibility to obtain further 
resources without worsening its position, ii) the capacity of debt negotiation or iii) the 
ability to generate additional incomes which may facilitate the application of strategy 
changes. 
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The right side of the Figure 1.1 defines the final subsequent status of firms, once 
specific actions have been taken. Post-distress Status shows the effectiveness of the 
management effort in a crisis situation, not only because the firm solves the initial state, 
but also since the new position is reached evidencing a well performance to set a 
suitable continuity in the new balanced situation. 
Figure 1.1. The model of Recovery Process 
 
Accordingly, Post-distress status assesses the quality of firms’ welfare accounting 
for the risk to re-entry into distress discriminating well performers and best performers 
in a crisis management process. In a distress context, a well-performer just achieves the 
objective (i.e. exiting the crisis situation) while best-performers are located in a new 
healthy scenario minimizing the likelihood to reenter in distress.   
The approach of Figure 1.1 encloses one main question: When a firm is facing a 
crisis situation, can the evolutionary deterioration always be reverted by means of 
certain strategic actions or the success may be affected by given structural strong/weak 
points of the company? Using a metaphoric reasoning, whenever a company is facing a 
disease such as financial distress, could it return to a healthy state only by means of 
therapeutic actions or does the cure depend on the absence of certain structural features? 
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Chapter II: Structural and evolutionary patterns of companies in a 
financial distress situation 
2.1. Introduction 
Different researches in the traditional line of failure have shown that the economic 
and financial structure of the companies that fail seems to be different from the ones 
that do not (Neophytou and Mar Molinero, 2005). In this sense, Gilberts et al. (1990) 
affirm that the financial variables that distinguish between the failed and not failed 
companies are not the same as those that distinguish between failed companies and 
firms with difficulties. Nevertheless, Poston et al. (1994) found that the financial ratios 
are questionable regarding their capacity to differentiate between the companies in crisis 
which are able to resolve the situation and those that are not. As a result, it is necessary 
to find out if there exist some patterns that determine the recovery possibility when a 
firm faces a hard financial situation. In particular, it is interesting to analyze the 
structural differences between the companies that, in spite of being in a state of crisis of 
a different degree, end up resolving the situation and those that do not. 
In this chapter we analyze the similarities and differences between structural 
features of a dataset of 526 companies facing some degree of financial distress situation 
due to the existence of certain group of widely accepted symptoms. This analysis can be 
seen through the changes in firms’ positions 10 years later, according to certain 
indicators of the process of “management” of that situation of crisis. We evaluate the 
process of “management of the crisis” considering three dimensions of analysis: a) 
economical and financial situation in the first year of the analysis, b) reaction path and 
c) strength of the situation. For the purpose of the analysis, we chose to use 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), which provides a visual representation of the pattern 
of proximities (i.e., similarities or distances) among a set of objects. This technique has 
also been used in other papers that have studied company failure (Mar Molinero and 
Ezzamel, 1991; Mar Molinero and Cerrano-Cinca, 2001; Neophytou and Mar Molinero, 
2004 and 2005). The MDS methodology allows us to analyze the profiles of firms in a 
specific financial distress situation without any a priori assumptions on causal relations 
that could be used as predictors of the status at the end of the analyzed period.  The final 
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objective is to explore the possible existence of this bond through the analysis of map 
placement of the companies in difficulties and the changes in these positions, according 
to their economic and financial structure and their initial starting situation. 
2.2. The hypotheses 
Considering some of the ideas exposed in Chapter I with respect to the 
evolutionary processes related to the company crisis we expect that: 
1 There exist structural differences between the companies that show different 
symptoms of a crisis. If failure is a continuous process and, sometimes 
degenerative, we can expect that the companies with serious symptoms of crisis are 
positioned clearly separated from those presenting a weak crisis, according to their 
variables structures.  
2 The outcome, or the position reached by a company after overtaking surpassing a 
period of crisis, is independent from the condition it began with. At the end of the 
period of analysis, the companies will be in a new position of “crisis” or “safety” 
depending on:  
a. Their structural characteristics, despite of the symptoms they showed at 
the beginning of the analysis. Authors like Ooghe and Prijcker (2008) 
assert that the difference between the failure processes depends on the 
distinctive initial lacks. 
b. The effort of the “management” of the crisis. The companies with greater 
effort in operating activity will improve their situation in spite of the 
initial symptoms they had. In this sense, Kahl (2001) and Routledge and 
Gadenne (2000) affirm that “operating performance” reflects the effort 
made during a distress situation and determines a successful evolutionary 
process towards the exit from that situation. 
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2.3. The sample 
In the first place, we selected a wide 10 years scenario - 1993 until 2002 - to 
analyze the evolution process of companies that, according to the criteria exposed in the 
first section of this paper, presented some kind of financial distressed situation. A ten 
years scenario is a wide and sufficient period of time in order to evidence the patterns of 
firms which started off a distressed situation. Moreover, as Smith and Graves (2005) 
affirm, in an economic expansion context distressed firms could easily perform a 
successful turnaround.  
In our case, given that the year 2002 was marked by events like the Stock Market 
Crash, the loss of investor’s confidence in the Stock Market or the emergence of 
corporate fraud and corporate governance, it is considered as an important “transit” year 
for the financial information and the US Stock Market. We consider this year as the 
final year of our analysis period so that the economic and financial data would not be 
influenced by external factors. Thus, the analyzed scenario covers the years 1993 until 
2002.   
The data used in this study were derived from Compustat Database. For their 
particular structure and function, firms operating in financial service industry were 
eliminated. We also excluded the companies that presented incomplete or inconsistent 
information in the analyzed years. Companies that did not have data starting from a 
certain year were studied separately in order to identify if they were inactive in the 
market and the reason of their inactivity, by means of Compustat item “Inactive Issue 
Status Market”. A total of 1721 companies were considered valid for the sample 
because they neither presented any incomplete data in their financial statements in one 
or various years nor disappeared from the Compustat Database during that period for 
reason not linked to liquidation or bankruptcy according to the Compustat Inactive Item. 
To identify the firms that in the beginning (year 1993) presented a financial 
distress situation, we consider a crisis status, based on the arguments discussed in 
Chapter I, as a variety of enterprise adversity situations that threaten the future viability 
of the company (Turetsky and Mcwewn, 2001; Graveline and Kokalari, 2008).  
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To select financial accounting symptoms we chose variables widely used in the 
previously discussed studies (Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Geiger et al., 1995; 
Mutchler and Williams, 1990; Mutchler, 1985). For this study we selected the following 
criteria to classify a firm as being in a financial distress situation in the first year of 
analysis: Negative Net Income, Negative Operating Income, Negative Retained 
Earnings, Negative Working Capital, Negative Cash Flow, Negative Operating Cash 
Flow and Negative Shareholder’s Equity. (For detailed definition of these variables, see 
Table 2.3).  Whenever a firm presented one or more of the above indicators in the first 
year (1993) it entered in the sample. However, if the company presented a Negative net 
Income as the only problematic symptom the fulfillment of at least one of the other 6 
criteria was required in order to classify that firm as facing a distressed situation. In 
agreement with Gilbert et al. (1990), to prevent the selection of firms that only had a 
poor performance in the starting year firms presenting merely a Negative Net Income 
for the year 1993 were not selected. This criterion made possible that poor performers 
were selected only when they also showed a continued instable situation such as losses 
in previous years or solvency problems. 
As a result, 753 US companies showed a situation of instability in 1993. However, 
in 2002, except two companies, the remaining 751 companies were still active in the 
market. This number is reduced to 526 companies because some of them did not present 
some of the necessary information for the further analyses such as interest expenses. 
The distribution of the firms by sector and by number of symptoms fulfilled can be 
found in Table 2.1. 
The number of observed symptoms permits an objective a priori classification 
based on the gravity of the starting situation. A firm would experience a weak crisis if it 
presents three or less criteria and, on the contrary, a strong crisis if it shows 4 or more. 
Following this further, in the first year of the analysis 77.38% of the firms encounter a 
weak crisis while 22.62% are facing a situation of strong crisis.  Moreover, the number 
of criteria allows us to classify the companies a priori according to the gravity of the 
crisis situation and to analyze their evolution throughout the 10 years. 
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Table 2.1. Number of firms by distress criteria fulfilled. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total Total (%)
Consumer Discretionary 59 16 7 8 10 0 100 19,01%
Consumer Staples 11 5 4 3 0 0 23 4,37%
Energy 16 10 4 0 4 0 34 6,46%
Health Care 17 6 1 3 38 1 66 12,55%
Industrials 52 22 19 7 12 4 116 22,05%
Information Technology 25 7 13 9 8 0 62 11,79%
Materials 18 14 7 4 3 2 48 9,13%
Telecommunication Service 5 3 2 2 1 0 13 2,47%
Utilities 60 2 2 0 0 0 64 12,17%
Total 263 85 59 36 76 7 526 100,00%
Total (%) 50,00% 16,16% 11,22% 6,84% 14,45% 1,33% 100,00%
Industry
Nr. Of Criteria Fulfilled
 
To complement the previous classification, companies were further classified 
according to their risk, using a widely accepted model in the literature. There exist 
many failure prediction models that could be used to assess default probability of 
distressed companies. Some of these techniques are the Z-Score models, KMV’s EDF 
model, CreditSights’ BondScore model etc. (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006). We chose to 
apply the Z –score (Altman, 1968) and see how the firms of our sample were classified 
on an indicative basis only. The distribution of the Probability of Default is presented in 
Table 2.2. As a result, although 84% of the companies have a very high probability of 
default they are still active in the market throughout the 10 year period. Do these 
distressed firms achieve this goal because their economic and financial structure shares 
similar patterns with healthy companies? Or else, do they perform an effective effort in 
the management of the situation and accomplish an improvement/recovery? 
Table 2.2. Distribution of Probability of Default  
Probability of Default Classification levels Nr. of companies 
Very High (VH) Z < 1.81 441 (84,17%) 
High (H) 1.81 < Z < 2.75 61 (11,64%) 
Low (L) 2.76 < Z < 2.99 5 (0,95%) 
Very Low (VL) Z > 3 17 (3,24%) 
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2.4. The variables 
A total of 12 variables (see definitions in Table 2.3) were selected in order to 
explain the structure of the underlying data in the analysis of the differences or 
similarities between the companies that presented certain level of crisis in the first year 
(1993) and their evolution undergone in the final year (2002).The descriptive statistics 
of the variables and their correlation are presented in Appendix A, B, C and D 
respectively. These variables are grouped in three categories as shown in Table 2.3: 
1. Reaction Path. This factor defines the initial capacity of a company to make 
decisions that can improve its future situation. We selected a series of variables 
that indicate some kind of “alternatives” on which a company can count on to 
improve. These variables would show the different evolution of companies that 
had the same symptoms in the beginning of the crisis situation.  This group is 
measured by 3 variables:  
a. Debt power (V1), or the possibility to obtain additional funds without 
deteriorating the financial situation 
b. Short term reaction power (V2), or short term obligations 
accomplishment 
c.  Resource generation power (V3). 
2. Economic and financial structure. This category reveals information about the 
initial economic and financial situation of the companies. It is measured by 
seven variables (V4 to V10) that point out the economic and/or financial 
weaknesses of the companies following previously cited papers. These variables 
reflect deficiencies in returns, financial autonomy, solvency etc. The 
consideration of this dimension is consistent with previous researches (Pearce 
and Robbins, 1993; Arogyaswamy et al., 1995) that show how severity of the 
distressed state influences the return process. The use of the 7 original variables 
applied to classify the firms in financial distress situation is in agreement with 
the approach proposed by Smith and Graves (2005) to test the role of severity of 
a distressed state in the turnaround process. 
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3. Strength of the situation in the period n+1 measured by two variables (V11 and 
V12) which imply strength or improvement of the situation after the initial crisis 
period. Mutchler (1985) already introduced the possibility of including a 
possible improvement of the company. It could be measured by the variation in 
the Net Income/Total Assets ratio, indicating a possible beginning of an 
improvement phase although the company maintained a difficult situation. In 
this sense, Kahl (2001) proved that the “operating performance” could be used 
to measure the viability of the company and it also reflected the effort made 
during a crisis situation. In this way, Routledge and Gadenne (2000) assert that 
firms in distressed situation with high levels of ROA (Return on Assets) have 
higher probability of success in the turnaround process.  
On the other side, the level of interest coverage of a firm is considered to be an 
indicator of the financial distress risk (Jostarndt, 2006; Asquith et al., 1994). In this 
paper, V11 is not presented as a ratio. This means it should be interpreted only as a 
measure of the existence of a possible distress situation (when the values of V11 are less 
than 0) or the non-existence of a prior distress situation (when the values of V11 are 
greater than or equal to zero). Thus, we are not evaluating the level of a risky situation 
of a firm, according to its degree of interest expense coverage. We want to detect its risk 
status due to its lack in the fulfillment of external capital obligations.  
The first two groups mark a starting situation of making certain decisions while 
the third group characterizes a final situation of “viability” after those decisions have 
been made. By combining the three categories we would be able to identify if the 
movements throughout the analyzed period are due to the structure of the company or if, 
on the contrary, they can be attributed to management factors. The latter may have 
influenced in the improvement, worsening or standing still of the company situation. 
Since our analysis begins with the data available in the financial statements of 
December 31, 1993, the set of variables is developed according to Figure 2.1. The 
capacities or abilities of a firm in year n will be reflected in the results obtained in year 
n+1 as well as the stability/instability of the situation. 
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Table 2.3. Financial Ratios 
Category  Variable Name  Variable definition
*
 
Reaction Path  V1  Shareholders' Equity/Total Liabilities 
  V2  Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
  V3  Sales/Total Assets 
Economic   V4  Net Income/Total Assets 
and financial  V5  EBIT/Total Assets 
structure  V6  Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
  V7  Working Capital/ Total Assets 
  V8  Cash Flow/Total Assets 
  V9  Operating Cash Flow/Total Assets 
  V10  Shareholders' Equity/Total Assets 
Strength  V11  EBIT - Interests (Yearn+1) 
   V12   EBIT / Total Assets (Yearn+1)  
* Variables defined according to Compustat (Global) Data Guide. In order of 
appearance: 
 
Figure 2.1. Scheme of the analysis 
 
31/12/1993        31/12/1994                                           31/12/2001      31/12/2002 
                                                                                                                                     
Capacities                                 ………………             Capacities 
  Results        Results 
  Stability       Stability 
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2.5. The methodology 
In order to evidence the underlying structural characteristics of the companies 
facing a financial distress situation, we chose to use Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). 
Briefly, Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) (Kruskal and Wish, 1984) is a multivariate 
statistical analysis tool that produces graphical representations of the main 
characteristics of a data matrix (Neophytou and Mar Molinero, 2004). This technique is 
based on the generalization of the principal component analysis that allows representing 
the similarities or differences between various elements according to the distances 
between certain variables (Peña, 2002). MDS produces a consensus map when the 
observed individuals are represented according to the underlying variable’s structure. 
The similarities between the structures of the individuals can be observed through the 
proximity of the represented points, so that if two individuals appear close to each other 
it is because they share similar information. On the contrary they will be positioned far 
from each other if their information is not similar.  
This technique has been used before in the analysis of company failure (Mar 
Molinero and Ezzamel, 1991; Mar Molinero and Serrano-Cinca, 2001; Neophytou and 
Mar Molinero, 2004 and 2005) although its use was focused on differentiating between 
failed and not failed companies. 
For this study we chose the ordinal scaling which works with orderings and does 
not require the data to be measured on a ratio or interval scale (Neophytou and Mar 
Molinero, 2004). MDS algorithm does not make any assumptions about the distribution 
of the financial ratios applied in the analysis and no prior data reduction is necessary. 
For a list of advantages of this technique see Neophytou and Mar Molinero (2004). 
The variables of the original data matrix can also be projected onto the consensus 
map by the Co-Plot methodology. The coordinates of the variables’ positions will be 
estimates by a multi-regression process using each variable as dependent variable and 
the coordinates that locate companies in the space as explanatory variables so that:  
ZVin= β0 + β1dim1n + β2dim2n + … + βJdimJn + ei 
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where ZVin is the standardized value of variable n (n=1,2,…,n) for company i (i= 
1,2,…,i). 
2.6. Empirical results and discussion 
The presence of discordant observations was identified when standardized values 
of one or more variable exceeded two and a half (Mar Molinero and Serrano-Cinca, 
2001). These discordant observations do not affect our analysis since the MDS 
algorithm uses relations of order so the results are robust to their presence. For the 
projection of the points in the map we chose not to omit these cases although the 
graphical representation is visually less attractive than when the outliers were omitted. 
Euclidean distance was selected as dissimilarity measure to calculate the proximity 
between two given companies. When the measure of dissimilarity among two 
companies is small the points in the space will have a short distance in between. In the 
same way, in the presence of large values of dissimilarity the companies will be placed 
far from each other. Thus, companies that in the representation of the initial year of 
analysis (1993) and in the final year of analysis (2002) are located close to each other 
share similar economic and financial structure according to the selected explicative 
variables. 
One of the most important decisions for the interpretability of the data is the 
number of dimensions in which MDS map is to be drawn. Determining the 
dimensionality of the MDS maps is equivalent to determining the number of 
components in Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (Mar Molinero and Ezzamel, 
1991). A prior PCA procedure would help in determining the accurate number of 
dimensions for the MDS analysis. The results of this PCA analysis are shown in the 
Appendix (E and F for the year 1993 data, G and H for the year 2002 data). These 
results only present information on how the initial data can be reduced in a less number 
of factors. 
In this study we determined the dimensionality of the MDS maps by means of the 
“elbow test”, which is, examining how the goodness-of-fit measure changes as the 
number of dimensions increases (Neophytou and Mar Molinero, 2004). The goodness-
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of-fit measure chosen for this study is the Kruskals’ Stress1 which measures the level of 
agreement between distances calculated from the map and the dissimilarities from 
which the map was derived. The stress measure turns out to be a “residual sum of 
squares”, it is positive and the smaller the better (Kruskal, 1964) (see Table 2.4). Table 
4 shows how the values of Stress1 change as the number of dimensions increases in the 
first year of the analysis, 1993. This relationship can be seen graphically in Figure 2.2. 
The same procedure was performed for the year 2002 data and the results can be seen in 
Appendix I and Appendix J. 
Table 2.4. Kruskal's Stress1 Evaluation 
Stress  Goodness of fit 
20%  poor 
10%  fair 
5%  good 
2,50%  excellent 
0%  "perfect" 
  
Based on these results, a 5-dimensional space would give a good representation 
for both years (1993 and 2002) and these results are in agreement with the prior-PCA 
analysis. In analyzing financial ratios, researchers identify up to seven factors so that a 
representation in seven dimensions would be adequate (Mar Molinero and Ezzamel, 
1991). For this paper, the first five principal components in 1993 were associated with 
eigenvalues larger than 0.78 and accounted for 84% of the total variance (see Appendix 
E). Thus, a five dimension analysis would be accurate, treating the remaining two 
dimensions as “residual variation” (Mar Molinero and Ezzamel, 1991). Nonetheless, for 
the visual representation it would be very difficult to interpret the distances between 
points in a 5-dimensional space. As a consequence, only the first 3 dimensions which 
better represent the differences and similarities between companies are exposed. This 
conclusion is in agreement with the stress1 level (0.057) which indicates that a solution 
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in three dimensions gives a good representation for the year 1993 (0.058 for the year 
2002). 










Figure 2.2. Stress1 Elbow Diagram for the year 1993 
 
2.6.1. Structure analysis and underlying patterns 
In order to observe the evolution and the movements that took place during the 
periods of analysis, we are going to represent the companies in two ways. Firstly, we 
will consider the number of symptoms the companies met at the beginning of the period 
(year1993) and secondly we will consider the Z-score classification for that same period 
on indicative basis only. The possible existence of divergences in the positions based on 
these criteria would allow detecting to what extent the failure risk can be disguised 
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under a slight group of symptoms. In the same way, the positions of the companies 
based on financial statement data for the year 2002 will also be represented in two 
ways. Firstly, we will consider the number of symptoms each company met in the year 
2002 and secondly, we will consider the final situation focusing on number of 
symptoms the companies had in the first year of analysis (year 1993). The possible 
existence of similarities between companies in each analyzed period allows us to detect 
those structures conditioning the evolution of the companies. If those similarities exist 
we may be able to affirm that the failure process is a degenerative form of a certain 
risky situation.  
Running the twelve linear regressions, one for each variable, and by means of the 
Co-Plot methodology, we obtained the coordinates of the variables representing the 
structural characteristics of the companies. The regression coefficient results for the 
year 1993 and 2002 are reported in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7, respectively. In this way 
we try to explain up to what point the value that a particular variable takes for a given 
company is associated with the position in the space of the point that represents that 
company (Neophytou and Mar Molinero, 2004). In general, the results are powerful 
enough to interpret the maps.  Note that the goodness of fit, R Square, of the variables 
for the year 1993 exceeds 65% except for the variable V11 which had the worst 
goodness of fit with a level of 54,5%. In the same way, the worst result for the goodness 
of fit for the year 2002 (Table 2.7) was a level of 68,7% corresponding to variable V11. 
For the rest of variables the goodness of fit exceeded 70%. 
The coordinate point that marks the position of each variable can be connected 
with the origin of the axes by a vector that helps interpreting the importance of each 
variable in the plotted dimensions. The vectors length indicates the variables that are 
better represented by the chosen factorial planes. If the feature of the data associated 
with the vector is not associated with the projection, the vector will have a short length.  
The angle between the vector and the plotted dimension demonstrates the importance of 
the features of a variable in the projection, so that an acute angle between variable 
vector and dimension indicates that that dimension is strongly related to that variable. If 
two vector endpoints are located next to each other it means that their associated 
variables convey similar information. 
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Table 2.6. Regression coefficient results for the year 1993 
DIM1 DIM2 DIM3 DIM4 DIM5 DIM6 DIM7
Dependent Variable Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
ZV1 1,34E-17 -0,762 1,724 -0,404 -2,713 0,076 0,865 0,523 74,4%
ZV2 -1E-16 -0,989 2,008 -0,906 1,492 0,071 0,010 0,106 78,0%
ZV3 1,09E-15 0,455 -1,113 -2,796 -0,604 1,910 -1,183 -0,056 84,6%
ZV4 2,56E-16 1,703 1,406 -0,319 0,162 -1,156 -0,282 0,130 89,9%
ZV5 1,15E-17 1,840 0,988 -0,596 0,116 -0,805 0,006 -0,545 89,6%
ZV6 1,02E-16 1,343 1,357 0,356 0,038 0,979 -1,578 -0,372 69,4%
ZV7 -2,39E-16 -1,122 1,581 -0,597 1,220 1,450 -0,447 -0,105 69,1%
ZV8 3,86E-17 1,737 1,285 -0,280 0,071 -1,298 -0,241 0,413 90,0%
ZV9 2,28E-17 1,736 0,488 -0,873 -0,681 -1,335 -0,845 -0,453 82,8%
ZV10 -1,71E-16 -0,971 1,856 0,676 -0,964 0,398 -0,450 -0,197 64,9%
ZV11 3,66E-16 0,789 0,151 1,959 -0,042 2,211 -0,443 -0,085 54,5%







Table 2.7. Regression coefficient results for the year 2002 
DIM1 DIM2 DIM3 DIM4 DIM5 DIM6 DIM7
Dependent Variable Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
ZV1 -1,54E-16 0,199 -2,071 -0,571 -0,635 1,697 -2,260 0,836 83,8%
ZV2 9,34E-17 0,141 -2,217 -0,025 -0,453 -0,615 1,578 0,188 71,2%
ZV3 -5,96E-16 -0,286 0,716 3,044 1,434 0,535 -0,318 0,960 72,9%
ZV4 2,61E-16 -2,059 -0,388 0,497 -0,515 0,143 -0,409 -1,780 92,1%
ZV5 -7,91E-17 -2,107 0,073 0,506 -0,872 -0,778 -0,576 0,073 92,0%
ZV6 5,33E-17 -1,706 -0,485 -0,584 0,789 0,108 0,392 1,764 69,9%
ZV7 5,68E-16 0,162 -2,219 0,458 0,927 -1,599 1,021 -0,506 78,8%
ZV8 1,16E-17 -2,075 -0,276 0,564 -0,560 0,106 -0,565 -1,495 91,5%
ZV9 1,58E-16 -1,939 0,160 0,537 -0,846 -0,748 -0,128 1,774 84,9%
ZV10 -3,28E-16 -0,408 -1,857 0,370 2,098 -0,613 -1,923 -0,458 79,8%
ZV11 -3,89E-17 -0,636 0,571 -2,476 1,934 -1,217 -0,112 -0,361 68,7%







Bivariate correlation matrix between the variables for year 1993 and 2002 can be 
found in Appendix C and D, respectively. 
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It can be noticed that in 1993 (Figure 2.3 for dimension 1 and 2; Figure 2.4 for 
dimension 1 and 3) there is a clear differentiation between the companies being in a 
weak crisis, which are located on the right of dimension 1 (x-axis), and those being in a 
harsh crisis, located on the left side of dimension 1. This differentiation is much more 
remarkable if we focus on companies that fulfill 1 symptom located in a safety zone of 
profitability (the upper-right quadrant) and those who present problems in the 
generation of income and cash-flow (located in the bottom-left quadrant). Thus, 
dimension 1 could be associated to the crisis status. In the same way, and according to 
the positions of variables V1, V2, V7 and V10, dimension 2 would be related to 
solvency and reaction ability in the financial structure. This fact would allow affirming 
that each quadrant assembles companies with a similar underlying structure in 1993, the 
starting year of the analysis.   
In order to determine to what extent the companies are represented by the factorial 
planes, according to their symptoms, we performed a logistic regression where the 
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of the number of fulfilled criteria and 
the independent variables are the coordinates of the companies in each dimension. The 
results here not exposed, showed that, except for the companies with 5 symptoms, the 
rest of the group-symptom was not well represented. This fact allows affirming that the 
group of symptoms is not representative of a common underlying structure for the 
companies that belong to the same group. However, the results of the logistic regression 
improve when we consider the separation between companies in weak crisis (1, 2 or 3 
criteria) and those in harsh crisis (4, 5 or 6 criteria), confirming the results visually 
obtained in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. 
 
The consensus map obtained by the MDS methodology provides us a picture of 
the structural features underlying in the analyzed data set of firms. In this sense, Table 
2.8 gathers the profiles of firms according to their placement on the map by combining 
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Table 2.8.Firms’ profile according to map zones. 
Reaction Path zone Safety zone
Financial reaction ability Solid economic and financial
structure
Solid economic and financial structure Income generation
Cash flow generation




Resource generation potential by
operating level
 
Figure 2.5 reflects, only on an informative basis, the positions of the companies 
using the failure risk, measured through Z-score93, to differentiate them. The 
companies with low risk appear clearly differentiated but we cannot affirm that their 
data structure is different from the companies with very high risk, which are located 
indistinctly in the four quadrants. There exists a difference between failure Z-risk and 
the number of crisis symptoms, except for the group of companies that show 5 criteria 
and very high risk. 
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A similar representation is reached by the MDS analysis in the year 2002 (Figure 
2.6). Dimension 1 separates the companies with more than four criteria to the right of 
the axis and companies in a weak crisis situation or that have solved this situation to the 
left part of the axis. The same results could be seen when we represented the companies 
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in dimensions 1 and 3 (Figure 2.7). It can also be noticed that dimension 2 distinguishes 
between the positions of the companies that have a different degree of strong crisis 
situation.  




Those companies that fulfill 5 criteria are located in the bottom-right part of the 
axis 2 and those that fulfill 6 or 7 symptoms are positioned in the upper-right part of the 
same axis.  
For the year 2002 (Figure 2.6), the companies that satisfy certain conditions seem 
to share a common data structure. As dimension 1 is mainly related with V4, V5 and 
V12, it represents the achievement and performance of the company. 
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The companies located in the left of dimension 1 are characterized by their 
strengths in the performance and they are in their way to recovery. It is to emphasize 
that the variable Operating Income/Total Assets, which measures the strength or 
stability of the way out, is an important variable when the companies are positioned on 
the left side of dimension one. In this sense, the idea that companies which survive 
crisis periods are characterized by a strong managerial action is reaffirmed (Kahl, 2001; 
Routledge and Gadenne, 2000). This managerial action is measured by Operating 
Income/Total Assets. On the other hand, these companies are also distinguished because 
they achieve higher Cash flow as well as Operating Cash flow.  
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Dimension 2 gathers information related to variables describing the financial 
structure. So, those companies located in the lower part of the dimension 2 indicate 
solidity with respect to their working capital or to their financial autonomy (V2, V7 and 
V10). It can be noticed that the companies that fulfill 6 or 7 symptoms have important 
financial deficiencies and they are grouped separately from the rest of the companies. 
Among the companies that fulfill 4 and 5 criteria we can detect two groups: the first one 
is made of companies that have economic and financial deficiencies and lie on the right 
of dimension 1. The second one is made of companies with financial deficiencies and 
lie on the upper part of dimension 2. 
The V11 should be interpreted very carefully in both years. As previously 
exposed, it is only an indicative variable of a status: to be able to cover the financial 
costs of external debt by means of operating income achieved. It does not measure the 
degree of this coverage ability. It is used only to determine the existence of a risky 
situation or not. 
2.6.2. Position displacements of companies with respect to their initial 
situation. 
It is of our interest to analyze the starting point of the companies that have 
survived or are in a phase of overcoming the crisis situation. For this purpose, Figure 
2.8 is a duplicate of Figure 2.6 but here the companies are represented using their 
positional markers of severity in the year 1993. Through this representation, we can 
observe the initial and final economic-financial structure profiles of the firms. 
Notice that, although the companies that are in a weak crisis situation in 2002 
started from that same situation in 1993, there is an outstanding group of companies that 
come from situations of strong crisis (5 and 6 fulfilled criteria). It is possible to affirm 
that there are groups of companies that share similar economic and financial structures 
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This fact can come motivated by two reasons: 
1. The crisis in its origin was weak and its development does not cause major 
problems. 
2. Certain structural deficiencies can be faced by the companies without any 
difficulties and can be solved by making “routine” decisions. 
There is a group of companies that started with 5 or 6 criteria in 1993 and were 
able to overcome the situation in 2002 by either resolving all the problems or improving 
their situation presenting only one criterion.  In this way, the analysis detected that these 
companies shared of common underlying data structures in spite of indicating different 
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crisis symptoms. This fact would allow affirming that there are some identity signs in 
the companies that make them more propitious to solve a crisis situation in spite of 
showing certain symptoms. These companies did not have an economic achievement 
deficiency (so presenting a light crisis) or it was not their most important deficiency (so 
presenting a strong crisis).  
Table 2.9 assembles the number of companies in each crisis-zone for the year 
1993 and 2002. Each zone defines the characteristics of the economic and financial of 
the companies located inside. These characteristics are the result of the interpretation of 
the variable representativeness in each dimensional space.  
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82% of the companies that in 1993 were positioned in the healthy zone (right part 
of dimension 1) are placed in the same healthy zone in the 2002 chart. 42% of these 
companies derive from the so-called safety zone and 58% from the Resource generation 
zone. Many of them could resolve the crisis situation in spite of starting from a 
complicated group of symptoms (4% of them showed a severe crisis based on the 
selection criteria). These companies did not present deficiencies of economic 
performance and they are ability to generate resources. This fact may have allowed 
them to be placed in a better position and to improve their position. A total of 100% of 
the companies that in 1993 were located in the safety zone, presented a weak crisis (1, 2 
or 3 criteria). 84% of them maintain their placement in this safety zone in the year 2002, 
confirming the idea that a weak crisis is easier to resolve or it can be “self-healed”. 76% 
of the companies that in 1993 were located in the healthy zone (specifically in the 
Resource Generation zone) and presenting a severe crisis (4 or more criteria) are also 
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located in the safety zone of the 2002 chart. This movement confirms the fact that 
retaining certain symptoms of difficulties does not condition the underlying structure. 
These companies shared similar profiles with the ones that had fewer criterions and 
have evolved in a similar way, mainly improving their situation. 
More than half of the companies that in 1993 presented damaged economic and 
financial structures, together with income generation issues, are mainly positioned on 
the right of dimension 1 in 2002. For these companies the crisis process seems to be 
“not reversible”. The displacement of companies that in 1993 presented the same 
damaged structure but moved towards the “safety zone” (left part of the 2002 chart),  
was mainly achieved through the effort made during the crisis period. This effort can be 
measured by the ratio Net Income/Total Assets which reflects the economic action and 
the adjustments measures taken from the directive board of the company facing a crisis 
situation.  
The Reaction Path zone has a similar number of firms in weak crisis and severe 
crisis in 1993. Nevertheless, the evolution towards the danger zone in 2002 is more 
notable (60% of the companies). This fact allows us affirming that the financial viability 
is not sufficient if it is not done together with an accurate economic performance in 
order to generate income and Cash flow for the debt payments. 
Finally, we cannot notice any remarkable movements for the companies that in 
1993 were positioned in the danger zone.  This fact implies very similar results for the 
companies that resolved their situation and those that worsened their position. 52% of 
them have shifted towards the healthy zone in the year 2002, even when presenting a 
severe crisis in 73% of these cases. This is certainly a group of interest for future 
research as they are companies with similar deficit situation and symptoms but with a 
very different evolution. The evolution process followed by these firms proves that the 
crisis situation can be efficiently managed, despite of the starting severity degree. 
Regarding the initial and final positions, Table 2.9 indicates: 
 Firms that present a stable economic and financial situation are mainly 
grouped as in weak crisis based on the criteria widely accepted. 
 The number of criteria initially used to classify a firm as being in crisis 
(weak or strong) does not seem to determine the evolution process. 
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 An accurate economic performance (profitability and the ability to 
generate resources) is a fundamental factor in fighting a crisis situation. 
2.7. Conclusions 
Some weak crisis situations tend to show a natural evolution throughout the “exit” 
and may be solved by simply making “routine” decisions. In our study, an important 
group of companies that did resolve the situation started from a weak crisis in the year 
1993 with deficiencies mainly related to the financial structure in the short term. The 
“momentary” character of these situations may be one of the reasons that these 
companies end up in a similar situation at the end of the period of analysis. 
The interesting part is when companies that start off a critical situation are been 
able to resolve it. This allows considering that failure is a reversible process and it is not 
necessarily degenerative if the company is able to achieve an effort in its economic 
performance. However, the situations of harsh or severe crises tend to generate those 
same situations throughout the years. Most of the companies with similar “degenerated” 
economic and financial structures are more exposed to an evolutionary-degenerative 
process although they maintain themselves in the market throughout the years.  
The evidence shows that the companies that have resolved the crisis situation: 
1. Have achieved an important effort in their economic performance during the 
crisis and this effort has allowed them to reinforce their situation. 
2. Shared common structure characteristics with companies that had less problems 
and slighter symptoms of crisis.  
This fact allows affirming that the symptoms are only manifestations of an 
underlying situation. The deficiencies and gravities of this situation are the factors that 
determine the changes in the crisis situation. Severity of the initial situation does not 
have to be a crucial factor in the outcome of the crisis and distressed firms with 
remarkable financial reaction capability and/or a solid financial structure evolve mainly 
toward a healthy zone. 
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It is to consider that, none of the firms identified as in a financial distress situation 
in 1993, and in conformity with the selected sample, incurred in a bankruptcy process 
during the period analyzed. 
It would be interesting to analyze the differences in profiles between firms that 
faced some financial distress situation and managed to recover and those that being in 
the same situation did not recover. The next step of this research could be to identify the 
relationship between some control variables such as size, industry, macroeconomic 
factor, etc. and the possibility of revolving the situation. In addition, the fact that the 
efforts in performance and behavior during a crisis situation are important features of a 
positive outcome would make it interesting to analyze to what extent the “management” 
of the crisis process determines this outcome. 
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A. Descriptive Statistics for the variables (year 1993) 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
V1 524 -0,757 115,780 2,192 7,094
V2 524 0,112 70,667 3,031 5,832
V3 524 0,000 7,088 1,073 0,859
V4 524 -2,008 0,405 -0,044 0,210
V5 524 -1,903 0,632 0,009 0,197
V6 524 -13,096 0,796 -0,285 1,113
V7 524 -1,126 0,986 0,214 0,294
V8 524 -1,954 0,418 0,004 0,207
V9 524 -1,589 0,444 0,013 0,183
V10 524 -3,123 0,986 0,416 0,323
V11 524 -520,890 8.161,000 179,229 750,448
V12 524 -2,954 0,589 0,014 0,229  
B. Descriptive Statistics for the variables (year 2002) 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
V1 524 -0,855 33,560 1,537 3,245
V2 524 0,077 52,094 2,759 4,862
V3 524 0,000 5,677 1,059 0,879
V4 524 -2,280 1,171 -0,043 0,257
V5 524 -2,217 0,588 0,014 0,199
V6 524 -19,453 1,048 -0,405 1,933
V7 524 -1,752 0,950 0,175 0,298
V8 524 -2,231 1,206 0,009 0,246
V9 524 -1,789 0,384 0,043 0,179
V10 524 -5,912 0,971 0,382 0,412
V11 524 -3.307,000 18.204,000 317,030 1.617,447




C. Bivariate Correlations of the Variables (year 1993) 
 
    V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 
V1 Pearson Correlation 1            
  Sig. (2-tailed)              
V2 Pearson Correlation ,555(**) 1           
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000             
V3 Pearson Correlation -,194(**) -,196(**) 1          
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000            
V4 Pearson Correlation -,087(*) -,134(**) ,027 1         
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,047 ,002 ,540           
V5 Pearson Correlation -,147(**) -,203(**) ,142(**) ,928(**) 1        
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,000 ,001 ,000          
V6 Pearson Correlation -,052 -,081 -,039 ,690(**) ,696(**) 1       
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,231 ,064 ,377 ,000 ,000         
V7 Pearson Correlation ,296(**) ,552(**) -,086(*) -,150(**) -,255(**) -,069 1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,048 ,001 ,000 ,116        
V8 Pearson Correlation -,110(*) -,172(**) ,036 ,987(**) ,916(**) ,668(**) -,200(**) 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,012 ,000 ,415 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000       
V9 Pearson Correlation -,149(**) -,230(**) ,180(**) ,709(**) ,779(**) ,580(**) -,432(**) ,734(**) 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000      
V10 Pearson Correlation ,315(**) ,365(**) -,331(**) -,079 -,228(**) ,046 ,599(**) -,102(*) -,286(**) 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,070 ,000 ,292 ,000 ,019 ,000     
V11 Pearson Correlation -,041 -,091(*) -,081 ,109(*) ,120(**) ,113(**) -,197(**) ,106(*) ,130(**) -,091(*) 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,351 ,036 ,065 ,013 ,006 ,009 ,000 ,015 ,003 ,037    
V12 Pearson Correlation -,241(**) -,322(**) ,268(**) ,608(**) ,709(**) ,441(**) -,307(**) ,608(**) ,641(**) -,268(**) ,113(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,010   
             
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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D. Bivariate Correlations of the Variables (year 2002) 
  
    V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 
V1 Pearson Correlation 1            
  Sig. (2-tailed)              
V2 Pearson Correlation ,496(**) 1           
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000             
V3 Pearson Correlation -,153(**) -,181(**) 1          
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000            
V4 Pearson Correlation -,008 -,003 ,064 1         
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,856 ,938 ,144           
V5 Pearson Correlation -,087(*) -,088(*) ,113(**) ,861(**) 1        
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,045 ,044 ,010 ,000          
V6 Pearson Correlation -,032 ,002 ,010 ,592(**) ,607(**) 1       
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,459 ,959 ,827 ,000 ,000         
V7 Pearson Correlation ,385(**) ,535(**) -,068 ,044 -,090(*) ,101(*) 1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,122 ,309 ,039 ,021        
V8 Pearson Correlation -,029 -,039 ,084 ,985(**) ,868(**) ,584(**) -,001 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,501 ,375 ,056 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,984       
V9 Pearson Correlation -,117(**) -,102(*) ,137(**) ,708(**) ,858(**) ,591(**) -,103(*) ,752(**) 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,008 ,019 ,002 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,018 ,000      
V10 Pearson Correlation ,391(**) ,268(**) -,092(*) ,275(**) ,139(**) ,278(**) ,574(**) ,269(**) ,123(**) 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,034 ,000 ,001 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,005     
V11 Pearson Correlation -,047 -,073 -,070 ,106(*) ,136(**) ,082 -,115(**) ,106(*) ,110(*) -,013 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,282 ,094 ,107 ,015 ,002 ,062 ,009 ,015 ,012 ,769    
V12 Pearson Correlation -,130(**) -,113(**) ,063 ,698(**) ,872(**) ,521(**) -,122(**) ,714(**) ,763(**) ,089(*) ,129(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,003 ,010 ,151 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,005 ,000 ,000 ,042 ,003   
             
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 




E. Total Variance Explained for the year 1993 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4,973 41,441 41,441 4,973 41,441 41,441 
2 2,269 18,910 60,351 2,269 18,910 60,351 
3 1,134 9,447 69,798 1,134 9,447 69,798 
4 ,924 7,702 77,500       
5 ,788 6,567 84,067       
6 ,490 4,083 88,150       
7 ,438 3,650 91,800       
8 ,383 3,192 94,992       
9 ,326 2,720 97,712       
10 ,198 1,650 99,362       
11 ,067 ,554 99,917       
12 ,010 ,083 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
F. Component Matrix* for the year 1993 
 
   
Component 
1 2 3 
ZV1** -,296 ,590 -,049 
ZV2 -,395 ,669 ,096 
ZV3 ,202 -,392 ,661 
ZV4 ,888 ,360 ,014 
ZV5 ,940 ,214 ,062 
ZV6 ,702 ,399 -,065 
ZV7 -,449 ,638 ,318 
ZV8 ,898 ,315 ,006 
ZV9 ,861 ,035 ,011 
ZV10 -,350 ,683 -,032 
ZV11 ,185 -,080 -,743 
ZV12 ,785 -,071 ,151 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
* 3 components extracted. 
** ZV indicates the standardized variables 
 




G. Total Variance Explained for the year 2002 
 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 









1 4,790 39,916 39,916 4,790 39,916 39,916 
2 2,433 20,274 60,190 2,433 20,274 60,190 
3 1,085 9,042 69,232 1,085 9,042 69,232 
4 ,864 7,203 76,435       
5 ,752 6,269 82,704       
6 ,598 4,984 87,688       
7 ,497 4,145 91,833       
8 ,395 3,291 95,124       
9 ,284 2,370 97,494       
10 ,225 1,872 99,366       
11 ,065 ,544 99,910       
12 ,011 ,090 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 




1 2 3 
ZV1** -,091 ,725 -,081 
ZV2 -,090 ,749 -,052 
ZV3 ,112 -,260 ,707 
ZV4 ,920 ,110 ,012 
ZV5 ,959 -,059 -,002 
ZV6 ,719 ,144 -,007 
ZV7 -,037 ,821 ,173 
ZV8 ,933 ,070 ,021 
ZV9 ,882 -,090 ,037 
ZV10 ,245 ,726 ,061 
ZV11 ,158 -,123 -,733 
ZV12 ,862 -,116 -,047 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
*  3 components extracted. 
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Chapter III. Overcoming decline in firms facing financial distress: 
Determinant factors of recovery process 
3.1. Introduction 
 The results of the previous chapter have shown that the initial crisis situation of 
firms may influence the evolution process. Certain situations of weak crisis appear to 
follow a natural evolution in a positive sense, such that firms manage to save their 
circumstances without major effort, subsequently placing themselves in a healthy 
scenario. In the same line, certain strong crisis situations seem to follow a degenerative 
process, maintaining their deficient initial position or even worsen it. However, the 
results also evidence that, in many cases, firms with different crisis symptoms shared 
structural characteristics which made them evolve in the same direction.  
The model exposed in Chapter I proposed that the Post-distress status is a 
consequence of the initial severity degree of the crisis, as well as of certain 
characteristics that allow acting as enhancer  or reducers of the final resolution of a 
crisis process. Nevertheless, the model also included other series of factors such as the 
different strategies that may successfully guide a company through the exit of the crisis 
situation, or issues associated with the behavior during the in-distress period.  
The evidence gathered in the studies exposed in Chapter I, regarding the fact that 
firms resolving their crisis situation show high profitability during recovery process is 
also observed in the results obtained in Chapter II. The return to a healthy scenario was 
associated with performance ratios. This matter appears to be a warranty in order to 
maintain the new status. 
Post-distress Status assesses not only if a firm resolves the initial crisis situation, 
but also the quality of firms’ welfare accounting for the risk of re-entry into distress. 
This line permits to consider a Fitness indicator discriminating between well-
performers, which just exit the crisis situation, and best-performers, which are located in 
a new healthy scenario minimizing the likelihood to re-enter in distress  
This approach allows us to test the model of recuperation of companies facing a 
financial distress situation when the Fitness in a post-distress status could be influenced 
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by specific variables related to initial structural characteristics of a firm as well as by 
strategies employed during a distress process.  
3.2. The hypotheses 
Continuing with the exploratory results of the evolutionary patterns analysis in a 
financial distress situation, and in accordance with the recovery model exposed in 
Chapter I, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
- H1: Severity degree of financially distressed firms is likely associated 
with the post distress status. 
- H2: Reaction Capability of distressed firms is positively related to a fit 
final position after recovery process.  
- H3: Performance in-distress is positively related with the welfare of the 
post distress status. 
- H4: Retrenchment strategies have a positive influence on the outcome of 
a distressed situation.  
- H5: Size of financially distressed companies is associated with the final 
position after recovery process. 
3.3. The sample 
To test the proposed hypotheses, we use the same sample of 526 US firms 
identified as being in a distressed situation. Considering the wider scenario of Poston et 
al. (1994), our analysis will be performed during the years 1993 until 2000. The US 
economy experienced an economic expansion during the analyzed period. According to 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (2001), a peak in business activity occurred 
in the U.S. economy in March 2001. A peak marks the end of an expansion and the 
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beginning of a recession
1
. So, the year 2001 was marked by events like the Dot-Com 
Bubble, Stock Market Crash, the loss of investor’s confidence in the Stock Market or 
the emergence of corporate fraud and corporate governance. The September 11, 2001 
attacks also, may have been an important factor in turning this decline in the economy 
into a recession. The financial data for the years after 2000 would be, to a greater or 
lesser extent, influenced by all these external factors. Stopping the analysis in the year 
2000 could be more appropriate for the stability of the same. 
3.4. The variables  
Severity Status, Reaction Capability and Fitness Status, as representative 
indicators of post-distress position, in the model proposed recovery model in Figure 1.1 
(Chapter I), are built by gathering information given by some individual variable-
indicators according to the features evaluated. The complete picture integrating the 
model and variables is showed in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1. Variables of influence in a recovery process 
 
 
                                                 
1 The NBER does not define a recession in terms of two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP. Rather, a 
recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, 
normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail 
sales. http://www.nber.org/cycles.html  
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Severity status (SEV_STAT) should be understood as an index assessing the 
degree of severity distress by seven financial ratios. These ratios correspond to the 7 
symptom-indicators used to classify a firm as being in financial distress previously 
described, all divided by Total Assets in order to eliminate the size effect. Ratios such 
as: Net Income/Total Assets, EBIT/Total Assets and Retained Earnings/Total assets, 
representatives of the economic performance, are also commonly used to determine the 
existence of a decline phase in turnaround and recovery research (Pearce and Robins 
1993, Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, Smith and Graves 2005). Negative Operating Cash 
Flow is also an indicator of liquidity deterioration and of financial distress probability 
(Anandarajan et al. 2001, Bell and Tabor 1991, John 1993).  These seven indicators 
should be considered in a negative direction with respect to financial distress. That is, 
the lower value of the indicators, the worse the starting situation of the firm. In the same 
way, the more the number of negative indicators in a firm, the higher the crisis severity 
degree will be. 
Reaction capability is evaluated through three indicators: Sales/Total Assets 
(TURNOV), Shareholders Equity/Total Liabilities (FIN_AUT) and Current 
Assets/Current Liabilities (SOLV). The first one reflects the capacity of the company to 
enhance profitability while the other two indicators are linked to the financial structure 
of a firm and enable us to value its self-sufficiency and solvency. Together, these three 
variables measure the capacity of a firm to obtain external and additional funds or to 
reorganize its debts, the short term response capacity and the ability to generate 
resources. 
 Fitness status (FIT_STAT) is defined as an index measuring the final health 
position on an objective and on a quality base as well, by means of 4 variables. Final 
Position is a categorical variable which indicates the existence or not of a crisis 
situation, when the firm still presents any symptom of distress. This variable takes value 
0 if the firm exits successfully and doesn’t present distress signals or value 1 otherwise. 
Additionally, to measure the health quality of this position, we follow the approach of 
Jostarndt (2006) when he identifies three factors that could cause financial distress: 
excessive leverage, a poor firm-specific operating performance and an industry 
downturn. These factors could be interpreted as indicators of the incapacity of a firm to 
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generate cash flow which may influence a continuous economic and financial 
deterioration. The variables are defined as follows:  
- Debt payment level: it permits the evaluation of the effects that a higher 
debt level of a firm has on cash flow generation, with respect to the industry 
where it operates. It indicates the level of interest payment the firm is paying 
compared to the median of the sector. If the level is above the median, the firm 
is paying more than other firms, so it should reduce it. 
- Firm Performance: It measures the effects that a poor performance, 
lower than the median of the industry, has on cash flow generation. It measures 
the operating income of a firm compared to the median of the sector. It indicates 
if the firm is performing above or below the median of the sector. 
- Sector performance: it allows analyzing to what extent the trend of the 
performance of the sector where the firm operates influences its capacity to 
generate cash flow if it behaved as the industry average. This item measures the 
improvement or the deterioration of a sector’s performance, compared to its 
performance the year before. 
(For further details on all variables correlations and calculation refer to Appendix 
II A and II B, respectively). 
These three variables measure the risk of distress which could be the consequence 
of leverage problems or economic issues, including the downturn of the industry. The 
former three defined ratio-indicators should be understood in a negative sense, thus, the 
higher the three ratios are, the worse the quality position of the firm and the greater the 
probability of financial distress. Therefore, Fitness Status variable measures the position 
of a firm t years after the financial distress has been detected, allowing to evaluate the 
performance in managing a difficult situation.  
Severity Status and Fitness Status indexes could be interpreted as two composite 
indicators gathering the information of 7 and 3 individual ratios, respectively. To 
overcome some of the drawbacks of aggregated indexes, such as the degree of 
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subjectivity in attribution of weights to each individual component (Munda 2005, 
Messer et al. 2006, Munda and Nardo 2009, Ramzan et al. 2008), we decided to use 
Data Envelopment analysis to summarize the complex information in just one index 
(Nardo et al. 2005a, Cherchye et al. 2008, Dyckhoff and Allen 2001). DEA is a non-
parametric performance measurement technique, based on a productivity approach, 
widely used to evaluate the relative efficiency of Decision Making Units (Cooper et al. 
1999, Seiford 1997, Gattoufi et al. 2004, Sherman and Zhu 2006). However, this 
methodology has also been used to create indexes combining different components by 
means of an optimization process, when the structure of weights of these components is 
not known, and without making any assumption concerning the internal operations of a 
DMU (Cherchye et al. 2006, Zhu 2000 and 2001, Puig-Junoy 1998, Sexton and Lewis 
2003). Thus, both Severity Status and Fitness Status scores are obtained applying a 
DEA model without explicit inputs, called DEA-WEI models by Liu et al. (2011). This 
formulation, discussed by Lovell and Pastor (1999), considering a model with only 
outputs and a single constant input, has been used by Chen (2002) and Cooper et al. 
(2009), and it is similar to other approaches as DEA-R (Despic et al. 2007) or DEA-
Index composite (Cherchye et al. 2008).  
Fitness Status use as DEA variables a series of indicators that measure negative 
features of a firm and they are also linked to the possibility of presenting a marked 
financial distress situation. This consideration is in agreement with the called 
pessimistic DEA approach, where the efficiency frontier contains, using Azizi and 
Ajirlu (2011) terminology, the worst-practisers as efficient in being poor-performers. In 
this way, DMUs scoring unity or close to unity levels will be the ones with higher 
degree of severity in their financial distressed situation.  Furthermore, Fitness Score 
DEA manages a categorical variable - Final Status - indicating the existence or not of 
distress symptoms. In this sense we follow the approach of Banker and Morey (1986) 
concerning the treatment of exogenously fixed data. 
To measure the strategies and the behavior of firms during distress, profitability 
and downsizing actions have been included in the analysis. With regard to profitability, 
we use ROA in the last year of the analysis (ROA) and the average of its variations in 
the previous years (ROA_AVG) to measure the impact of efficiency oriented strategies 
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to the final post-distress position. Concerning downsizing actions, variations in total 
assets during previous year are included to measure the impact of retrenchment 
strategies (RET_STG). 
Finally, to control the size effect (SIZE), natural logarithm of sales [ln(sales)] is 
included in the analysis in order to assess the influence of size on the possibility to 
return on a healthy scenario. 
3.5. The methodology 
The DEA score Fitness Status will be treated as a dependent variable in order to 
analyze to what extent post-failure position could be explained by issues such as 
severity, reaction capability or certain strategies implemented by the firms. Many 
different approaches can be found in the literature when a DEA score is used as a 
dependent variable of a regression to relate “efficiency” to the factors and study their 
influence on the former. The consideration of the DEA score as a censored variable 
(showing values between zero and unity) has been the argument for using regression 
censored models such as Tobit. On the other hand, Mancebón and Molinero (2000) do 
not share this opinion and affirm that efficiency takes natural limits of zero and one and 
they estimate a model of the log type to explain inefficiency. In the same line, Puig-
Junoy (1998) considers that DEA scores do not fit the theory of sampling censoring for 
Tobit models explaining inefficiency by a multiplicative function of the explanatory 
variables according to Banker and Johnston (1994). In spite of recent proposals by 
Simar and Wilson (2007) or the two-stage analyses proposed by Banker and Natarajan 
(2008), McDonald (2009) affirms that when efficiency scores are treated as descriptive 
assess of relative performance, OLS is an unbiased and consistent estimator to easily 
evaluate the influence of factors to this non-parametric performance measure. Hence, in 
line with McDonald (2009), the following functional form is exposed: 
Post-distress Status = f (SEV_STAT, FIN_AUT, SOLV, TURNOV, ROA, 
ROA_AVG, RET_STG, SIZE) 
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Poston et al. (1994) consider that a 7-8 years period is appropriate for a company 
to get ahead of a crisis situation. On the contrary, Kahl (2001) or Smith and Graves 
(2005) contemplate that a four-year period should be sufficient to detect if a firm in a 
distressed situation can successfully return to a healthy scenario. Considering these 
arguments, the above regression model to explain the post-distress position will be 
applied in both in a 3 and 8 year scenario, performing the analysis considering the 
outcome in a short and long term. Indeed, equation [1] reflects the final regression 
model applied for both 3 year and 8 year analysis. The regression has also been 
performed for each sector separately, in order to detect if there are differences in 
recovery models associated to industry. The analyzed sectors are: Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Industrials, Information Technology, 
Materials and Telecommunication Services.  
[1] Fitness Status = β1SEV_STAT + β2FIN_AUT + β3SOLV + β4TURNOV + β5ROA + 
β6ROA_AVG + β7RET_STG + β8SIZE + ε 
3.6. Empirical results and discussion 
The initial results of post-distress position (see Table 3.1) show that 8 years after a 
financial distress has been identified, a small number of firms (3 in concrete) are 
considered to be the worst performers and with a high distress risk according to the 
variable Fitness Status. In all the three cases, the firms started from a weak crisis 
situation in 1993, first year of analysis, presenting only one of the 7 symptoms used to 
classify this initial position. However, a considerable number of firms (37% of the total) 
obtain satisfactory results in the final year of the analysis, showing a Fitness Status 
close to zero (score < 0.0009). It is to remind that the variable Fitness Status, obtained 
by using a DEA methodology, is raised on a pessimistic sense. Hence, the scores near or 
equal to unity identify poor performers and, on the contrary, the scores near to 0 identify 
good performers. Approximately, 3 out of 4 of these firms presented a weak crisis 
situation in the first year. Clearly, it could be a positive insight in arguing that this weak 
crisis is a favorable condition for the evolution of the situation.  In the same line, of 190 
firms classified as “good performers”, 45% present a weak crisis in the last year of the 
analysis and a 40% was positioned in a healthy zone, showing no symptoms of distress.  
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Considering the assessment of various authors, stating that a 3-4 year period 
would be sufficient to display the recovery signals, we calculated the Fitness Status 
variable for an intermediate period, a three year scenario. In this case, the firms listed as 
poor performers increase to 5 firms, a number not that different from the 8 year 
scenario. Yet, the percentage of firms that three years after the classification of the 
distress situation obtained favorable Fitness Status Scores (<0.0001) reached 23%, 
compared to a 12% in the last year of analysis. Considering these results, we could 
actually contemplate that a 3-4 year period would be appropriate to recover a financially 
distressed situation. However, regarding the comparative results of the score frequency 
distribution exposed in Table 3.1, better results are obtained in the 8 year scenario so 
that we can affirm that the stabilization of the entire sample occurs in the long run. This 
situation could be explained by the fact that the firms detecting certain symptoms of 
adversity react by using “bump” measures which produce satisfactory results in the 
short run but they also reduce the possibility of the firm to maintain this stable situation. 
We could figuratively denominate this phenomenon as “spring recovery process”.  
Table 3.1. Score Frequency Distribution 
 3-year window 8-year window 
Firms scoring unity (Poor performers) 5 3 

















In spite of the fact that almost 50% of the companies do not present any distress 
symptoms three years after starting the analysis, the Fitness Status of the firms is better 
when considering the 8-year scenario. In particular, the average of the 8-year period is 
almost half the value of the 3 year period. Also, in 2000, 50% of the firms do not show 
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any crisis signal. However, these are not firms that have abandoned the critical situation 
in previous years. During the analyzed period, only 94 firms (18%) exit distress and do 
not enter again. This is the highest rate of abandon until 1997. The rest of the companies 
appear to survive in a continuous more or less severe crisis situation (42%) or living a 
nonstop enter/exit situation (40%), confirming the spring effect statement.  
The results of the Wilcoxon-test between two related paired samples allow 
affirming that the values of the Fitness Status variable, measuring the quality of a 
healthy/distressed new position are distinct between scores of the 3-year scenario and of 
the 8-year scenario and lower in the latter case with a significance level of 0.000. 
According to these results and the statements on the evolution of distress symptoms of 
firms during the analyzed period, it could be considered that a long term, as Kahl (2001) 
affirms, actually permits an effective outcome of a crisis situation.  
The regression results for the long term scenario (Table 3.2) offer satisfactory 
levels of goodness of fit for the global model (R
2
 = 66,4%) and for the individual 
sectors as well (between 61,1% for Consumer Discretionary and 91,2 % for the 
Materials industry). In the case of the three year scenario (Table 3.3), the global model 
reaches a R
2
 = 62,3% while the individual sectors obtain values between 89,5% for 
Information Technology and 65,4% for Consumer Staples, which is the worst 
represented. In both tables, D.V. refers to the Dependent variable and the sectors 
analyzed are: CD (Consumer Discretionary), CS (Consumer Staples), EN (Energy), 
IND (Industrials), IT (Information Technology), MA (Materials) and TS 
(Telecommunication Service) 
3.6.1. Determinants of the post-distress position 
Severity appears to be significant in the general model (p = 0.000) in explaining 
the performance of firms 8 years after the distress symptoms have been identified. 
However, the negative sign of its coefficient indicates that firms starting from a worse 
situation present a lower distress risk and a more solid position at the end of the 
analysis. These results permit affirming the hypothesis that the severity degree does not 




Table 3.2.  Regression coefficients and level of significance for the 8 year scenario 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
SEV_STAT -0,026 0,483 0,043 0,696 -0,047 0,714 -0,076 0,226 -0,107 0,065 -0,139 0,182 -0,078 0,755 -0,134 0,000
FIN_AUT -0,259 0,000 -0,111 0,384 -0,207 0,259 -0,067 0,299 -0,331 0,000 -0,341 0,011 -0,273 0,153 -0,029 0,318
SOLV -0,118 0,002 -0,224 0,292 -0,128 0,462 -0,295 0,000 -0,122 0,131 -0,204 0,175 0,496 0,326 -0,207 0,000
TURNOV -0,532 0,000 0,028 0,868 0,161 0,482 -0,417 0,000 -0,528 0,000 -0,190 0,135 0,354 0,300 -0,233 0,000
RET_STG 0,028 0,395 0,180 0,244 0,280 0,106 -0,001 0,984 0,112 0,027 0,000 0,998 -0,289 0,440 0,003 0,903
ROA -0,139 0,000 -0,586 0,006 -0,572 0,010 0,020 0,702 -0,072 0,148 -0,437 0,000 -0,495 0,122 -0,093 0,001
ROA_AVG 0,021 0,491 -0,121 0,333 0,015 0,879 0,012 0,763 0,077 0,107 0,070 0,486 0,335 0,136 0,024 0,338
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Table 3.3.  Regression coefficients and level of significance for the 3 year scenario 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
SEV_STAT 0,061 0,373 0,259 0,144 -0,180 0,080 -0,126 0,053 -0,054 0,319 0,068 0,545 -0,489 0,300 -0,062 0,056
FIN_AUT -0,256 0,001 -0,052 0,740 -0,061 0,545 -0,142 0,072 -0,395 0,000 -0,179 0,105 -0,379 0,200 -0,020 0,510
SOLV -0,016 0,813 -0,408 0,073 -0,467 0,002 -0,186 0,054 -0,125 0,097 -0,097 0,493 0,139 0,626 -0,210 0,000
TURNOV -0,312 0,002 0,102 0,639 -0,351 0,041 -0,148 0,139 -0,618 0,000 -0,239 0,101 -0,267 0,440 -0,362 0,000
RET_STG -0,079 0,229 0,297 0,069 -0,187 0,038 -0,101 0,081 -0,032 0,511 -0,164 0,106 0,135 0,489 -0,062 0,029
ROA -0,266 0,142 -0,509 0,252 0,049 0,817 -0,035 0,774 -0,326 0,002 -0,391 0,156 -0,439 0,728 -0,082 0,143
ROA_AVG 0,162 0,368 0,068 0,905 -0,415 0,044 -0,333 0,020 0,306 0,001 0,172 0,542 0,087 0,952 0,025 0,667
SIZE -0,319 0,004 -0,447 0,282 0,455 0,032 -0,134 0,141 0,127 0,150 -0,235 0,215 0,121 0,853 -0,287 0,000
Global
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89,50% 68,90% 78,70%
D.V: Fitness Status
73,50% 65,40% 84,00% 73,30%
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appropriate conditions. Thus, in both scenarios, the results show that our first hypothesis 
is supported as the association exists, yet, it is not in the same direction as in many 
studies. In this line, the outcomes could be coherent with two types of approach: 
i) According to Moulton and Thomas (1993), the starting situation will 
determine the outcome of the actions to be taken more than the final result of the 
recovery process. In the presence of a situation strongly shortcoming, the efficiency 
of the actions taken will produce remarkably satisfactory results in relation to the 
starting position. 
ii) According to Kahl (2002), the diagnosis of distress using financial 
indicators results in an imperfect measure of firm’s feasibility to recovery. In this 
sense, as spotted in the results of Chapter II, companies solving their distress 
situation share structural patterns more than just indicative symptoms of disorder.  
 
With regard to Reaction Capability, measured through financial autonomy, 
turnover and solvency ratios, there is lack of evidence in order to support our H2 
hypothesis. In this way, a suitable level of activity that generates resources (turnover 
ratio) and an appropriate management of the maturity period (solvency ratio) are crucial 
factors for the survival in distress situations. The results of these two variables, with a 
significance level of p=0.000, confirms the assessment of authors such as Barker and 
Duhaime (1997). On the contrary, financial autonomy does not seem to be of any 
significance on the Fitness Status after recovery. However, the results show that the 
interpretation is different if we consider the global model or whether the individual 
industries are analyzed. 
Profitability, which represents the performance during the analyzed period, was 
significant only when concerning the variable that measures the returns in terms of 
ROA and not when considering the average overall performance. This means that 
profitability is an important factor in representing a low risk situation. However, these 
results are not sufficient to conclude that continuous profitable performance is a 
necessary condition to overcome a difficult situation, as affirmed by Robbins and 
Pearce (1992) and Kahl (2001) and as a consequence we cannot support our H3 
hypothesis.  
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Regarding the influence of retrenchment strategies, measured by means of asset 
variation as downsizing actions, the H4 hypothesis is not supported. In this sense, the 
reduction of asset level possibly depends on the capacity of the industry to maintain a 
required and appropriate level of activity, or maybe it depends on the fact that this 
variable is not a characteristic of the sector where the firm operates. In this way, similar 
conclusions to Sudarsanam and Lai (2001), stating that intensive restructure does not 
imply a greater success in a recovery process, are obtained.  
 As expected, company size influences the evolution of the distress process. Big 
firms tend to present a better situation and a lower risk after the initial distress situation, 
thus, the results allow supporting the H5 of this study.  
3.6.2. Differences between the periods of recovery 
 Variables associated with Severity, Reaction Capability and Size, behave in the 
same way despite considering a 3-year or an 8-year scenario. Although severity reduces 
its level of significance (p=0.05), it is surprising that in such a short time after the 
financial distress classification, the financial deterioration, measured by the 7 
symptoms, still shows a negative relationship with firms’ risk 3 years after. This can 
only be explained by the fact that firms starting in worse conditions initiate stronger 
actions to redirect the situation. Nevertheless, and on the contrary to what occurred in 
the case of ROA in the 8-year scenario, the variables related to effort that measure the 
profitable behavior do not explain the final Fitness Status. On the other hand, 
retrenchment strategies, which were not selected as explicative variables in the previous 
model, appear with non-zero coefficients and with a p=0.029 level of significance, but 
with negative sign. In contrast with the starting hypothesis, downsizing actions do not 
seem to be associated with the decrease of financial distress risk. These results are in 
line with Smith and Graves (2005) suggesting that asset expansion, and not their 
reduction, is more likely to affect recovery. Additionally, the fact that retrenchment 
strategies result significant but in a negative direction for the short run analysis suggests 
that drastic actions taken when a distress situation is identified may imply more 
deterioration for the firm in the short term. Clearly, then searching efficiency through 
profitability oriented actions may result more effective in resolving a distress situation. 
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The results allow us thinking that strong cuts in a short period of time may weaken the 
capacity of the firm to maintain the necessary level of activity to generate resources and 
redirect the difficult situation. However, these results could be explained in another 
direction. It could be that the variable used to measure retrenchment actions is not the 
most suitable due to the inclusion of total assets of the firm in the calculation. In this 
way, if a firm increases its current assets through cash by selling their operational 
assets, its total assets does not change but its short term financial position will increase. 
This would permit understanding the negative relationship with the variable that 
measures the final risk position. Thus, maybe it would be appropriate to use the 
variation of non-current assets to measure retrenchment actions. 
3.6.3. Differences between industries 
The proposed model presents a satisfactory goodness of fit in explaining recovery 
processes when referring to activity industries, both in short and long term. However, 
despite the levels of the regression coefficients (approximately a 90% of explanatory 
capacity: 91.20% in Telecommunication Service and 89.50% in Information 
Technology), the results show that the model variables have higher explanatory capacity 
in the 3 year window analysis. In the 8 year scenario, except for Consumer 
Discretionary, in the rest of industries the variables have a specific influence on the 
post-distress position but without presenting any common pattern. In particular for 
Consumer Discretionary industry, all model dimensions conditioning a recovery process 
exposed in this paper result significant except for retrenchment strategies which remains 
with the trend analysis of the general model and severity status, which for this sector is 
not significant. 
It is to be noticed that none of the variables used to measure the Reaction 
Capability determines the recovery process for the set of industries composed by: 
Consumer Staples, Energy, Telecommunication Service and Materials (the latter in the 
short run). Moreover, the recovery process in the Telecommunication Service sector 
does not seem to be explained by any of the variables proposed in spite of the regression 
coefficients obtained. On a sector level, the suggested variables have a higher 
explanatory power in the short run, as it can be observed in Table 4, according to the 
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number of significant variables and in particular in industries such as Energy, 
Industrials or Information Technology. 
Some specific issues have to be considered in some sectors when a different 
behavior pattern of the significant variables is observed compared with the general 
model. In the Energy sector, size variable constitutes a short term handicap in the 
recovery process, given the positive sign of its coefficient and p= 0.032. The asset 
structure management is fundamental in Information Technology and Consumer Staples 
sectors in the long run and short run respectively given that the variable associated with 
retrenchment actions shows a positive sign in both cases. These results are opposite to 
the ones obtained in the general model as well as in the rest of the sectors where this 
variable resulted significant. However, in the short run, in the Energy and Industrial 
sector, disinvestment actions increase a post distress status more risky, given the 
negative sign of the coefficient. In this way, selling assets exposes to danger the 
recovery process in those sectors where asset investment is fundamental for their 
operational activity.  
3.7. Conclusions 
Understanding what factors affect the probability to overcome a crisis situation is 
crucial in order to improve the decision making process of managers. Several researches 
have shown that issues such as severity of the initial situation or size condition the 
recovery process. Moreover, implementing strategies oriented towards efficiency has 
also resulted to be fundamental in encountering a better and improved path.  
The results obtained suggest that the final post-distress position can be explained 
by certain variables and under certain circumstances. First of all, the hypothesis that 
Reaction Capability of distressed firms is positively related to a fit final state after 
recovery was not supported. However, the results show that the interpretation is 
different if we consider the global model or whether the individual industries are 
analyzed.  
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Second, and in contrast with other researches, the Severity degree does not 
determine a negative outcome of the situation or a negative survival capacity in 
appropriate conditions. In agreement with Reaction Capability results, it is the 
underlying structural capacities, and not the distress symptoms, that determine the way 
by which a firm faces its critical situation.  
When considering the difference between recovery periods (3 year and 8 year 
scenarios), it can be considered that a long term actually permits an effective outcome 
of a crisis situation. Regarding profitability, although it is an important factor in 
representing a low risk situation the results were not sufficient to affirm that continuous 
profitable performance is a necessary condition to overcome a difficult situation.  
As expected, company size influences the evolution of the distress process. Big 
firms tend to present a better situation and a lower risk after the initial distress situation. 
However, regarding the influence of retrenchment strategies, there is not sufficient 
evidence to conclude that it has a positive influence on the outcome of a distressed 
situation. Finally, the industry where a firm is developing its activity has an influence 
on the outcome of a difficult situation. Certain sector specific characteristics may 
contribute or inhibit the evolution of the turnaround process and as a consequence on 
the outcome of the strategies implied by the firms to solve the distress. 
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APPENDIX II. 
A. Correlations between the variables of influence in the Fitness Status 
 Fitness Status SEV_STAT FIN_AUT SOLV TURNOV RET_STG ROA ROA_AVG SIZE 
Fitness Status 
Pearson Correlation 1         
Sig. (2-tailed)          




 1        
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000         




 -,004 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) ,049 ,936        






 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,801 ,000       
N 526 526 526 526      
TURNOV 




 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) ,088 ,170 ,001 ,000      






 ,034 ,083 -,100
*
 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) ,011 ,001 ,432 ,056 ,021     












 -,037 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,033 ,000 ,000 ,399    
N 526 526 526 526 526 526 526   
ROA_AVG 
Pearson Correlation ,070 ,003 ,007 ,021 -,018 ,012 -,005 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,111 ,941 ,878 ,627 ,681 ,783 ,913   
















 ,020 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,024 ,000 ,000 ,657  
N 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 519 520 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




B. Category and Definition of the Variables 
Category Variables Definition
NI/TA Net Income/ Total Assets 
EBIT/TA Earnings before Interest and Taxes/ Total Assets
RE/TA Retained Earnings/ Total Assets
OCF/TA Operating Cash Flow/ Total Assets
WC/TA Working Capital/ Total Assets
CF/TA Cash Flow/ Total Assets
SE/TA Shareholders’ Equity/ Total Assets
SE/TL Shareholders’ Equity/ Total Liabilities
CA/CL Current Assets/ Current Liabilities
Sales/TA Sales/ Total Assets 
Debt payment level [(Interests/Total Assets)n - Median of Sector] x Total Assets
Firm’s performance 
[(Operational Income/Total Assets)n - Median of Sector] x Total
Assets
Sector’s performance
[Median of (Operational Income/Total Assets)n-1 - Median of
(Operational Income/Total Assets)n] x Total Assets
Final Status
this item indicates if a firm manages to exit the crisis situation at the
end of each year during the analyzed period. It takes value 1 if it































































Chapter IV: CSR strategies in firms facing a declining situation. 
4.1. Introduction 
In recent years, “revolving” a crisis situation has been of much interest in many 
research papers the aim of which is to identify those patterns that distinguish companies 
in crisis situation that are able to resolve their issues against those that are not. These 
studies show that there exist different strategies that may successfully guide a company 
through the exit of the crisis situation (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Pearce and Robbins, 
1993, 1994; Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Cascio et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, there have also been many studies dealing with the CSR matter and 
firms’ financial and economic performance. Some of them have been  proof of the 
positive association between CSR actions and financial performance, but others found 
evidence that this relation was negative or neutral  (Aupperle et al. 1985; Davidson and 
Worrell, 1992; Brown and Perry, 1994; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Griffin and 
Mahon, 1997; Dowell et al. 2000; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Orlizky et al. 2003; 
Brammer and Millington, 2008; Nelling and Webb, 2009; Jong-Seo et al. 2010; Peters 
and Mullen, 2009; Mishra and Suar, 2010; Byus et al. 2010). Murphy (2002) performs 
an exhaustive review of studies that have analyzed the relationship between responsible 
behavior and financial performance, concluding that there exists a solid base 
demonstrating a positive relationship between responsible environmental behavior and 
a strong financial performance. Concerning the social behavior, Margolis and Walsh 
(2001) assert that the positive relationship with the financial performance can be 
presumed neither for all companies nor for all kind of social activities. 
The different results of research studying CSR and CSP make possible affirm that 
responsible behavior does not negatively affect the performance of a firm but there is no 
explicit evidence about the achievement of abnormal earnings. As a consequence, 
although there is wide evidence proving that the responsibility generates positive results 
for the companies, there is not an irrefutable proof of a cause and effect relationship 
(Schadewitz and Niskala, 2010).  Moreover, the relationship does not have to be 
necessarily from CSR to performance, it is also plausible that performance drives CSR 
or that both situations can occur (Devinney, 2009). In this sense, some research affirm 




that firm’s historical financial performance contributes to the current CSR investments, 
according to the reverse-causality relationship between both terms (Hillman and Keim, 
2001; Xueming and Bhattacharya, 2006). This approach has been supported by 
considering that good financial results allow redirecting excessive resources towards 
social activities. This means that good financial performance derives in social 
responsible practices, thus, influencing CSR profiles. 
However, if investing in responsible behavior causes positive effects on future 
financial performance the market should appraise this behavior so that investors reward 
the value attributed to socially responsible companies. In this way, firms that satisfy 
stakeholders will receive their support in return. This view has opened an investigation 
line which tries to connect CSR actions with market value of firms. Although these 
researches are not conclusive, Statman et al. (2006) affirm that even if there is no higher 
valuation for being social responsible, there is no penalty associated with these 
behaviors. However, a wide range of studies have shown that social responsible 
companies are well valued by the market (Cormier and Magnan, 1997; Graves and 
Waddock, 2000; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Orlizky et al., 2003; Schadewitz and Niskala, 
2010; Semenova et al., 2010; Lo and Sheu, 2007). Investment in responsible behaviors 
can be understood as a “product” offered to investors, some of which are willing to buy 
although it may imply a reduction in the present value of cash flow or obtain less profit 
compared to non-responsible firms (Mackey et al., 2007). 
These results allow considering the hypothesis that investors evaluate a firm’s 
value based on their expectation generated by financial data and also by the returns or 
detriments derived from socially responsible actions. In this sense, Semenova et al. 
(2010) concluded that environmental and social performance complete financial 
information and that these are relevant in explaining the variation in stock prices. In the 
same line, Hassel et al. (2005) propose that market value of a firm is a combination of 
financial variables and firm’s environmental information. Thus, CSR practices 
complement, and also modify, the expectations marked by financial data, revealing 
crucial aspects that affect a firm’s future in terms of reaching a competitive advantage. 
Recalling Heal (2005), this extra-financial information can be considered as an 
intangible asset valued by the market in the assessment of the future of the firm in terms 




of competitiveness, efficiency and even survival, making the companies more attractive 
to investors.  
If the expectations of investors for the survival chance of a firm based on financial 
information are modified when the extra financial information is considered, it is 
interesting to know to what extent this modification of expectations occurs in firms that 
present some kind of financial difficulties resulting in an a priori unattractiveness for 
the investors. This is the approach followed by Goss (2009) when showing that, starting 
by considering CSR as a “proxy” of good corporate governance, there is a negative and 
robust relationship between CSR and financial distress where this latter one is 
calculated as the probability of default following Merton’s Model. Goss (2007) 
concluded that there was a relationship between CSR and distress, which means 
information about CSR practices complements and brings in additional information to 
that offered by financial data, however, a clear demonstration on the fact that CSR 
investment reduces the distress risk, could not be established.   
CSR investments transmit confidence to the management. The good management 
theory (Miles and Covin, 2000) considers socially responsible practices as an indicator 
of “good managers” who adopt strategies that permit the improvement of competitive 
power of a firm. Schadewitz and Niskala (2010) also affirm that the management of 
CSR practices is fundamental for investors to distinguish between efficient firms and 
those in conditions to defend their competitive advantage in the marketplace. In this 
line, it can be questioned to what extent poor financial performance could incentivize 
the managers towards these practices as a way to add confidence to the value of the 
firm. In this sense, Ho and Taylor (2007) argue that those 
firms experiencing unfavorable profit performance have incentives to issue 
more information on activities that add social value, helping to put the company back to 
a positive path. The authors found a significant negative relationship between social and 
environmental information   issued by companies and the profit variable, which 
shows that firms with lower profitability tend to report more about their responsible 
behavior. This improves the perception of shareholders on the company and 
mitigates the weaknesses that can occur in a given time on its financial performance. 
This approach supports the line followed by Lee et al. (2009), when considering that 




firms make use of CSR as a legitimate instrument to influence the perceptions of 
stakeholders. 
Thus, investing in CSR in times of "crisis" may encourage the support of 
shareholders and other stakeholders on a possible reorganization.  Managers of 
financially distressed firms with a high or low level of severity can use investment in 
CSR strategies in order to “redirect” the weak image offered by financial variables of 
the company, so that investors (and other stakeholders) do not lose their trust and 
support to the firm. These last factors are vital for future survival of every company. In 
this sense, Goss (2009) affirms that CSR investments are like good managers practices, 
which imply an investment in the future results of financially distressed firms. 
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), as well, state that if the company's economic value is 
greater than its present liquidation value, the company should be encouraged in order 
to further continue in the market. The going-concern value, using authors’ word, would 
be understood as the value associated with a firm’s ability to continue in the market and 
with future expectations, and these expectations may depend on the company's 
emphasis on CSR. Using an "adverse selection" argument, the market could understand 
that a company not "investing" in CSR does not consider any kind of future. This fact 
will be interpreted as bad news and as a consequence it will be discounted by investors.  
4.2. Incorporating CSR actions in turnaround process 
A company facing a financial distress situation needs to adopt a series of specific 
strategies in order to return to a healthy scenario (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Pearce and 
Robbins, 1993 and 1994; Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Castrogiovanni and Bruton, 2000; 
Smith and Graves, 2005; Pretorius, 2008). In a declining phase, and under the vision of 
a turnaround process, three issues are fundamental: i) preserve the confidence and 
support of the shareholders; ii) improve the profitability by acting over profits; and iii) 
attract funds for the short and medium term needs in cases when the firm presents 
weaknesses in cash or financial dimension. It is in this area, where CSR may play a key 
role as strategies in order to positively support a turnaround process. In this sense, 
Hernández-Murillo and Martinek (2009) state that certain actions framed in responsible 
behavior can be interesting for companies because they can create opportunities to 




generate additional economic benefits by means of which a bad economic performance 
can be restored. Among these benefits, the authors enumerate a reputation 
improvement, a profit generation by product diversity or the possibility to extract a 
premium for the products so that they can be converted to additional future returns. Heal 
(2005) states that social and environmental actions can increase long-term profit by 
reducing the cost of interest conflicts with the company, cost reduction, employees’ 
productivity, and brand value generation making the firm more attractive to investors. 
Other possible advantages can be a better way to obtain resources, an increase in 
product demand or a reduction in production process costs (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Konar and Cohen, 2001). 
Firms facing some kind of financial distress situation transmit risks to investors, 
who will be cautious in the moment they contribute funds to the company. CSR actions 
could help mitigate the perceived financial risk by modifying the future expectations 
and image of the firm. Managers of firms facing a crisis situation in a certain moment of 
time, may have the incentive to invest in social responsible actions among their 
recovery strategies in order to: i) complement efficiency strategies oriented towards 
returns on investment; ii) reduce the cost in certain actions to develop cost reduction 
strategies or iii) create favorable expectations that mitigate the weak financial results 
given by their financial ratios. Thus, there exist various motivations to perform greater 
efforts “in benefit” of the community in order to recompense those bad financial results 
published. The managers of companies in a financial distress may try to "handle" the 
image of this weak financial situation through responsible behavior as a reaction to a 
discretionary organizational conflict. This attitude is a manner of giving strength to their 
future so that managers can spread their future expectations to investors and to the 
market. However, once identified a declining phase, it does not exist, a priori, a clear 
argument on how managers decide to integrate CSR within the activities to be carried 
out due to the different possibilities of action and the possible effects of such 
investments.  




4.3. Reputation and trust approach 
To maximize the benefit of the stockholders and the long-term survival (Becchetti 
et al. 2012), a company's reputation and a positive assessment of its 
actions by stakeholders are critical. These ideas have already been pointed out 
by Freeman (1984) when considering that, taking into account the stakeholder 
theory, the survival of a company is closely related to its ability to adjust the values 
of the corporation and of its managers and the expectations of the stakeholders. 
Smith and Graves (2005) state that once a situation of decline is identified, 
managers should try to stabilize the financial condition of the entity, 
undertaking various actions allowing gathering stakeholders support. The level of 
available resources is an issue that can affect the ability of the firm to undertake various 
strategies in a turnaround process. Shareholders’ trust is crucial to obtain additional 
financial contributions, the financial resources permit companies more options to 
undertake change strategies (Barker and Duhaime, 1997) initiating a way out of the 
crisis situation.  
Investors are cautious in the presence of the financial risks of a firm. The 
confidence of shareholders depends on the evaluation of expectations and, in a company 
in financial crisis, on the probability estimations of the restitution of firms’ situation. 
However, various research defend that CSR practices reduce the perceived risk of a firm 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Feldman et al., 1997; Miles and Covin, 2000; Heal, 2005; 
Devinney, 2009; Ghoul et al., 2011; Whetten and Mackey, 2004). Fombrun and Shanley 
(1990) already demonstrated a negative and significant correlation between risk and 
reputation, being the latter one a consequence of CSR behaviors of companies. In the 
same way, Fernández-Feijóo (2009) asserts that in times of financial crisis, CSR actions 
provide a guarantee to future investors which can allow reducing the risk of investment 
in firms. Iannou and Serafeim (2010) investigated how investment analysts perceive 
CSR strategies carried out by the companies and how they react to these strategies by 
issuing investment recommendations. Responsible behavior could revise the perception 
of a company on its negative financial valuation if the updated benefits outweigh the 
uncertainty associated with the same. 




CSR actions can modify the perceived risk and, indirectly, influence the 
possibilities of access to external funding, as well as the cost of capital the company 
supports. Various works collect the existence of positive returns for the companies that 
invest in socially responsible behavior through an improvement in the cost of capital. 
Feldman et al. (1997) found that companies adopting proactive actions in CSR 
experience a thorough reduction of risk by investors, which can lead to a cheaper cost of 
capital. Strengthening the corporate image, by increasing the reputation towards the 
stakeholders, mitigates the risk such that responsible behavior is converted to better 
discount rate, allowing even lower cost of capital (Miles and Covin, 2000; Heal, 2005; 
Lee et al., 2009; Cheung et al., 2010; Ghoul et al., 2011). This advantage in the cost of 
funding is evidenced in studies such as Goss (2007) showing that companies with bad 
CSR performances pay higher debt costs. Firms are no strangers to this relationship 
given that, as Devinney (2009) notes that, along with other directly-implicated in 
performance, one of the reasons why firms and their managers are involved in CSR 
initiatives is the impact on the risk (cost of capital). 
According to Godfrey et al. (2009), CSR might offer a security mechanism to 
firms in order to preserve their financial performance. Certain CSR actions create the so 
called moral capital or goodwill which mitigates the penalty sanction that stakeholders 
may undertake under negative events. These authors argument that the moral capital 
does not have any effect on value generation yet it preserves the economic value of the 
company. In this way, CSR actions condense the negative effect by awarding the firm 
with the “benefit of the doubt”. 
Although companies do not receive tangible rewards for CSR actions, they 
generate intangible assets such as reputational capital, trust and positive actions among 
regulatory institutions (Godfrey, 2005). Keeping in mind that companies in a more 
prejudicial position, from a financial point of view, attempt to reduce agency costs by 
increasing the level of corporate information, we expect that the managers of enterprises 
in crisis are encouraged to responsible attitudes in order to improve their ability to 
access funding sources and reduce the cost of fund raising. 




4.4. Liability risk 
Regarding liability risk, the so called social-sanction theory argues that the 
companies are subject to claims for those behaviors that do not contribute to the growth 
and development of society (Devinney, 2009), as they are not behaving within the 
norms and mores of the societies in which they operate. Reinhardt (1999) refers to the 
risk of liability or damaged reputation in which it should be considered not only the risk 
of an adverse event, but also the associated cost for the losses that would occur. 
Responsible actions minimize transaction costs and reduce the risk of legal conflicts 
with them (Becchetti et al., 2012). As asserted by Levine (2008), CSR programs ensure 
the fulfillment of responsibilities, managing the legal or reputational risk to which firms 
are exposed in this current context of social requirements.  In this sense, Hassel et al. 
(2005) as well, state that returns from "greening", referring to the reduction 
of environmental pollution, minimize future environmental responsibility. 
Not responsible behaviors may imply future responsibility in terms of costs 
associated with responsibility demanding (Waddock and Graves, 1997), which will also 
be deducted by the shareholders who assess their "future cost" in the present time. The 
market attractiveness of socially acceptable behavior evidenced by Iannou and Serafeim 
(2010) is reconfirmed in the ethical investments approach which defends the selection 
of firms according to social and environmental practices besides financial data (Shea, 
2010). The ethical behavior becomes an intangible asset which will be used in the 
investors’ valuation so that they will be penalized or rewarded depending on their 
perception (Lo and Sheu, 2007). In the same line, Becchetti et al. (2012) show that 
market punishes firms that withdraw from social indices.   
However, the requirements for irresponsible behaviors are more sensitive in 
certain sectors (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) and certain construct dimensions of CSR, 
such as actions related to the environment. This behavior has already been 
detected in pioneer works such as Shane and Spicer (1983) who showed that 
misbehavior in environmental responsibility produces negative effect on 
investors’ predictions of future earnings.  With this argument, several studies have 
investigated the market reaction to certain environmental behaviors. Konar and 




Cohen (2001) find a positive relationship between the reduction in toxic emissions 
and market value of companies. Cormier and Magnan (1997) show a negative 
relationship between the responsibility derived from pollution levels and the market 
value of the firm.  
All these arguments are congruent with the line followed by the value-
creation theory which states that efforts related to the environment produce competitive 
advantage and improve financial performance in benefit of investors. On their 
behalf, Semenova et al. (2010) refer to Porter's Theory to discuss that a proactive 
environmental behavior has a positive impact on market value of a firm as it 
anticipates future responsibilities. Moreover, Wahba (2008) found that the market 
recompenses firms for their environmental awareness, as corporate environmental 
responsibility showed a positive and significant influence on the firm market value.  
This fact can be explained by the positive relation that exists between environmental 
liability cost and negative reputation and the relation of these latter with profitability 
(Khanna et al., 2004). 
4.5. Economical-vulnerability approach 
The risk of economical-vulnerability is related to the capacity of a firm to align 
with its environment. Fittest firms have greater chance to survive in a continuing 
competitive context by constantly adapting themselves to the environment. Socially 
responsible practices permit the improvement of competitive power of a firm, creating 
opportunities to generate economic benefits and differentiate the company form its 
competitors (Miles and Covin, 2000; Hernández-Murillo and Martinek, 2009). Well 
performing firms become less vulnerable to afford adverse situations or decline phases, 
reducing the risk of not overcoming these situations. 
Searching the improvement of the results is characteristic of the first stage of the 
so called efficiency strategies which are implemented by the managers of companies 
facing distress and they are strongly related to the recovery of a stable situation 
(Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Campbell, 1996; Routledge and Gadenne, 2000; 
Castrogiovanni and Bruton, 2000; Smith and Graves, 2005). The positive relationship 




between CSR investment and performance, and also between good performance and 
crisis recovery process, allow arguing the existence of incentives to implement social 
responsible actions, among the strategies undertaken by managers of companies facing 
distress in order to start a recovery process.  
Companies that manage to resolve their crisis situation present higher 
performance levels during the recovery process (Kahl, 2001) highlighting the fact that 
firms manage efficiently their sales process in order to obtain higher profits. Barker and 
Duhaime (1997) listed several studies that associate successful turnaround processes to 
increases in sales and significant gains in market share. However, firms facing a 
difficult situation can suffer sales and revenue decline because customers start losing 
their trust on them. In this case, CSR practices may reward this initial distrust of 
customers so that they still find it attractive and reliable to continue their purchase 
relationship with the firm 
Certain CSR programs are drivers of customer satisfaction (Xueming and 
Bhattacharya, 2006) and produce positive effects on customers’ attitude towards a 
product (Berens et al., 2005), allowing an identification with the firm which converts to 
an important support to it (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; Lichtenstein et al., 2004). To 
wager on client support means to bet for the future. For a firm facing a situation of 
financial distress this bet could be a signal of warranty of the weak financial statements, 
allowing that a bad economic performance could be restored. In this sense, Ruf et al. 
(2001) show that there is a continuous positive relationship between CSR and sales 
increase. 
In addition, to improve the profits there exist other ways in which CSR investment 
may also result positive. In this way, CSR practices generate cost reduction, generate 
profit by product diversity, increase sales and generate brand value, building a stronger 
performing firm (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ruf et al., 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 
2001; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Heal, 2005; Becchetti et al., 2012; Hernández-Murillo 
and Martinek, 2009; Becker-Olsen et al., 2006). On the other hand, certain CSR actions 
may have a positive effect on employee’s productivity so that an alignment between 




company’s objectives and employees’ motivation can be reached. In this way, there 
would be a cost reduction and an increase in productivity (Becchetti et al. 2012). 
4.6. Cost-reduction approach 
The nonexistence of a consensus on the research focusing on the relationship 
between financial performance and corporate social performance allows assessing the 
existence of a bidirectional relation between these two concepts. In this way, an increase 
in social performance could be also interpreted as a discretional activity that is financed 
when the firm has an excess of funds, that is, good financial performance (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001). Complementing this, the theory of slack resource (Miles and Covin, 2000) 
argues that certain environmental behaviors are adopted as a consequence of good 
financial results, allowing undertaking additional investment by allocating funds as well 
as making discretionary investment decisions. 
Investment in CSR has also been interpreted as a cost at the expense 
of shareholders’ value, particularly in proceedings related to certain dimensions of CSR. 
These dimensions involve significant economic outlays with a great impact on the 
current income statement due to the difficulty of quantifying them as performances 
generating future profits. This hypothesis is in line with the results obtained by Lo and 
Sheu (2007) which indicate that investors can be reluctant towards CSR actions of a 
firm if they consider that these actions increase operational and production costs.   
The shareholders theory point of view, it has been argued (Yermack, 2006; 
Barnea and Rubin, 2005) that shareholders can consider CSR actions as an 
unnecessary important agency cost that improves company image but at their interest 
expense. The cost-concerned theory (Earle, 2000) argues that investments in 
responsible behavior, specifically those related to environmental performance, only 
produce costs that affect company’s profits and this fact does not contribute to 
enhancing the shareholder value (Lee et al., 2009). This perception of CSR 
environmental actions as a expense on future earnings, has been evidenced by some 
researches showing the negative reaction of investors to the reduction in future 
expectations and return, reflecting lower market values (Friedman, 1962 and 1970; 




Jensen, 2002). Investors perceive environmental investments as a cost on their future 
returns and they react negatively because of a reduction in the expectations of their 
returns which does not imply a risk reduction (Holman et al., 1985). This approach 
explains the results obtained by Hassel et al. (2005) founding a negative relationship 
between environmental performance and market value, indicating that better valued 
firms in an environmental point of view are not the better valued by investors. The 
authors consider that it may be explained by the costs involved in environmental 
performance. These performances carry high costs which negatively impact the future 
returns used by investors as estimators in order to make their investment decisions.  
In the recovery process, the efficiency-oriented strategies, characterized, among 
others, by cost and expense reduction that allows an improvement in profitability has 
been found strongly associated with turnaround (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Campbell, 
1996; Routledge and Gadenne, 2000). If managers associate the responsible behavior 
to costs more than to investment, it is expected that companies in crisis "disinvest" 
in CSR as a way to relieve their income statement. In the same vein, Fernández-
Feijoo (2009), states that investments in CSR imply a threat to companies in crisis, so 
it is to expect that these behaviors do not occur in these uncertainty 
frameworks. However, the author suggests that CSR processes and the 
crisis periods share a number of necessities and strategies so that CSR could go from 
being a threat to being an opportunity.  
If cost reduction is one of the possible conducts in a turnaround process, it would 
seem reasonable to think that managers of firms facing a financial distress situation 
initiate cost adjustment strategies. These strategies are thought to be the beginning of a 
logical improvement track so they would be positively valued by investors.  
Becchetti et al. (2012) state that almost all of the KLD dimensions - both 
strengths and weaknesses - involve some form of increase in cost except for product 
quality and rewards of managers. However, not all responsible behavior has to be 
associated with costs of the same impact on firm’s business. For this reason, the 
discount and the effect on the company’s valuation will not be the same. It is more 
plausible the fact that declines are produced in those dimensions of CSR that generate a 




major and immediate expense (i.e. actions framed within the environmental dimension). 
Managers design CSR investment strategies opting for those dimensions "more 
profitable" for their purposes, disinvesting in the most "serious" in terms of cost and 
redirecting the strategy to others less expensive but still beneficial for the poor financial 
image. These behaviors are consistent with the results of the work of Chen et al. (2008), 
who showed that an investment strategy in philanthropic activities was followed by 
companies with poor environmental and product safety. 
The above argument makes sense if we consider, as indicated by Hassel et al. 
(2005), that the market is short-term oriented and investors do not consider the impact 
of long-term when making their decisions. Thus, according to the Cost-Threat approach, 
companies in financial distress would tend to decrease their investment in certain 
dimensions of CSR that shareholders consider as an expense. The managers of these 
companies prefer to "redirect" firm’s income statement in a shorter time interval, 
reducing the costs and expenses that do not produce immediate benefits. This 
assessment is based on the paradox of considering responsible actions as a present cost 
or as an investment and it is more evident in dimensions related to environmental 
responsibility. This paradox of environmental responsibility - opportunity by reducing 
future costs or threat by reducing current costs – allows considering that the strategies 
followed by managers of companies in distress do not present a clear a priori direction 
in this dimension. Following Waddock and Graves (1997), we can suppose: 
- Negative association: Actions linked to the environment cause additional, 
usually important, costs that can be hardly affordable by companies in financial 
difficulties. Enterprises immersed in financial distress will tend to reduce this type of 
investment.  
- Positive association: the lack of investment in environmental actions cause legal 
responsibility demands that have associated cost. Some of them are implicit, such as the 
perception of shareholders and future investors, and sometimes they could overcome the 
explicit costs. 
On the basis of previous arguments, our purpose is to analyze to what extent 
companies facing financial distress situations incorporate investment in responsible 




behaviors among their strategies as a mechanism to create favorable expectations that 
mitigate the weakened image given by certain financial indicators. We will study the 
different patterns of implementation of these strategies which are conditioned by the 
degree of financial distress and the underlying weaknesses of this situation, so that we 
can show the selection mechanisms among the various dimensions that form the CSR 
construct depending on: i) the costs associated to these responsible behaviors; and/or ii) 
the period in which it is supposed to obtain the returns or benefits of this CSR 
investment.   
It is necessary to consider that the difference in the perception of CSR strategies 
(cost threat or investment opportunity) is associated with the level or stage of the 
company’s crisis or default situation. If the source of the crisis is an economic 
imbalance there is a greater tendency to consider CSR practices as a threat because of 
the effect they have on the costs of the exercise, ergo, we expect a negative relationship 
in this type of firms. On the contrary, if the source of the crisis of the company is a 
financial imbalance, it is reasonable to think of a positive association of CSR 
performances as a way to improve the confidence of investors and creditors in the 
future. 
Finally, focusing on companies with financial problems, we should take into 
account the stage of the distress process in which the company is immersed. Companies 
that encounter a serious crisis situation, derived by many factors, are more likely to 
center their precedence over the short-term survival and any initiative related to CSR 
practices would be considered as a negative cost with immediate impact on the target of 
survival. 
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Chapter V. Patterns in CSR actions in mitigating a weak financial 
image 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to evidence whether companies facing financial 
distress situations incorporate investment in responsible behaviors among their 
strategies as a mechanism to create favorable expectations that mitigate the weakened 
image given by certain financial indicators. For this purpose, we will perform an 
analysis of similarities or differences in the attitude of firms towards CSR actions in 
order to determine if there exist a link between this attitude and the economic-financial 
situation of the firm.  
The analysis of similarities and differences in the CSR behaviors is performed 
using a dataset of 392 companies classified, based on their financial structure, in healthy 
firms and distressed firms. CSR performance is assessed using the rating reached by the 
firms in the KLD database, accounting for the concerns and strengths obtained in the 
seven KLD’s dimensions: Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employees, 
Environmental, Human Rights and Product. For this evaluation, we chose to use 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), which provides a visual representation of the pattern 
of proximities (i.e., similarities or distances) among a set of observations. This study 
does not start off a direct link between company crisis and certain CSR strategies. The 
MDS methodology allows us to analyze the profiles of firms in a specific financial 
distress situation without any a priori assumptions on causal relations that could be used 
as predictors of CSR performance.  
Considering the argumentations of Chapter IV, regarding the incentives of 
managers of firms facing some kind of financial distress situation to invest in CSR 
practices and according to the characteristics of the methodology that we are going to 
use, we expect that the positions of the analyzed companies in the plot can verify the 
following: 
- The nonexistence of structural CSR differences between the companies that 
show symptoms of a crisis and the healthy ones. If the managers of firms in a declining 
process use the responsible behaviors as a strategy to "mitigate" the weak image 
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manifested by its economic and financial data, we suppose that the positions of 
companies in variables associated with the evaluation of its performance in CSR is 
independent of its financial structure. 
However, we expect that the severity degree of the crisis will mark differences in 
the attitude of the company toward CSR and investment in responsible behaviors. In 
this way, the position reached by a company is not independent from the condition it 
began with.  
- The existence of structural differences in CSR concern between the companies 
that show crisis and the healthy ones, considering the arguments of the so called 
Current-Cost approach. 
- The existence of structural CSR behavior differences according to the financial 
concerns the firms present. Taking into consideration the threat-opportunity approach, 
we expect that there is a positioning difference between firms that present economic 
weaknesses and firms that show financial weaknesses.  
5.2. The sample  
In the analysis we used matched KLD-COMPUSTAT databases of firms during 
the period 2000-2002. Starting from the basis that the economic-financial situation of 
the company may be an incentive for CSR strategies, CSR variables were compiled for 
the period 2001-2002 and financial variables for the period 2000-2001. 
The analyzed periods were selected according to the following reasons: i) In 2001, 
KLD expands the coverage of companies included in the database passing from S&P 
500 Index and Domini 400 Social Index, to incorporating 1000 largest U.S. publicly 
traded companies by market capitalization; and ii) the year 2002 marked the beginning 
of a crisis characterized by important financial scandals which may have influenced the 
behavior of the companies in the market generating significant changes in homogeneity 
in the context used for this analysis. These changes can affect both the attitude of 
companies toward social responsibility and the financial data submitted when immersed 
in a crisis context.  
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Firms operating in the financial service industry were eliminated. We also 
excluded the companies that presented incomplete or inconsistent information in the 
years analyzed. A total of 1721 companies were considered valid from the Compustat 
Database. However, the final numbers of firms were conditioned to the availability of 
their CSR rating in the KLD database for the overall analyzed period. As a result, the 
sample is composed by a total of 392 firms for the considered periods (See Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1. Firm distribution by industry 




















Firms were classified according to their financial situation into two groups: 
healthy and distressed firms. The distressed firms were selected using the financial 
accounting symptoms already used in previous chapters. The used criteria allow us also 
to classify the firms into two groups: i) firms facing a severe crisis situation satisfying 4 
or more criteria; and ii) firms facing a weak crisis situation satisfying 1, 2 or 3 criteria. 
This classification will make it possible to highlight possible differences in social 
responsibility strategies associated with the severity of their situation.  In this sense, a 
company in a situation of strong financial distress may need to carry out imminent 
actions of restructuring for which performing only socially responsible actions to 
"mitigate" the delicate situation expressed by its financial data is not sufficient. This 
approach is consistent with the results found in some other lines of research (Iannou and 
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Serafeim, 2010) that demonstrate a U-shaped relation between financial performance 
and CSR. In addition, companies identified as being in weak crisis were again classified 
into companies with economic weaknesses and financial weaknesses. This classification 
was carried out taking into account which symptoms dominated in negative values (i.e. 
operational performance or financial). Table 5.2 contains a summary of the distribution 
of enterprises in the three years analyzed according to their association in each of the 
above groups. 
Table 5.2. Distribution of firms according to their financial situation 
Firm’s Characteristic 2000 2001 
- Healthy 248 214 
- Crisis 144 178 
    - Weak crisis 134 166 
         *Economic 31 58 
         *Financial 103 108 
    - Strong crisis 10 12 
 
A total of 36,7% (2000) and 45,4% (2001) of the sample firms present some kind 
of financial distress situation. Firms in weak crisis are dominant in the sample and 
among these, dominate firms with financial weaknesses.  
5.3. The variables 
Socially responsible behavior is measured using the rating achieved by companies 
in each of the dimensions of Kinder, Lyndenberg and Domini's database (KLD) 
database. KLD is a widely accepted tool to measure US firms' social responsibility 
(Wood and Jones, 1995; Ruf et al., 2001) because it does truly reflect the actions and 
behaviors of CSR and it is not based only on the information issued by the companies 
(Iannou and Serafeim, 2010). KLD is used in a wide number of studies such as Graves 
and Waddock (1994), Waddock and Graves (1997), Hillman and Keim (2001), Ruf et 
al. (2001), Siegel and Vitalino (2006), Hull and Rothenberg (2008), Kacperczyk (2009), 
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Peters and Mullen (2009), Ioannou and Serafeim (2010), Melo and Galán (2010), Melo 
and Garrido-Morgado (2012), Bear et al. (2010), Boesso and Michelon (2010).  
KLD assesses CSR by 7 dimensions representing firms' environmental, social and 
governance performance (Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee 
Relations, Human Rights, Environment and Product). Each individual dimension is 
measured by means of a series of indicators which represent positive actions (as 
strengths) and negative actions (as concerns) using a binary system (0, absence; 1; 
presence). Table 5.3 exposes the number of items included in each dimension.  
Table 5.3. Dimensions assessed in the KLD database 
Dimensions Number of strength items Number of concern items 
Community 8 5 
Corporate Governance 5 6 
Diversity 8 3 
Employees relations 7 5 
Environmental 8 7 
Human Rights  4 7 
Product 4 4 
 
Regarding the use of KLD rating for measuring CSR behavior of firms, studies 
like that of Siegel and Vitalino (2006) or Ghoul et al. (2011) sum up strengths and 
weaknesses obtaining a single variable that measures the responsible behaviors. In this 
way, companies with a result greater/smaller than 0 are considered socially 
responsible/irresponsible. However, in this study we chose to consider independently 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different criteria-dimensions. We follow the same 
approach as Mattingly and Berman (2006), as we understand that both reflect not only 
different behaviors but also opposite, positive and negative, so that a mix could lead to 
misinterpretation of the results (Strike et al. 2006; Godfrey et al. 2009; Kacperczyk, 
2009; Arora and Wadwarkar, 2011). Thus, the firms have two scores in each one of the 
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individual dimensions representing their  “investment” in socially responsible 
behaviors; a strength score (showing the number of strengths displayed) and a concern 
score (showing the number of concerns displayed). These two scores can be interpreted, 
following Arora and Wadwarkar (2011), as proactive actions (strengths)/reactive 
actions (concerns) to stakeholders.  
We perform the analysis taking into account the strength/concern overall score, by 
grouping individual assessments obtained in each of the dimensions, as well as an 
individual strength/concern score on each of these dimensions (Community, Corporate 
Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Human Rights, Environment, and 
Product). Thus, we follow the approach used by Griffin and Mahon (1997) who believe 
that the creation of a unique index that values the strength/weakness of a company in a 
single variable can disguise those individual dimensions that are important for a 
company or industry and also, the effective effort that a company performs on each of 
them. Nevertheless, in spite of the defended approach, a global assessment variable will 
be included in order to analyze to what extent it can be representative of possible 
differences between companies.   
On the other hand, we include a set of variables that reflect the economic and 
financial situation of companies based on issues associated with the profitability, 
liquidity and debt, in line with previous research that tries to associate responsible 
behaviours to financial variables (Ho and Taylor, 2007).  All financial variables have 
been divided by Total Assets of the company to eliminate the effect size. Table 5.4 
contains the description of each of the variables used in the analysis. 
TOT_S and TOT_C correspond to the sum of strengths and weaknesses 
respectively and they are measured according to the ratings obtained in each individual 
dimension of KLD. It is necessary to consider that this overall score may be affected by 
the number of items included in each individual dimension (see Table 5.3). Thus, more 
items in one dimension correspond to greater valuation of that dimension, without 
implying a more responsible behavior. For this reason, the individual scores have been 
adjusted according to the number of items valued in each individual dimension in order 
to obtain an adjusted score (CSR_S and CSR_C).  
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Table 5.4.Variables used in the analysis 
Category Variables 
Financial Net Income (NI) 
Operating Income (OPI) 
Working Capital (WC) 
Equity Shareholders (ES) 
Liabilities (LIAB) 
Cash Flow (CF) 










In this way, CSR_S = ∑(Si/si),  and  CSR_T = ∑(Ci/ci), where i=1….n, represents 
the number of individual dimensions assessed, Si, the score of  strengths in one 
dimension, Ci, the score of concerns in one dimension, and s and c, the total of  items 
assessed as strengths and concerns, respectively, in the i dimension.  
Finally, CSR_global represents the difference between adjusted valuations of 
CSR_S and CSR_C as a manner to obtain an overall assessment of the responsible 
behavior if a firm. Even though, as mentioned above, the use of a variable of this type, 
which brings together strengths and weaknesses, is not considered appropriate we 
included it in the analysis to show to what extent this variable could be useful 
and representative of the responsible behavior of a company. Tables 5.5 and 5.6, contain 
the descriptive statistics of the variables for each of the years, differentiating 
between healthy companies, firms with problems and the total sample.   
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5.4. The methodology 
Based on the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) methodology, which allows 
representing graphically the similarities or differences between various elements 
according to the main characteristics of a data matrix (Neophytou and Mar Molinero, 
2004; Kruskal and Wish, 1984; Peña, 2002), we will plot an n-dimensional consensus 
map where the observed individuals are positioned according to the underlying 
variable’s structure, so that if two individuals appear close to each other it is because 
they share similar information and its original variables act in a similar way. On the 
contrary, their structural differences in the analyzed variables will be shown by the 
distances in the consensus map. Again, as we clarified in a previous Chapter, MDS 
algorithm does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the variables 
introduced in the analysis and no prior data reduction is necessary. 
5.5. Empirical results and discussion 
Performing the MDS analysis, the Euclidean distance was selected as dissimilarity 
measure to calculate the proximity between two firms. The dissimilarity measure is the 
reference value for the representation of the distances showed in the consensus map. 
Thus, companies that in the representation map are located close to each other, share 
similar economic and financial structure, as well as similar action strategies with respect 
to CSR according to the selected explicative variables. 
The dimensionality of MDS map was chosen running a prior Principal 
Components Analysis (Mar Molinero and Ezzamel, 1991). This initial analysis permits 
considering a five dimensional space as the most appropriate for the representation of 
the structural relations between firms according to the original variables. This prior 
consideration is confirmed by the results of the goodness-of-fit measure chosen for this 
study: Kruskals’ Stress1 level. The smaller the stress value, the better the adjustment is, 
following the range variation proposed by Kruskal (1964). Table 5.7 shows the results 
of the analysis for each of the analyzed years.  




Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics: Year 2000 
 
Year 2000 
Situation   NI OPI WC LIAB CF OACF ES Total_S Total_C CSR_S CSR_C CSR_global 
Healthy 
Aver. 0,09 0,14 0,22 0,52 0,13 0,13 0,48 1,96 1,74 0,34 0,42 -0,08 
SD 0,06 0,07 0,17 0,18 0,06 0,07 0,18 2,20 2,08 0,39 0,48 0,48 
Min. 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,06 0,03 0,01 0,03 0 0 0,00 0,00 -2,22 
Max 0,29 0,47 0,78 0,97 0,36 0,35 0,94 10 15 1,73 3,37 1,44 
Distress 
Aver. 0,03 0,08 0,04 0,65 0,07 0,07 0,35 2,31 2,55 0,39 0,58 -0,20 
SD 0,08 0,10 0,21 0,20 0,08 0,10 0,20 2,34 2,56 0,39 0,57 0,61 
Min. -0,30 -0,30 -0,39 0,06 -0,29 -0,35 -0,53 0 0 0,00 0,00 -2,44 
Max 0,39 0,69 0,86 1,53 0,42 0,35 0,94 12 12 2,09 2,64 1,17 
Total 
Aver. 0,06 0,12 0,15 0,57 0,11 0,11 0,43 2,09 2,04 0,36 0,48 -0,12 
SD 0,07 0,09 0,20 0,20 0,07 0,08 0,20 2,26 2,30 0,39 0,52 0,53 
Min. -0,30 -0,30 -0,39 0,06 -0,29 -0,35 -0,53 0 0 0,00 0,00 -2,44 
Max 0,39 0,69 0,86 1,53 0,42 0,35 0,94 12 15 2,09 3,37 1,44 




Table 5.6. Descriptive statistics: Year 2001 
 
Year 2001 
Situation  NI OPI WC LIAB CF OACF ES Total_S Total_C CSR_S CSR_C CSR_global 
Healthy 
Aver. 0,07 0,13 0,21 0,53 0,12 0,14 0,47 2,03 1,77 0,35 0,44 -0,09 
SD 0,05 0,07 0,17 0,18 0,05 0,07 0,18 2,26 2,05 0,39 0,48 0,49 
Min. 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,05 0,02 0,00 0,01 0 0 0,00 0,00 -1,73 
Max 0,24 0,41 0,80 0,99 0,30 0,39 0,95 12 14 2,09 3,22 1,51 
Distress 
Aver. -0,04 0,05 0,09 0,61 0,02 0,09 0,39 2,56 2,76 0,45 0,65 -0,21 
SD 0,38 0,10 0,22 0,21 0,35 0,08 0,21 2,47 2,56 0,42 0,58 0,60 
Min. -4,58 -0,39 -0,53 0,05 -4,13 -0,11 -0,18 0 0 0,00 0,00 -2,40 
Max 0,35 0,59 0,87 1,18 0,42 0,50 0,95 13 12 2,13 2,69 1,12 
Total 
Aver. 0,02 0,09 0,16 0,57 0,07 0,11 0,43 2,27 2,22 0,40 0,54 -0,14 
SD 0,27 0,09 0,20 0,20 0,24 0,08 0,20 2,37 2,34 0,41 0,54 0,55 
Min. -4,58 -0,39 -0,53 0,05 -4,13 -0,11 -0,18 0 0 0,00 0,00 -2,40 
Max 0,35 0,59 0,87 1,18 0,42 0,50 0,95 13 14 2,13 3,22 1,51 




Table 5.7.  Kruskal’s stress1 evaluation 
   Kruskal's scale  
 Period Stress-I level Interval Goodness of fit Nr. Of Dimensions 
Year 1  2000-2001 2,87% 2,5%-5% Excellent-good 5 
Year 2 2001-2002 3,64% 2,5%-5% Excellent-good 5 
 
Nonetheless, for the visual representation it would be very difficult to interpret the 
distances between points in a 5-dimensional space. As a consequence, the final graphs 
exposed here correspond to the better final bi-dimensional space representing a 
consensus map where the positioning are better emphasized (i.e. Dimensions 1 and 3 for 
the year 1; Dimensions 2 and 3 for the year 2). In order to observe the possible relation 
between financial situation and CSR strategy, we are going to represent the companies 
in two ways. Firstly, we will consider the existence of a financial distress situation and 
secondly we will consider the severity degree of the distress, as well as the origin or the 
causes of this situation (economic or financial). The possible existence of divergences in 
the positions based on these criteria would allow detecting to what extent the CSR 
strategies can be disguised under a slight group of symptoms.  By means of the Co-Plot 
methodology previously discussed (Chapter II), the variables of the analysis were 
projected in the same dimensional space with the companies. The regression coefficient 
results for the 2 years are reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, respectively.  
The results obtained are powerful enough to interpret the consensus maps 
allowing considering the representativeness of the positions of the firms with respect to 
original variables. Note that the goodness of fit, R Square, of the variables for the two 
years exceeds 70% except for the variables CSR_global (51,5%) in the year 2002 and 
WC/TA in the year 2002 (67%),which had the worst goodness of fit.   
The consensus maps obtained are represented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 for every 
year of the analysis, respectively. For a better representation and for a better visual 
observation, we expose the dimensions coordinates of both variables and individuals in 
a zero to one scale.  




Table 5.8. Regression coefficient results for the Year 1 
 Independent Variables  
 DIM1 DIM2 DIM3 DIM4 DIM5  
Dependent Variable Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. R square 
ZTotal_S_01 0,231 0,000 1,871 0,000 -1,928 0,000 -1,431 0,000 0,427 0,000 0,969 
ZTotal_C_01 1,292 0,000 1,775 0,000 1,454 0,000 -1,034 0,000 0,264 0,000 0,979 
ZCSR_S_01 0,203 0,000 1,813 0,000 -2,007 0,000 -1,468 0,000 0,399 0,000 0,975 
ZCSR_C_01 1,204 0,000 1,79 0,000 1,512 0,000 -1,188 0,000 0,314 0,000 0,990 
ZCSR_global_01 -1,019 0,000 -0,413 0,000 -2,929 0,000 0,08 0,000 -0,013 0,630 0,992 
ZNI/TA_00 -1,924 0,000 1,238 0,000 0,59 0,000 0,721 0,000 0,805 0,000 0,932 
ZOPI/TA_00 -1,78 0,000 1,276 0,000 0,466 0,000 1,135 0,000 0,898 0,000 0,903 
ZWC/TA_00 -1,105 0,000 -1,065 0,000 0,475 0,000 -1,625 0,000 3,114 0,000 0,841 
ZLIAB/TA_00 1,436 0,000 0,836 0,000 -0,629 0,000 2,412 0,000 1,128 0,000 0,969 
ZCF_00 -1,915 0,000 1,349 0,000 0,511 0,000 0,725 0,000 0,131 0,090 0,940 
ZOACF_00 -1,629 0,000 1,301 0,000 0,382 0,000 0,608 0,000 -1,585 0,000 0,790 
ZES_00 -1,436 0,000 -0,836 0,000 0,629 0,000 -2,412 0,000 -1,128 0,000 0,969 




Table 5.9. Regression coefficient results for the Year 2 
 Independent Variables  
 DIM1 DIM2 DIM3 DIM4 DIM5  
Dependent Variable Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. R square 
ZTotal_S_02 0,162 0,000 -2,619 0,000 4,454 0,000 -3,713 0,000 0,238 0,400 0,848 
ZTotal_C_02 -0,124 0,000 -4,807 0,000 -0,335 0,025 -2,349 0,000 -0,045 0,880 0,827 
ZCSR_S_02 0,178 0,000 -2,509 0,000 4,442 0,000 -3,783 0,000 0,414 0,154 0,839 
ZCSR_C_02 -0,154 0,000 -4,667 0,000 -0,186 0,228 -2,714 0,000 0,150 0,628 0,817 
ZCSR_global_02 0,284 0,000 2,713 0,000 3,505 0,000 -0,161 0,566 0,162 0,748 0,515 
ZNI/TA_01 1,323 0,000 0,274 0,008 1,717 0,000 0,945 0,000 -3,056 0,000 0,870 
ZOPI/TA_01 0,357 0,000 0,916 0,000 4,842 0,000 2,962 0,000 -2,351 0,000 0,720 
ZWC/TA_01 -0,055 0,226 3,157 0,000 -0,954 0,000 -3,915 0,000 -4,194 0,000 0,667 
ZLIAB/TA_01 0,245 0,000 -3,840 0,000 -0,328 0,013 4,722 0,000 -1,696 0,000 0,865 
ZCF_01 1,324 0,000 0,319 0,003 1,880 0,000 0,955 0,000 -2,284 0,000 0,863 
ZOACF_01 0,021 0,601 1,125 0,000 4,664 0,000 1,924 0,000 6,133 0,000 0,723 
ZES_01 -0,245 0,000 3,840 0,000 0,328 0,013 -4,722 0,000 1,696 0,000 0,865 




As we can see, in the first year of analysis, (Figure 5.1) there is a clear 
differentiation among firms according their financial situation in t-year. Healthy 
enterprises are located to the left of the dimension 1 and companies who have some form 
of financial distress situation, are located to the right. This differentiation is consistent 
with the positioning of the financial variables; thus, we can consider that dimension 1 
collects information related to the economic-financial of firms. In the same vein, 
dimension 3 can be interpreted as the performance of the companies on CSR in t+1-year. 
The lower part of this dimension gathers proactive companies on social responsibility and 
the upper part companies that present greater weaknesses in this analyzed responsibility 
dimension.  
A similar situation can be seen for the second year (Figure 5.2). In this year, 
however, there is no dimension that clearly reflects only economic and financial 
information as it occurred in the first year of analysis.  
As a result, we can observe that companies in crisis situation are located in the 
lower left side and upper left  part of the plot in year 2 (Figure 5.2). In this case, an 
imaginary diagonal line clearly marks the separation between healthy and distressed firms 
and there surely is some other type of information that allows the positioning and 
differentiating among them. 
Therefore, in the representation of the year 2, dimension 2 is associated with 
information on not responsible behaviors and on solvency. Companies with more 
concerns would be characterized by worst financial structures. On the other hand, 
dimension 3 reflects the performance of the company both from the economic point of 
view, collecting variables such as profitability and results, and from the proactive 
attitudes on CSR. The differences in the representation of both years could be explained 
by the attitude change towards CSR during these years. De facto, as it will be discussed 
later on, these results are indeed significant in this sense. This change in attitude could be 
explained by the fact that starting from 2001, KLD makes public the valuations in 
responsible behavior of a wider number of firms. These assessments make firms more 
vulnerable to the markets opinion on these behaviors. 
 
 




Figure 5.1. Factorial plane 1-3 for the Year 1   
   
0: Healthy firms; 1: distressed firms; 
Figure 5.2. Factorial plane 2-3 for the Year 2  
 
 
0: Healthy firms; 1: distressed firms. 




 In the years analysed, and taking into account only the classification of healthy 
firms and distressed firms, we can observe that, at first, there are no obvious differences 
between the positions of companies according to the strengths in CSR. This issue is 
consistent with the initial starting approach about the non-existence of CSR structural 
differences between the companies that show different symptoms of crisis and healthy 
companies. However, with regard to the concerns, there are more companies in crisis 
situation, positioned to the side of the map where the variables TOT_C and CSR_C are 
plotted. This situation is much more appreciable looking at the graphical representations 
corresponding to the year 2. Taking into account the characteristics of the items 
considered in KLD as representative of concerns, we can presume that, in fact, companies 
that have to deal with solving a delicate economic-financial situation, redirect their 
actions towards more beneficial types of actions for these purposes. 
In particular, to analyse the possible association between financial distress situation 
and CSR strategies, the above graphs were drawn again but this time, for the positions of 
firms, we set markers according to their degree of severity of the distress, as well as the 
possible origin of this distress: economic problems, linked to his performance and level 
of activity, or financial problems linked to solvency or generation of cash flow. These 
representations correspond to the Figures 5.3 and 5.4 for years 1 and 2, respectively. 
Companies in severe crisis are the worst positioned with respect to the investment 
in responsible behavior, as well as the overall evaluation measured through the 
CSR_global variable. These locations are in agreement with the posed idea that the 
degree of severity of the crisis marks differences in the attitude of the company on CSR 
and this statement is evident looking at the graphical representations of the years 2 and 3. 
Companies with economic weaknesses are mainly located in quadrant characterized by 
concerns and without a proactive attitude towards CSR. In this way, they show a 













1: Healthy firms; 2: weak crisis firms (operational concerns); 3: weak crisis firms 
(financial concerns); 4: strong crisis firms. 
Companies with financial weaknesses present irregular behavior. A significant 
number of these companies are positioned in the lower right quadrant without presenting 
a negative assessment from the concerns point of view and some of them extend in the 
direction of the dimension 3 which marks a responsible behavior. These companies 
present higher rates of debt, so supporting the strategy of seeking "reputation" in order to 
promote their image in front of investors and lenders to reduce cost of capital or even to 
renegotiate debt. However, in the following years of our analysis, these companies evolve 
in their attitudes on responsible actions. The graphs show that they tend to be placed 
along the line which marks the concerns; even liability variable (LIAB) is plotted closest 
to the TOT_C and CSR_C variables. This could be explained because during these two 
years the debt level of companies with problems increased. The companies may have 
"redirected" their strategy focusing on the economic performance, such as cost reduction, 




to relieve their results so that they can to obtain funds and cash flow for remunerating the 
external capital. 
Figure 5.4. Factorial plane 2-3 for the Year 2 according to distress 
 
  
1: Healthy firms; 2: weak crisis firms (operational concerns); 3: weak crisis firms 
(financial concerns); 4: strong crisis firms. 
In order to analyse more in particular the profiles of companies with respect to their 
CSR performance we must take into account their ratings in each of the individual 
dimensions measured in the KLD. Remembered that KLD uses 7 dimensions, the positive 
ones as strengths and negative ones as concerns, to assess the socially responsible 
behaviour of a company: Community (COM), Corporate Governance (CGOV), Diversity 
(DIV), Employee relations (EMP), Environment (ENV), Human Rights (HUM) and 
Product (PRO). However, the short range of variation of the scores for these individual 
dimensions (0 to 4 in most dimensions and 0-2 in many of them), as well as the number 
of companies counting up the same value obstruct their introduction in the MDS analysis, 




preventing consistent results and acceptable degrees of representativeness. For this 
reason, we performed a MDS taking into account the Euclidean distance between 
variables as a measure of similarity between them, allowing plotting to what measure the 
CSR strategies are characterized by proactive or reactive attitudes in certain dimensions. 
In this case, if two variables appear next in the consensus map it means that they share 
original data structures among individuals in the sample; therefore it can be understood as 
part of a common behavior pattern. Just like in the representation of companies, for space 
reasons we expose the plots in those two dimensions that better reflect the differences of 
the different variables associated with social responsibility positions (Figure 5.5 and 5.6 
for years 1 and 2, respectively). Either way, in the three years analyzed, the MDS in 5 
dimensions showed good levels of Stress-I: 0.04 (2001) and 0.05 (2002). 
It can be observed that for the two years, dimension 1 perfectly discriminates 
responsible actions, to the right, and not responsible actions, to the left side of the plot. 
Most of the variables appear concentrated along this dimension, mainly in year 2, from 
the point of view of the strengths and of the concerns. We can assert that companies who 
care about social responsibility tend to express it with valuable actions positively 
assessed in all areas. This same claim can be made on not responsible behaviors, 
according to the proximity of the positions of certain variables located in the left part of 
the graph, also most prominent in the last year of analysis.   
Figure 5.5. Factorial plane 1-2 of the Variables: Year 1 
 




However, it is necessary to emphasize the placement of specific variables like 
CGOV_C, HUM_C and ENV_C on the concerns part and PRO_S, ENV_S and CGOV_S 
on the strengths side. These variables appear, somehow, bland from the rest as if they 
were strategies that do not respond to a general responsible (or not) attitude in those 
dimensions. 
Figure 5.6. Factorial plane 1-2 of the Variables: Year 2 
 
Companies that are negatively valued in the dimension Human Rights (HUM), also 
express negative behaviors in Environment (ENV). The fact that these variables appear 
close to each other in the graphical representation and the disproportion of items valued 
at each of these individual dimensions of CSR could be simply justified by the fact that 
firms negatively valued in both directions have generally little or no awareness of social 
nature. Nevertheless, we should consider that items rated by KLD in the Human Rights 
concerns have to do with the existence of controversial company's operations in Mexico, 
including especially those related to the degradation of the environment. Therefore, these 
companies may be firms with production activities conducted towards Mexico or near the 




border, whose poor environmental awareness policy could be being valued in both 
dimensions at the same time. 
It can be observed that, in the years analyzed, the former two variables have a 
totally opposite behavior compared to Product (PRO) strengths. KLD positively assesses 
this dimension when a company has an adequate and/or recognized quality program or it 
is leader in its industry for research and development (R&D). These aspects are 
consistent with an environmentally responsible KLD attitude by: innovative products or 
environmental remediation services or innovative products with environmental benefits. 
It is also necessary to note that, according to Figures 5.5 and 5.6, environmentally 
responsible companies also show a positive assessment (high strengths) in Corporate 
Governance. Being evaluated negatively in this last variable, however, does not seem be 
associated to any specific profile or related to any other type of positive or negative 
action on CSR; the variable CGOV_C is located far away from the rest of variables, most 
significantly in year 2. 
To give consistency to the results obtained by the MDS analysis, we studied if the 
means representing different groups of companies - classified on the basis of the 
existence or not of a financial distress situation and the severity and features of such crisis 
- are statistically significant. The Tables 5.7 to 5.10 show the main results of these 
analyses. 
Regarding the attitude of social responsibility (Table 5.7), we observe a uniform 
behavior of firms during the three years regardless of their financial situation. The 
proactive behavior measured by CSR_S, as well as negative concerns (CSR_C), increase 
during the two years. The results in Table 5.7 show that, as stated earlier, there are 
differences in the attitude and behavior between firms in the analyzed years, and these 
differences are independent from their economic-financial situation. As previously 
commented, the wider range of KLD database in valuing firms, may have motivated the 
fact that firms worry more about their responsible image.  As a result, 
average CSR_global variable experienced a statistically significant decrease.  
 




Table 5.7. Differences between CSR variables across years. 
Total Sample Year 1 Year  2 t (Y1-Y2) Sig. 
CRS_S 0,36 0,4 -5,887 0,000 
CRS_C 0,48 0,54 -6,123 0,000 
CRS_Global -0,12 -0,14 2,028 0,043 
Healthy Year 1 Year  2 t (Y1-Y2) Sig. 
CRS_S 0,34 0,36 -4,393 0,000 
CRS_C 0,42 0,47 -43723 0,000 
CRS_Global -0,079 -0,101 1,683 0,094 
Crisis Year 1 Year  2 t (Y1-Y2) Sig. 
CRS_S 0,39 0,43 -3,928 0,000 
CRS_C 0,58 0,64 -3,894 0,000 
CRS_Global -0,195 -0,214 1,13 0,260 
 
Table 5.8. Differences between healthy and distressed firms in CSR. 
Variables Healthy Crisis Sig. 
TOTAL_S_01 1,96 2,31 0,140 
TOTAL_C_01 1,74 2,55 0,001 
CRS_S_01 0,342 0,389 0,254 
CRS_C_01 0,421 0,584 0,002 
CRS_GLOBAL 01 -0,078 -0,195 0,037 
TOTAL_S_02 2,03 2,56 0,028 
TOTAL_C_02 1,77 2,76 0,000 
CRS_S_02 0,352 0,446 0,024 
CRS_C_02 0,442 0,653 0,000 
CRS_GLOBAL 02 -0,09 -0,207 0,038 
 
 




Table 5.9. Differences between healthy and distressed firms in individual CSR 
dimensions 
Variables Healthy Distressed Sig. 
COM_C_01 0,09 0,25 0,000 
DIV_S_01 0,73 0,99 0,045 
ENV_C_01 0,4 0,75 0,001 
PRO_C_01 0,29 0,5 0,009 
COM_S_02 0,29 0,45 0,039 
COM_C_02 0,09 0,31 0,000 
DIV_S_02 0,77 1,1 0,023 
EMP_S_02 0,45 0,71 0,005 
ENV_C_02 0,29 0,88 0,000 
 
Table 5.10. Differences between weak operational and weak financial firms in individual 
CSR dimensions 
Variables Economical Financial Sig. 
COM_C_01 0,03 0,32 0,005 
ENV_S_01 0,13 0,39 0,011 
ENV_C_01 0,39 0,88 0,036 
COM_C_02 0,1 0,35 0,003 
ENV_C_02 0,45 0,96 0,007 
HUM_C_02 0,05 0,19 0,046 
PRO_S_02 0,33 0,09 0,001 
PRO_C_02 0,29 0,54 0,046 
 
 




These same behaviors occur when we analyzed separately the healthy firms and 
distressed firms, so we can assert that there is a common pattern in the market or that 
there are external and contextual issues that influence the strategy or attitude of 
companies against CSR. If we analyze the differences between companies with problems 
and the healthy ones (Table 5.8), the formers have higher and statistically significant 
concerns in the years studied and, in general, a lower overall score. However, their CSR 
strength valuation is not statistically different from the behavior presented by healthy 
companies, except in year 2 that offers an even higher valuation of TOTAL_S and 
CSR_S. These results confirm that the companies in crisis, indeed, continue to maintain a 
proactive approach to responsible behavior that might be motivated by the intent to 
"mitigate" the weak image offered by their financial data. However, because of their 
deteriorated economic and / or financial situation, they try to ignore certain aspects that 
may be cost associated, which is why they present a higher valuation on weaknesses. In 
this way (Table 5.9), they are committed to low-cost but high impact responsible 
behavior as the variable DIV_S, where facts like having a woman or a member of a 
minority group as chief executive officer, promotion programs to women and minorities, 
programs addressing work/life concerns (e.g., childcare, elder care, or flextime), or 
implementing notably progressive policies toward their gay and lesbian employees. On 
the contrary, these firms are negatively valued on issues associated with ENV_C and 
PRO_C which highlight the existence of liabilities, civil penalties actions or disputes that 
may be explained by not investing in R&D activities to improve their production 
processes and/or products. It should be noted that companies in crisis also presented 
greater Community concerns than the healthy companies in the years analyzed. This 
variable evaluates issues such as whether the company has recently been involved in 
major tax disputes involving Federal, state, local or non-U.S. government authorities, or 
is involved in controversies over its tax obligations to the community.   
Finally (Table 5.10), regarding the possible differences between companies that are 
in a weak financial distress position. We can affirm that those companies whose 
situation is explained by economic issues (poor performance) show more responsible 
values, statistically significant,  in the dimension associated with the product (PRO_S) 
than those in a weak financial situation (solvency problems). These results are consistent 
with the approach of the existence of a strategy to improve the income statements by the 




progress of products by means of increased sales, quality programs and concerns 
about R&D to obtain innovative product that may place them as market leader. 
5.4. Conclusions 
The purpose was to explore if managers of firms in a financial distress situation try 
to “handle” the image of the weak financial situation throughout investments in 
responsible actions as a mechanism in order to supply future solidity to the firm. Doing 
so, investors and the market itself would be infected by this behavior of future 
expectations of the managers.  
The results evidence the no existence of structural CSR differences between the 
companies that show symptoms of a crisis and the healthy ones, with respect to those 
aspects considered as strengths in CSR behavior. In this sense, either 
the responsible attitude is inherent to the philosophy of management and it is 
independent of the financial situation, or managers of companies in a declining 
process have, indeed, a strategy process to "soften" the image shown by their weak 
economic and financial data by means of responsible behavior.  
Moreover, we did obtain evidence that there exist differences in the valuation 
of concerns. Companies in crisis are worse valued with respect to the negative 
items included in the KLD and this could be a consequence of the tendency to 
reduce costs and investments that may continue weakening an already 
deteriorated financial situation. These companies are characterized by 
a CSR strategy aimed at investing in responsible behavior with a high level of social or 
reputational impact but with a low investment cost, such as gender diversity. 
The differences in the responsible behaviors for weak firms from an 
operational performance view and weak firms from a financial structure view can be 
caused, to some extent, by such situations. Companies weak in performance need 
to improve their short-term income statement and this can be seen in the tendency to cut 
costs and invest in stocks with a direct benefit on turnover rather than social standing.  
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Chapter VI. Investment in Social Responsibility as a Strategy for 
distress recovery.  
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we obtained evidence that there exist underlying structural 
characteristics that mark the differences and similarities between firms considering the 
fact that they have faced a financial distress situation. By means of the consensus map 
obtained by MDS, which allows representing, simultaneously, individuals and variables 
used in the analysis, we cannot identify if there exist groups of firms that share the same 
specific profile. At the same time, the available information on CSR variables 
individually considered prevented their plotting in the same map in order to determine 
firms’ patterns in a more effective way. 
The present chapter is oriented towards the analysis of CSR profiles of U.S. firms 
in order to identify the possible association clusters and to determine if these clusters 
are or could be linked to the existence of a financial distress situation. As in the 
previous chapter, we start from the existence of an incentive towards the modification 
of responsible behavior by firms facing a crisis situation. Regarding the previous 
chapter, the basic differences consist in: 
- A more precise definition of the analyzed firms. 
 We center the analysis in the second biennium given that the results 
showed a change in the attitude of firms, regardless of their crisis 
conditions, starting from 2001, and with a significant difference between 
values obtained in the year 2000 and in 2001. The fact that this change 
could be motivated by the incorporation in KLD database of the bigger 
1000 U.S. firms in the year 2001, allows us considering more reasonable 
taking this year as basic reference. 
 An additional filter was performed, so that in the year 2000 no firm 
presented any weakness symptom indicating a situation of crisis. In this 
way, we made sure that the differentiation between healthy and 
distressed firms in effect occurred in year t. 
- For the cluster identification, we selected the two-step cluster methodology 
which allows discovering natural grouping of individuals which are difficult to 




observe in a direct manner. At the same time, it consents to automatically obtain 
the optimal number of clusters. 
For this purpose we will analyze the patterns of responsible behavior to determine 
the identity marks of the firms and explore if the behavior profiles could be related to 
the existence of a distressed situation or whether they are not. 
6.2. The sample 
The analysis is performed on the valuation of responsible behaviors of the 1000 
more capitalized U.S firms in the year 2001, according to KLD database. Thompson 
database information was used in classifying the firms as distressed based on the 
economic and financial characteristics and symptoms discussed in previous chapters. 
The matching of the two databases gave as a result 392 firms. To avoid influences 
swept along previous years, only firms showing a healthy situation in the year 2000 
were selected so that the final sample is composed of 248 firms. By doing so, we make 
sure that firms classified as being in distress in the year 2001 came from, at least, a year 
of stability. Considering the former information, sample firms were classified as shown 
in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Group classification of firms 
Classification Criteria 
Healthy  (186) No symptoms 
Weak 
Distress  
Economic (40) < 3 criteria Economic criteria are dominant 
Financial (17) Financial criteria are dominant 
Strong Distress (5) 4 or more criteria 
 
6.3. The variables 
The variables used to classify the profiles of responsible behaviors are gathered in Table 
6.2.  
 




Table 6.2. Variables of the analysis. 
Variable Definition 
Total_S Sum of total strengths assessed in KLD considering all 
dimensions valuations.  
Total_C Sum of total concerns assessed in KLD considering all 
dimensions valuations.  
CSR_S Sum of total strengths assessed in all dimensions 
weighted by the items included in each of them.  
CSR_C Sum of total concerns assessed in all dimensions 
weighted by the items included in each of them.  
Dimension_S (*) Sum of strengths in the corresponding dimension. 
Dimension_C (*) Sum of concerns in the corresponding dimension. 
(*) Dimensions correspond to: Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, 
Employee relations, Environment, Human Rights and Product.  
 
In addition, we introduce two categorical variables: 
- Prob_01 which gathers information on the situation of a firm in the year 2001, 
taking 0 value (when firms are healthy) and 1 otherwise (when firms present any 
symptom of distress) 
- Situation_01, which classifies distressed firms in three categories depending on 
the degree and type of distress, taking values: healthy, weak economic distress, 
weak financial distress and strong distress, following the classification in Table 
6.1. 
6.4. The methodology 
In order to evidence the existence of common patterns we will perform a Two-
Step Cluster Analysis, developed by Chiu et al. (2001). The name itself indicates that 
the analysis is based on two stages. First, an algorithm similar to k-means algorithm is 
performed and then a hierarchical agglomerative clustering combines the individuals in 
order to create homogenous clusters (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011) 




This exploratory procedure permits evidencing the possible natural agglomeration 
between individuals, according to certain variables, that in a direct way would be 
difficult to observe. This technique has the advantage of managing categorical and 
continuous variables, as it is the case of being in distress or the degree of the same 
(Prob_01 and Situatuon_01). Moreover, it allows contrasting the significance level of 
each variable in the formation of each agglomeration, that is, through Chi-Square for 
categorical variables and T-Student for continuous variables. 
Log-likelihood distance is used to calculate the distance between clusters because 
we manage continuous and categorical variables. In addition, as the clusters are grouped 
into one cluster, their distance is associated with the reduction of the natural logarithm 
of likelihood function (Shiopu, 2010). To determine the number of clusters we opt for 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). The BIC criterion 
(clustering method) is computed for each possible number of clusters. The smaller the 
values of the BIC, the better the models are, and as a consequence, the best cluster will 
have the smallest BIC value.  
The analysis will be performed separately for variables representing positive 
responsible behaviors (strengths) and for variables representing negative responsible 
behaviors (concerns), following the arguments stated in previous chapters. In addition, 
we introduce two categorical variables representing the existence or not of distress 
(values 0 or 1) or the degree and type of the distress the firms presents (up to 4 values). 
The two step cluster analysis will be performed over the variables gathering social 
responsible actions of firms in the year 2002, in order to explore, as already specified, 
the possible existence of incentives for distressed firms to mitigate, their weak 
economic and financial indicators, once distress has been identified. However, the 
analysis of the 2001 data allows determining if these agglomerations existed previously, 
without considering their association with distress. 
6.5. Empirical results and discussion 
Considering the information gathered in Table 6.3, firms presenting some type of 
distress in the year 2001 have better valuation in responsible behaviors concerning 
strength items and worse behaviors regarding concerns, when compared to healthy 




firms. In the year 2002, this situation remains still so that the global assessments do not 
indicate any movement in the responsible actions incentivized by the distressed 
situation a firm is going through. In this sense, the valuation of responsible behaviors, 
proactive and reactive, one year after the classification of the economic-financial 
situation, is higher for both groups and for the global sample. This fact allows 
evidencing that the behaviors follow an evolutionary pattern independent from the 
existence or not of a distressed situation. These increases in the valuation are 
statistically significant (0,000) for the overall sample and for healthy firms, in all the 
four variables taken into account. However, in the case of distressed firms, the 
differences in the valuations for the two years analyzed are significant only in those 
variables gathering strengths information (TOT_S and CSR_S, 0.004 and 0.019 
respectively). 
Table 6.3. Differences in overall assessments for the years 2001-2002 
  2001 2002 
  Total Distressed  Healthy Total Distressed Healthy 
  M D M D M D M D M D M D 
TOT_S 1,96 2,20 2,31 2,30 1,85 2,16 2,14 2,35 2,52 2,47 2,01 2,31 
TOT_C 1,74 2,08 2,31 2,35 1,55 1,95 1,91 2,11 2,42 2,32 1,74 2,01 
CSR_S 0,34 0,39 0,42 0,42 0,32 0,37 0,38 0,41 0,45 0,43 0,35 0,40 
CSR_C 0,42 0,48 0,55 0,53 0,38 0,45 0,48 0,49 0,59 0,52 0,44 0,48 
 






















We performed an analysis to evidence if the differences observed in the average 
valuation of distressed and healthy firms could be explained by some underlying cause. 
The differences resulted significant only for the behaviors related to non-responsible 
actions, measured by concern variables and only for the year 2001 (TOT_C_01 (0.01) 
and CSR_C_01 (0.01). In this way, the worse valuation in 2002 of the distressed firms 
is not statistically different from the valuation of healthy firms. Distressed firms facing 
remarkable continuity problems, tend to be carefree in certain dimensions of responsible 
behavior, yet not less than firms that do not present any distress symptoms in the 
previous year. 
In spite of these results, we cannot affirm a priori that there exist a common 
pattern or conduct profile between firms that may or may not face a certain distressed 
situation. Performing the two step cluster analysis allows us clarifying some of these 
previous issues. 
6.5.1. Clusters for the year 2002 – Strengths 
We identify 5 optimal clusters following the BIC criterion (Table 6.4). The 
number of clusters corresponds to the lowest BIC value for the selection. The number of 
firms grouping in each cluster, based on prob_01 variable which represents the 
existence of distress, is shown in Table 6.5.  
Table 6.4. Auto-clustering statistics 











1 1754,873       
2 1509,140 -245,734 1,000 1,840 
3 1423,431 -85,709 ,349 1,014 
4 1340,353 -83,078 ,338 1,562 
5 1324,873 -15,480 ,063 1,767 
6 1361,579 36,705 -,149 1,270 
 




Table 6.5. Distribution of cases in clusters 
Cluster 0 (healthy) % 1 (distressed) % 
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The interpretation of the clusters is performed by means of centroid analysis 
(Table 6.6) in each variable. It allows evidencing to what extent there exist differences 
between the cases grouped in each cluster, as well as interpreting the characteristics of 
the companies forming each agglomeration. 
The results show that, in the year 2002, 72% of distressed firms are grouped in 
cluster 3, and no healthy firm shares similar profile with them. These firms are not 
positively valued, in general terms, though they present better average results than 46% 
of healthy firms. They also do not outstand in any dimension, yet they surpass the 
average values of more than 64% of the firms showing a stable situation. It is necessary 
to highlight that in cluster 1, there is a relevant number of distressed firms that are the 
best valued of the entire sample, except for actions regarding environmental issues, 
against only a 5% of healthy firms. On the other hand, healthy firms mostly 
agglomerate in cluster 2 and 5. 
Nevertheless, the profiles of each cluster can be better identified by means of 
graphical representation that the two step cluster analysis offers, evidencing significant 
variables that determine each profile. In this sense, in Figure 1 are exposed the five 
clusters obtained from the analysis. The non-continuous line marks the critical point 
from which each variable is significant for the interpretation of the clusters. Those 
variables that cross this line are significant in the determination of companies’ profile 
composing each cluster. The variables located in the positive value zone represent, in 
the corresponding cluster, scores above average values. 




Table 6.6. Centroids 
   Cluster 
    1 2 3 4 5 Combined 
TOT_S_02 Mean 7,59 3,37 1,33 2,18 ,31 2,14 
  Std. dev 1,992 1,291 1,279 1,048 ,512 2,353 
CSR_S_02 Mean 1,3162879 ,5742690 ,2379630 ,4326923 ,0454902 ,3755712 
  Std. dev ,33516833 ,20846591 ,23139451 ,19794619 ,07619803 ,40784309 
COM_S Mean 1,32 ,56 ,11 ,00 ,05 ,28 
  Std. dev 1,249 ,682 ,318 ,000 ,213 ,650 
CGOV_S Mean ,41 ,09 ,09 ,51 ,00 ,15 
  Std. dev ,590 ,285 ,288 ,601 ,000 ,393 
DIV_S Mean 2,77 1,40 ,47 ,38 ,19 ,78 
  Std. dev 1,270 1,334 ,625 ,633 ,450 1,161 
EMP_S Mean 1,82 ,81 ,49 ,49 ,07 ,54 
  Std. dev ,907 ,854 ,695 ,683 ,258 ,809 
ENV_S Mean ,68 ,11 ,07 ,79 ,00 ,22 
  Std. dev ,568 ,310 ,252 ,570 ,000 ,454 
HUM_S Mean ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
  Std. dev ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
PRO_S Mean ,59 ,40 ,11 ,00 ,00 ,17 
  Std. dev ,590 ,563 ,318 ,000 ,000 ,404 
 




Figure 6.1. Significant variable forming Cluster 1 
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Figure 6.3. Significant variable forming Cluster 3 
 
 
TwoStep Cluster Number = 3 
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Figure 6.5. Significant variable forming Cluster 5 
 
TwoStep Cluster Number = 5 





As it can be seen in Figure 6.1, firms facing distress in the year 2001 are firms not 
considered responsible in the year 2002. Moreover, it is their non-investment in actions 
related with environment, community and diversity that better contribute to the cluster 
formation of distressed firms. In the latter two dimensions, these firms share common 
behavior patterns with more than 50% of healthy firms. The difference between healthy 
and distressed firms resides in the environmental strategy, incorporated in the firms 
forming cluster 4. Moreover, they also differentiate in the general attitude towards 
responsible behaviors (with high overall scores) against firms that do not pay attention 
(Cluster 5). Table 6.7 gathers in a simplified manner, the characteristic patterns of each 
cluster. 
      In order to determine if there exist differences in firms’ profiles with respect to the 
previous year, we follow the same procedure but considering strength valuations in the 
year in which distress symptoms were used to classify firms according to their 
economic-financial situation. The resulting two clusters do not allow differentiating 
between highly responsible firms and non-responsible firms (showing variable values 
very below the average). The latter ones formed the cluster where 69% of firms were 
healthy and 61 % were distressed. 




Table 6.7. Cluster profile characteristics for the year 2002. 




Responsible firms that wager for actions on diversity, employee relations, 
community and environment.  
 




Distressed firms, not valued as responsible and do not outstand in actions 
regarding environment, community and diversity.  
 
4 
Firms strong in environment and corporate governance and not standing out 
in diversity.  
 
5 
Healthy, non-responsible firms not caring about employees, diversity and 
community.  
 
In fact, variable prob_01 was not significant for the formation of any cluster.  This 
starting point and also the results discussed previously, allow asserting that firms facing 
distress, indeed, modify their proactive actions in social responsibility in the same 
direction. However, these actions are linked to certain dimensions and to specific 
aspects. 
6.5.2. Clusters for the year 2002 – Concerns  
In the case of concern representative variables, in the year 2002 we identify 4 
clusters, according to the BIC criterion (Table 6.8). Distressed firms gather in a 
considerable amount (80%) in one cluster where there are no healthy companies (Table 
6.9).  These latter ones are considerably grouped in two clusters where neither is located 
any distressed firm. Considering the results exposed in Table 6.10 as well as the 
representation of significant variables in Figure 6.6, we can affirm that some of the 
groups are very specifically outlined. This fact occurs mainly in cluster 2, where healthy 
firms stand out in a positive way due to their low concern, placed below the average 
scores, and in a negative way in corporate governance. On the other hand, cluster 4, 
composed by distressed firms, mainly shares the care for human rights dimension. 
Cluster 3 gathers healthy firms (12%) and distressed firms (19%) which are 
characterized by reactive conduct towards social responsible actions. 
 




Table 6.8. Auto-clustering statistics 












1 1926,273       
2 1599,125 -327,148 1,000 1,867 
3 1472,506 -126,619 ,387 1,463 
4 1419,100 -53,406 ,163 1,602 
5 1425,141 6,041 -,018 1,174 
 
 
Table 6.9. Distribution of cases in clusters 
Cluster 0 (healthy) % 1 (distressed) % 
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Table 6.10. Centroids 
   Cluster 
    1 2 3 4 Combined 
TOT_C_02 Mean ,41 1,95 5,82 1,58 1,91 
  Std. dev ,589 ,890 2,634 1,180 2,107 
CSR_C_02 Mean ,0802679 ,5422902 1,3324230 ,4218571 ,4772945 
  Std. dev ,11340782 ,21486618 ,60603031 ,31545989 ,49214654 
COM_C Mean ,01 ,00 ,68 ,00 ,10 
  Std. dev ,112 ,000 ,589 ,000 ,322 
CGOV_C Mean ,00 ,68 ,79 ,54 ,45 
  Std. dev ,000 ,495 ,592 ,579 ,545 
DIV_C Mean ,00 ,31 ,41 ,24 ,21 
  Std. dev ,000 ,465 ,500 ,431 ,408 
EMP_C Mean ,16 ,33 ,82 ,42 ,36 
  Std. dev ,371 ,474 ,869 ,575 ,574 
ENV_C Mean ,14 ,11 1,71 ,16 ,35 
  Std. dev ,413 ,381 1,360 ,510 ,835 
HUM_C Mean ,00 ,15 ,29 ,02 ,10 
  Std. dev ,000 ,364 ,524 ,141 ,310 
PRO_C Mean ,10 ,37 1,12 ,20 ,35 
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Figure 6.7. Significant variable forming Cluster 2 
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t - Student 
 (N) Not significant 
 
(C) Constant (N) Not significant 
 
 




Figure 6.8. Significant variable forming Cluster 3 
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Bonferroni Adjustment Applied 
t - Student 






Figure 6.9. Significant variable forming Cluster 4 
 
 
TwoStep Cluster Number = 4 




t - Student 
 (C) Constant (N) Not significant 
 
 




According to the results, the profiles of the companies, with regard to concerns, one 
year after the detection of the existence or not of distress, are gathered in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11. Cluster profiles according to distress situation, year 2002 (Concerns). 
 Cluster Characteristics 
1 
Healthy firms not valued very negatively in terms of concerns, especially in 
product, community and with less intensity in environment and employees. 
2 
Healthy firms, weak in corporate governance and not valued very 
negatively in environment.  
3 
Extremely weak firms in general, and in particular in environment, 
community and product.  
4 Distressed firms standing out for their low human rights score.  
 
Surprisingly, in the year 2001, the agglomerations are similar (Table 6.12). In 
fact, only one cluster collects distressed firms and two clusters gather healthy firms, 
although the latter show an unequal participation in each of them. Cluster 4, gathering a 
total of 80% of distressed firms, is mainly characterized by the care in product and 
human rights, obtaining concern values way below the average scores. However, as 
stated previously, in the year 2002, they continue highlighted by low valuations in 
human rights. In this sense, it can be understood that distressed firms have stopped 
investing in actions that minimize their negative impact in product variable, as a 
measure to avoid associated costs that could influence their already deteriorated 
situation. 
In order to determine if the variable “situation_01” is significant when generating 
natural clusters, we repeated the analysis using this categorical variable. The results 
regarding strength valuations are similar to the ones discussed previously, when 
distinguishing only between healthy and distressed firms (Table 6.9). However, it is to 
highlight that firms presenting economic weaknesses, as well as strongly distressed 
firms, are 80% grouped in one agglomeration (cluster 2). 
 




Table 6.12. Cluster profiles according to distress situation, year 2001 (Concerns) 






Firms valued negatively in general and in particular in 













Healthy firms not valued negatively in general terms and in 






Distressed firms not valued negatively in product and human 
rights.  
 
Moreover, firms that show financial issues are distributed in half between this 
cluster and the one gathering healthy firms. Companies of cluster 2 cannot be marked as 
responsible as they basically fail in community and diversity. These results continue 
resembling the common profiles already observed for distressed and healthy firms, still 
it is to be noted the formation of cluster 3. This group is composed by firms in a critical 
situation in some cases and with a strong bet on social responsibility including 
dimensions such as environment. This fact may be influence by the sector where 
companies are developing their normal activity. Considering the results of the analysis, 
the profiles of each cluster are shown in Table 6.13. 
Regarding concerns, in the year 2001 there are no agglomerations based on the 
crisis situation shown in that year, yet there are clusters one year after the issues of 
distress show up. Mostly, firms in distress with different type and degree of distress are 
gathered together and, in general, they obtain good valuations, overpassed by only 42, 5 
% of healthy firms. Moreover, these firms tend to center their actions in minimizing 
negative impacts associated with community and human rights dimensions (see Table 
6.14).















1 47,85 0,00 47,06 0,00 
Healthy and financially weak firms generally valued 
as responsible.  
2 0,00 80,00 47,06 80,00 
Distressed firms, not responsible and weak in 
community and diversity.  
3 6,45 20,00 5,88 20,00 
Responsible firms that wager for diversity, 
employees, product, community and environment.  
4 45,70 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Healthy firms, not responsible and carefree about 
employees, diversity and community.  
 











1 11,29 17,50 23,53 0,00 
In general, weak firms especially in environment, 
community, product and corporate governance.   
2 46,24 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Healthy firms but weak in corporate governance 
that worry about minimizing environmental issues 
and community.  
3 0,00 82,50 76,47 100,00 
Distressed firms, worrying about minimizing their 
effects on community and human rights.  
4 42,47 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Healthy firms with low general weaknesses and 
worry about minimizing their impact on product, 
employees and environment.  




Although the results show the existence of differentiated clusters, with specific 
action profiles one year after considering the situation of distress, we also analyze the 
significance of these agglomerations. For this purpose, we perform a Kruskal-Wallis 
test in order to determine to what extent the variable values are different in each cluster. 
The results show that for the 2002, in strength dimensions as well as in concerns, the 
groups present statistically and significant different values (p=0,000). Because of null 
values in the variable Human rights strengths, this variable was omitted from the 
analysis. These results confirm that the clusters obtained previously represent the 
existence of CSR behavioral patterns between the two groups of firms analyzed.  
The analyzed results indicate that, indeed, there could have been a conduct change 
in firms, motivated by the appearance of negative situation indicators. The non-
parametric Wilcoxon and Mann Whitney allows us determining to what extent these 
differences really exist between values obtained from one year to another and between 
healthy and distressed firms as well. 
It can be observed that there are differences in the total sample between distinct 
variables, where a reduction in negative valuations dominates (weaknesses in 
responsibility), except for the environment dimension which seems to attract less 
attention from companies. These general sample results are in agreement with the case 
of healthy firms (in fact, community and diversity are significant at a 0, 10 level. 
Healthy firms have, in a certain manner, changed their social responsibility strategies, 
mainly by means of actions towards minimizing negative impacts in performance. It is 
relevant to state that, in distressed firms of the year 2001, the results only were 
significant for product variable, where increasing the actions in this dimension has 
brought a better score and valuation. 
With regard to possible dissimilarities between healthy and distressed firms 
(Table 6.16), differences are mainly observed in weak responsible behaviors (concerns) 
and always in favor of healthy firms which obtain lower valuations (in all the cases, the 
rank sum was higher for distressed firms than healthy firms). These differences are 
maintained in both years for employee and environment variables. The existing 
differences in human dimension, for the year 2001, disappear one year after distress 
symptoms show up and, on the other side, in this year there are differences in 




community variable. Table 6.15 collects the significant results for the differences in 
variable values between the year 2001 and 2002. 
Table 6.15. Differences in variable values between the year 2001 and 2002 
Total sample Z Sig. asintot. (bilateral) 
COM_S_01 / COM_S_02 -2,324(*) 0,020 
CGOV_S_01 / CGOV_S_02 -4,146(*) 0,000 
CGOV_C_01 / CGOV_C_02 -2,668(*) 0,008 
DIV_S_01 / DIV_S_02 -2,062(*) 0,039 
DIV_C_01 / DIV_C_02 -2,183(*) 0,029 
EMP_C_01 / EMP_C_02 -3,536(*) 0,000 
ENV_C_01 / ENV_C_02 -2,268(**) 0,023 
PRO_C_01 / PRO_C_02 -2,858(*) 0,004 
Healthy firms   
COM_S_01 / COM_S_02 -1,667(*) 0.096 
CGOV_S_01 / CGOV_S_02 -3,500(*) 0,000 
CGOV_C_01 / CGOV_C_02 -2,496(*) 0,013 
DIV_S_01 / DIV_S_02 -1,738(*) 0,082 
DIV_C_01 / DIV_C_02 -2,138(*) 0,033 
EMP_C_01 / EMP_C_02 -3,272(*) 0,001 
ENV_C_01 / ENV_C_02 -1,964(**) 0,050 
PRO_C_01 / PRO_C_02 -2,524(*) 0,012 
Distressed firms   
PRO_C_01 / PRO_C_02 -1,732(*) 0,083 
(*) based on negative ranks t+1< t 
 
 




Table 6.16. Dissimilarities between healthy and distressed firms. 
Dimension U Mann-Whitney W  Wilcoxon Z Sig. asintot. (bilateral) 
EMP_S_01 2205,500 19596,500 -2,507 0,012 
ENV_C_01 2330,000 19721,000 -2,375 0,018 
HUM_S_01 2790,000 20181,000 -2,449 0,014 
COM_S_02 2320,500 19711,500 -2,365 0,018 
COM_C_02 2615,500 20006,500 -1,729 0,084 
EMP_S_02 2218,000 19609,000 -2,442 0,015 
ENV_C_02 2246,000 19637,000 -2,913 0,004 
 
6.6. Conclusions 
The Two Step Cluster methodology allowed us exploring the possible existence of 
natural agglomeration of firms, based on their responsible behaviors, characterized by 
the presence or not of distress problems. The results show that the crisis variable, 
indeed, as well as the type and severity of the same, discriminates companies with 
similar proactive and/or reactive patterns. Moreover, these common patterns usually are 
more highlighted one year after the company has identified certain deteriorated 
economic and financial indicators.  
Distressed firms obtain higher valuation in behaviors qualified as positive, but 
also in concern dimensions, than healthy firms. This increase in strength assessments 
follows the same pattern as the one observed for healthy companies, so that it cannot be 
derived that, in general, this wager on responsibility is a consequence of actions towards 
decline situation. 
The behaviors of distressed companies only resulted statistically different, with 
respect to sane firms, in actions qualified in a negative sense. However, the fact that 
these differences occur in both years of the analysis does not allow affirming the 
existence of an association between crisis and responsible actions either. 




One year after the crisis situation reveals, companies seem to have a common 
profile regarding social responsible behavior, which was not observed previously. Yet, 
the only characteristic that discriminates these companies from the general profile of 
healthy companies is their weak wager on actions that could strengthen their 
environmental position. This fact can be explained by the associated costs that these 
actions require and which may impact an already deteriorated economic position. 
Distressed firms modify their responsible behavior in a way that is not reflected in 
a more positive general valuation. They act on certain specific actions. Regarding 
concerns, distressed firms do not have a differentiated specific profile, yet their situation 
has changed after the starting of the deficient state, as if they simply had decided to join 
the more common behaviors among companies to avoid being valued negatively. 
Distinct profiles exist when we consider the type and origin of the crisis, mainly 
differentiating the existence of a deficit in the income statement. This agglomeration 
could be related to strategies implemented by the company for the recovery process. 
It is to mention that the methodology used only contributes with exploratory 
results that allow opening lines towards hypotheses on possible causal relations that, 
should anyway consider the type of strategy implemented by companies in order to 
overcome the crisis situation, as well as the sector where they develop their activity, 




Mooi, E. and Sarstedt, M. (2011), “A concise guide to market research: the process, 
data, and methods using IBM SPSS statistics”, Berlin, Springer 2011. 















CHAPTER VII. DO FIRMS CHANGE THEIR CSR 
BEHAVIOR WHEN SIGNALS OF FINANCIAL  










Chapter VII. Do firms change their CSR behavior when signals of 
financial distress are identified? 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters evidenced certain changes in the attitude of firms facing a 
financial distress situation, justified by the existence of incentive for managers to 
mitigate the weak image given by firm’s income statements. In some of the cases, the 
analyses were only exploratory, such as Multidimensional Scaling, and did not start off 
a causal relationship between variables. However, the results obtained are a relevant 
basis for subsequently proposing these relationships. On the other hand, the analysis 
was performed during a specific year range, being the first years of the 2000 decade, in 
coincidence with the increase in the number of firms constituting KLD database. This 
increase in the number of companies makes us think that in the years coming 
afterwards, firms would care more about their CSR valuation in the database. In this 
way, investment in responsible actions could be considered as a mechanism to “adjust” 
their responsible image towards society. 
 In this chapter we extend the analyzed period from 2000 to 2007, which allows 
identifying to what extent the evidence obtained for a specific period could occur in a 
continuous period of time. In this way, we maintain the basic question: Can responsible 
behavior act as a mitigation factor of the firms’ ongoing concern when certain financial 
distress situation takes place?  
7.2. The hypotheses 
Under the diminishing the perceived risk approach, if investors are cautious in the 
presence of the financial risk of a firm, the mitigating factors of an a priori 
unattractiveness for the investors are determined by the possible effects that a CSR 
investment could have on firm’s performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003). We could expect 
that managers of financially distressed firms could be incentivized to perform greater 
efforts in CSR behaviors in order to mitigate the bad financial results, securing the trust 
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and support of stakeholder when the survival of the firm could be compromised. Based 
on the above approach, we propose the following general hypothesis: 
H1: Despite of the associated costs, distressed companies tend to invert, or 
maintain their investment in CSR actions in order to compensate their weak financial 
image.  
In particular, deriving from this first hypothesis, we will also test: 
 H1.1: Despite of the associated costs, distressed companies tend to invert, or 
maintain their investment in those CSR actions that have a direct repercussion on profit 
generation, so that they can restore their delicate economic situation.  
Under the cost-reduction approach, investment in responsible actions could be 
also interpreted as a cost affecting the future profit of a company. In the short run, 
responsible behavior increase the costs, influencing in a direct way the financial results 
(Belu, 2009). Moreover, they could imply a redirection of resources necessary for other 
relevant areas of the company which could impact the firm’s viability (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001). However, the cost of being responsible affects in a different way in each 
dimension of social responsible behavior, making it difficult to estimate the possible 
cost impact of the responsible actions. This is the case of environmental or product 
actions that imply, in most of the cases, a relevant investment associated to R&D.  The 
selection of the investment in responsible behavior strategy will be determined based on 
its cost/benefit. 
In front of the cost ranges associated to different alternatives, we propose that: 
H2: Companies presenting symptoms of financial distress will redirect their CSR 
performance, mitigating in those lines that imply a further deterioration of their 
statements, and investing in non-costly actions that permit maintaining stakeholders’ 
support.  
On the other hand, considering the results obtained in previous chapter, we have 
found that, among other issues: 
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- In some cases there were no changes in the conduct of firms towards social 
responsibility between the year catalogued as being in distress and the year afterwards. 
This fact indicates that, in some occasions, companies had already started a behavior 
change in the year they expected the financial indicators to be weak. This affirmation 
makes sense if we bear in mind that firms know in advance how their activity results are 
going. In this sense, when expecting that negative indicator will present a weak image 
to shareholders and other stakeholders, companies try to mitigate this image by means 
of adequate valuations in responsible actions. 
- Certain differences depending on the type of distress, associated to economic or 
financial issues, were detected. This fact may exert an influence on the type of 
responsible actions where the company invests. Firms with weakened profit balance 
will try to disinvest in costly actions and invest in those dimensions that could promote 
incomes. On the other hand, financially distressed firms tend to invest in responsible 
actions with impact on reputation and image in order to minimize the estimated risk of 
present and/or future investors. 
- Finally, the sector where companies normally operate may also condition the 
maintenance of certain responsible behaviors, despite of the derived associated costs 
and their repercussion on the financial situation. It is the case of actions regarding 
environmental issues, which can be essential for the “reputational” survival in certain 
sectors compromised with environment, or in sectors depending on the product 
innovation and customers’ needs satisfaction. 
Considering these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H3. CSR behavior of the year when symptoms of distress are identified has a 
positive influence on the CSR conduct one year after. 
H4. Companies presenting symptoms of financial distress will redirect their CSR 
behavior depending on the economic or financial weaknesses that define their distress. 
 H5. The sector where companies operate influences the reaction on responsible 
behavior, once a distress situation has been detected.  
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7.3. The sample  
We used a sample of US firms derived from Compustat database matched with 
Kinder, Lyndenberg and Domini's database (KLD), gathering both economic-financial 
and CSR information. The analysis was made during the period 2001-2007, building 5 
block scenarios, each of them comprising a three year window, allowing comparing if 
an attitudinal change occurs in different scenarios. Firms operating in the financial 
services, for the particularity of their activity, were eliminated from the sample. 
Companies that did not present complete nor had consistent information were also 
discharged. Firms were classified as being in distress or healthy, in a certain year t, 
using the same symptom indicators exposed in previous chapters. Furthermore, to 
assure that the distress is not a situation coming from previous years, we selected firms 
that in t-1 were all in a healthy position. So, for instance all the 3-year blocks are 
composed by all healthy firms in (t-1) and healthy or distressed firms in the year (t). The 
data of the year t+1 allows us investigating the CSR actions and reactions of the firms, 
once they are aware of their decline. The Table 7.1 shows the distribution of the sample 
across the analyzed period. 
Table 7.1. Firm distribution by financial position/year 
Years Distress Healthy Total Distress % Healthy % 
2001-2003 44 136 180 24,44% 75,56% 
2002-2004 25 174 199 12,56% 87,44% 
2003-2005 40 530 570 7,02% 92,98% 
2004-2006 77 593 670 11,49% 88,51% 
2005-2007 77 612 689 11,18% 88,82% 
 
7.4. The variables 
The variables used are grouped based on the information they provide, as well as 
in the analysis where they will be applied. 
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- Distress variables: they are used for the classification of companies as being 
healthy or in distress. In particular, these variables are: Negative Net Income, Negative 
Operating Income, Negative Retained Earnings, Negative Working Capital, Negative 
Cash Flow, Negative Operating Cash Flow and Negative Shareholder’s Equity (the 
same classification variables followed in previous chapters).  
- CSR variables: they are obtained by the firms’ valuation in the seven KLD 
dimensions. These dimensions are: Community (COM), Corporate Governance 
(CGOV), Diversity (DIV), Employee Relations (EMP), Environment (ENV), Human 
Rights (HUM) and Product (PRO). In each of these dimensions we compute the overall 
valuation obtained by the companies in strengths and concerns, respectively. In this 
way, we can check if the incentives are produced towards proactive actions (strengths), 
that is, an improvement in responsible behavior, or reactive (concerns), which imply a 
decrease in non-responsible conducts. 
o DIM_str/DIM_con: these variables refer to the sum of strengths/concerns in each 
dimension of KLD database for the year t and t+1 where t stands for the year 
when symptoms of distress appear and t+1 the year afterwards. 
o CSR_S/CSR_C: these variables indicate the weighted sum of each 
strengths/concerns dimension, taking into account the items forming each 
dimension. 
o  TOT_S/TOT_C: they are the mere sum of the score obtained by companies in 
each strength/concern dimension, as they appear in the KLD database.  
- Economic and financial variables: To measure the economic performance of the 
companies we use the Return on Assets (ROA) indicator while for measuring the firm’s 
market liquidity and capacity to meet creditors demands we use the Current Ratio. 
These variables are used as proxy of economic or financial weaknesses, respectively.  
The final variables (Table 7.2) are gathered according to their usage in the 
analysis, which is described below.  
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Table 7.2.Variables used in the analysis 













Net Income (NI) These variables are  
Operating Income (OPI) used to classify a firm as 
Working Capital (WC) distressed/ healthy.  
Equity Shareholders (ES) They should be interpreted  
Retained Earnings (RE) with a negative sign.  
Cash Flow (CF)   
Operating Activities Cash Flow 












Strengths  Concerns    
COM-str* COM-con** The dimensions of CSR  
CGOV-str CGOV-con are used to plot  
DIV-str DIV-con the evolution of both  
EMP-str EMP-con groups of firms. 
ENV-str ENV-con These variables are also  
HUM-str HUM-con used in the testing of our  
PRO-str PRO-con  hypotheses. 
















ROA = Operating Income/Total 
assets 
Measures the economic 
performance of firms 
CACL = Current Assets/Current       
Liabilities 
Measures the ability to 
meet creditors demands 
Size= ln(Total Assets) 
Measures the size of 
the company 
FINDISS = dummy variable 
Indicates the situation 
of a firm: value 0 for healthy 
firms and value 1 for distress 
*str refers to each CSR dimension strength of KLD database 
**con refers to each CSR dimension concern exposed in table 2 
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7.5. The methodology 
In order to complement the results reached in previous chapters, the first part of 
the analysis deals with the evolution of behavior by means of Multidimensional Scaling 
in five 3-year blocks, maintaining the same approach. The results will permit observing 
to what extent the conduct changes can be extended to all the period analyzed or if there 
exist other external variables that may have an influence on the behavior of firms in 
certain years. 
The second part of the analysis pretends to determine the variables of influence in 
responsible behaviors, by proposing and testing the following regressions for each 
sector of activity of our sample: 
[1]      CSR_St+1 = β0 + β1*CSR_St + β2*CSR_St-1 + β3ROAt + β4*CACLt + β5*Sizet + 
β6*DFINDISSt + εt 
[2]      CSR_Ct+1 = β0 + β1*CSR_Ct + β2*CSR_Ct-1 + β3ROAt + β4*CACLt + β5*Sizet + 
β6*DFINDISSt + εt 
Equation [1] and [2] refer to CSR strengths and CSR concerns, respectively. Size 
is a control variables calculated by taking the natural logarithm of Total Assets of firms 
in the year t, and the variable DFINDISS is the dummy variable for FINDISS, taking 
value 0 if the firm is in a steady situation (healthy) and 1 otherwise. 
In the same way, we will test the regressions for each dimension of KLD 
database, as in previous chapters we have noticed that the differences between healthy 
and distressed companies were also shown when considering the dimensions separately. 
[3]      DIM_St+1 = β0 + β1*DIM_St + β2*DIM_St-1 + β3ROAt + β4*CACLt + β5*Sizet + 
β6*DFINDISSt + εt 
[4]      DIM_Ct+1 = β0 + β1*DIM_Ct + β2*DIM_Ct-1 + β3ROAt + β4*CACLt + β5*Sizet + 
β6*DFINDISSt + εt 
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The sample firms and the sectors where they develop their normal activity are 
gathered in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3. Sample firm distribution by sector category 
Sector category Description* Number of companies % 
1 Basic Materials 111 4,92% 
2 Communications 77 3,42% 
3 Consumer, Cyclical 471 20,90% 
4 Consumer, Non-cyclical 494 21,92% 
5 Energy 110 4,88% 
6 Industrial 578 25,64% 
7 Technology 342 15,17% 
8 Utilities 71 3,15% 
  Total 2254 100,00% 
* a full definition and characteristics of each sector is offered in Appendix III. 
7.6. Empirical results and discussion 
7.6.1. Evolution of behavior 
After performing the MDS we obtained that a 4-dimensional map would be 
accurate to project the individuals of our sample. The goodness of fit of our model was 
2.2%, which is an excellent level (Kruskal, 1964).  
The graph with dimension_1 and dimension_2, which better displays the 
evolution of the CSR behavior of the two groups of firms forming our sample 
(distressed firms and healthy firms) during the years 2001-2007, will be exposed 
(Figure 7.1). By means of the Co-Plot methodology we projected the original variables 
together with the individual points in the same dimensional space running the fourteen 
linear regressions (7 for each strength dimension and 7 for each concern dimension) for 
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each block. It is to be noted that the goodness of fit, R square, of the regressions for the 
5 year blocks of our study are all powerful enough to interpret the map. Table 7.4 and 
Table 7.5 show the R-square value for the CSR strength variables and CSR concern 
variables, respectively.  
Table 7.4. Goodness of fit for the Strength dimensions model 
 Strength Dimensions (Model R2) 
Time period Com Cgov Div Emp Env Hum Pro 
2001-2003 77,00% 14,10% 99,60% 98,80% 16,50% n/a* 91,50% 
2002-2004 90,20% 5,90% 99,50% 98,60% 13,00% n/a 88,80% 
2003-2005 55,00% 80,90% 98,80% 98,00% 75,60% 9,40% 74,90% 
2004-2006 61,00% 78,80% 98,50% 88,40% 65,50% 5,60% 78,00% 
2005-2007 44,80% 88,00% 97,00% 96,30% 49,70% 3,80% 84,90% 
*n/a. Not enough information to run the model.  
Table 7.5. Goodness of fit for the Concern dimensions model 
 Concern Dimensions (Model R2) 
Time period Com Cgov Div Emp Env Hum Pro 
2001-2003 36,70% 95,40% 97,90% 99,00% 93,90% 4,70% 99,80% 
2002-2004 65,20% 79,50% 59,70% 69,50% 67,50% 78,40% 54,10% 
2003-2005 37,40% 95,80% 99,70% 98,70% 90,10% 9,10% 98,90% 
2004-2006 38,20% 95,80% 99,80% 99,10% 89,80% 85,00% 99,10% 
2005-2007 37,50% 93,80% 99,70% 99,00% 95,30% 18,80% 98,90% 
 
Figure 7.1 represents the map in dimension 1 and dimension 2 of the coefficients 
obtained for the firms as well as for the variables. The points represent the mean value 
of the two groups of firms in each year-window. In this way, EHT_1 indicates the 
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average value of a certain variable of an Enterprise, Healthy and in time T of the 1
st
 
block. Similarly, EDT1_1 shows the mean value of a variable of an Enterprise, 
Distressed and in time t+1 (T1) of the 1
st
 block. The same interpretation is used in the 
remaining four blocks. 
It can be observed that dimension_1 is related to the time period, gathering on the 
left part the first years of the analysis and on the right part the last years. On the other 
hand, dimension_2 reasonably discriminates CSR profiles, placing strengths in the 
lower part and concerns in the upper part. According to this map representation, we 
could follow the movement of firms’ position in all years observing a cyclical path 
starting from the left part, being the first years of the study, towards the right part of the 
chart.  
In general, in the first years of the analysis, the firms were positively valued with 
respect to their responsible behaviors. These evaluations detect profiles strong in 
Product, Community, Diversity and Employees. Healthy firms maintain this 
performance in the second year-window; nevertheless distressed firms find themselves 
shifted towards the concerns area, highlighting negative profiles in Product and 
Environment Dimensions. In the last years of the analyzed period, firms are more 
characterized by a strong profile in Corporate Governance and they are also situated in 
the responsible environmental behavior zone in the consensus map. When considering 
the negative assessments, firms are penalized in aspects related to Diversity. As it 
occurred on the left side of the map, healthy firms preserve the same performance and 
distressed firms are, again, considering the 4
th
 year-window, located in the area 
characterized by firms that do not invest on CSR actions and are not responsible when 
considering Environment or Community issues. 
In overall, except for the second and fourth block, the placement of the firms 
presenting financial distress does not appear to be different from the globalized 
behavior of the rest of the sample. This is why we can consider that their investment on 
CSR actions is a consequence of the trend marked by the attitude and demand of the 
stakeholders. However, we can observe differences in certain placements as well as 
displacements of each group one year after the financial distressed is detected. 




Figure 7.1. Evolution of CSR dimensions for healthy and distressed firms during the year-blocks analyzed. 
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Throughout all five 3-year windows analyzed, except for the fifth, distressed firms 
are situated separately from the healthy firms and this occurs already during the year 
their financial statements present a poor performance. This fact allows considering that 
CSR actions are performed in advance, when the firm predicts that its financial situation 
will be delicate. In this way the firm gets ahead of the alarm signal that its financial 
statements will emit to the market. 
In order to analyze if the existence of differences in the placements of the firms is 
not due to randomness, we run the Wilcoxon non-parametric test for healthy and 
distressed firms and the Mann-Whitney test for independent samples in the year t and 
t+1. The results of these tests are shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 respectively (only 
the p-value of significant results is showed). The tests were performed on each 
dimension related to CSR and on strengths and concerns of each dimension separately. 
We also included the global CSR strength (CSR_S) and concern (CSR_C) valuations 
which gather the weighted sum of the valuations obtained in the strength and concern 
dimensions, respectively. The weighted valuation was performed, to avoid that 
valuations obtained in dimensions formed by more items could affect the overall 
assessment.  
Considering the global CSR assessments, firms classified as healthy present 
positive changes in all the year windows analyzed while distressed firms tend to 
increase their concern valuation or reduce their strength valuation one year after 
identifying the symptoms of economic and financial weaknesses. 
Regarding the specific dimensions, in the cases where the Wilcoxon test results 
are statistically significant for the healthy firms as well as for the distressed firms, we 
can affirm that there exist changes in responsible behaviors for both groups between t 
and t+1. These changes occur in the same line for the two groups of firms so that it can 
be understood that they are the consequence of the satisfaction of the stakeholders’ 
demand on certain dimensions of CSR. 
The results show that firms modify their behavior one year after some kind of 
distress has been identified. But this attitude change does not always happen in the same 
direction and occurs only for the samples analyzed in the windows 2001-2003 and 
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2002-2004. For this two periods, the changes affect positively the investment on 
Community or Employee relations which permit improving the company image and 
giving certain warranty for future. 
In the same line, we observe that in all the year windows analyzed there exists a 
trend for the healthy firms to increase their concerns in Corporate Governance and 
Human rights. This trend line does not occur for the firms in distress so that they 
confirm their worry about offering a trusted image to the community, in general, and to 
investors in particular. Thus, the fact that they continue keeping certain CSR investment 
level and that, in some dimensions, they worry about improving their image towards 
society, allow us confirming our first hypothesis (H1).  
No positive changes in dimensions as product and employee relations indicate that 
distressed firms do not wager directly on actions that have a direct repercussion on 
generation of profit. As a consequence we cannot confirm the hypothesis H1.1 
On the other side, there exists also an increase in the negative valuation regarding 
environmental issues. This fact is better observed in the results showing that healthy 
firms reduce concerns in Environment issues and that this trend does not occur for the 
distressed firms in the same time window. Thus, we can support our H2 hypothesis.    
 Mann-Whitney test was performed to test the similarity between the responsible 
behavior of the healthy firms and distressed firms. The results show that Community 
concerns and Employee Relations strengths are statistically and significantly different in 
year t and t+1 in the 2001-2003 and 2004-2006 year windows. The results also evidence 
a reduction in the average valuation in concerns for distressed firms in t+1 (hence, 
supporting H1). Moreover, the 2004-2006 year window is the period when most 
differences exist between the two groups of firms concerning Community, Employees 
and Product (see Table 7.7). In this case, average assessments obtained for distressed 
firms decrease in all dimensions, except for Employee concerns where a considerable 
increase is observed, one year after the symptoms of financial distress were recognized. 
Additionally, in Employee concerns and Human rights concerns in 2003-2005 and 
Diversity concerns in 2004-2006, the differences between both groups disappear one 




Table 7.6. Wilcoxon test results for which the hypothesis that each variable has the same distribution in t and t+1 is rejected. 
 01-03 window 02-04 window 03-05 window 04-06 window 05-07 window 
 Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed 
COM str   0,059*         0,039**       
COM con     0,035**   0,000**           
CGOV str       0,083*     0,079*       
CGOV con 0,004**   0,000**       0,000** 0,012** 0,012**   
DIV str 0,002** 0,002** 0,001**   0,000** 0,059*     0,002**   
DIV con         0,001**   0,070*       
EMP str     0,016**       0,006**   0,000** 0,013** 
EMP con 0,000** 0,052*   0,083* 0,000** 0,000** 0,004** 0,005** 0,000**   
ENV str         0,000** 0,059* 0,000**   0,003**   
ENV con   0,083* 0,002**   0,023** 0,046** 0,001**       
HUM str                     
HUM con 0,002**   0,008**   0,000**   0,083*       
PRO str             0,035**       
PRO con         0,016**   0,086*       
CSR_S 0,096* 0,004** 0,046**  0,005**  0,000** 0,072* 0,000** 0,000** 
CSR_C 0,000** 0,063* 0,002**  0,000** 0,001** 0,000** 0,006** 0,000** 0,000** 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
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year after the problems of a financial distress have shown up. These are the only three 
cases where clear differences in behavior between the two groups of the analysis occur. 
These three dimensions assess deficient behavior in CSR actions, yet a reduction in 
valuation occurs only in Diversity dimension, which involves actions that do not imply 
a relevant cost affecting firm’s performance, confirming again the H2 hypothesis. 
Table 7.7. Mann-Whitney test results for which values of the variables of interest 
differ across groups. 













*In each 3 year window, t corresponds to the middle year, when distress 
symptoms are identified, and t+1 correspond to the last year of the year window, which 
is the year after the symptoms were recognized.    
7.6.2. Determinant factors on CSR behavior 
Testing the models proposed to explain the responsible behavior, Table 7.8 and 
7.9 show the most relevant results with respect to overall behavior assessments: 
strengths and concerns. The results show a model with a proper goodness of fit in all the 
sectors analyzed, although the results for each explicative variable are different.  
When considering the general valuations, we obtain that the CSR strength 
assessment one year after the symptoms of distress appear, as expected, is strongly 
dependent of the CSR strategy followed the year before and it happens for all sectors. 
All firms increase their CSR valuation in terms of strengths. The same effect is noticed 
for all sectors, except for Communication, Consumer non-cyclical and Energy sectors, 
in the CSR strategy in the beginning year of the analysis, when all firms do not show  




Table 7.8. Regression coefficient for each sector in the overall CSR assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
CSR_S1 ,292 ,005 ,005 ,962 ,138 ,004 ,013 ,775 ,130 ,204 ,246 ,000 ,117 ,057 ,229 ,049 
CSR_S2 ,563 ,000 ,934 ,000 ,873 ,000 1,021 ,000 ,665 ,000 ,710 ,000 ,909 ,000 ,598 ,000 
ROAt ,256 ,134 ,213 ,093 ,020 ,641 ,034 ,525 ,121 ,340 ,075 ,276 ,001 ,992 -,255 ,761 
CACLt -,011 ,584 ,000 ,967 ,000 ,919 ,004 ,224 ,000 ,999 ,001 ,638 ,003 ,170 -,025 ,393 
LnTA ,045 ,020 ,032 ,003 ,013 ,015 ,015 ,000 ,034 ,001 ,029 ,000 ,025 ,000 ,027 ,069 
FinDiss ,009 ,862 ,028 ,497 ,023 ,258 -,011 ,535 -,026 ,368 ,050 ,013 -,004 ,853 -,105 ,010 
R square 85,70% 89,00% 83,20% 91,10% 83,70% 82,90% 94,60% 75,80% 
 
Table 7.9. Regression coefficient for each sector in the overall CSR assessment - CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
CSR_S1 ,004 ,969 -,159 ,127 ,096 ,020 ,113 ,016 ,145 ,091 ,081 ,044 ,120 ,014 -,090 ,406 
CSR_S2 ,738 ,000 ,916 ,000 ,782 ,000 ,826 ,000 ,637 ,000 ,680 ,000 ,764 ,000 ,921 ,000 
ROAt -,022 ,927 -,124 ,496 -,024 ,706 ,026 ,763 ,284 ,213 -,013 ,897 ,079 ,287 -,017 ,986 
CACLt ,020 ,508 ,002 ,753 -,001 ,854 -,005 ,334 ,013 ,451 -,003 ,541 ,000 ,962 -,014 ,658 
LnTA ,072 ,005 ,023 ,081 ,033 ,000 ,024 ,001 ,076 ,001 ,045 ,000 ,010 ,087 ,054 ,021 
FinDiss -,008 ,912 ,028 ,630 ,026 ,374 ,010 ,730 -,009 ,864 -,008 ,790 ,014 ,576 -,031 ,470 
R square 76,60% 71,00% 74,10% 83,30% 89,80% 72,40% 74,90% 89,70% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
Chapter VII. Do firms change their CSR behavior when signals of financial 




any symptoms of distress. These results allow confirming our H3 hypothesis, although 
somehow with care for the significance of CSR in t-1 in some of the analyzed sectors.  
The size of the companies has a positive effect on the CSR conduct, in every 
sector, which means that bigger firms try to fulfill the requirements towards the society 
and maintain their reputation and image. While the capacity of firms to satisfy creditors’ 
demands, measured by the Current ratio, does not influence the decision made on CSR, 
the economic performance (ROA) of the companies operating in the Communication 
sector seems to have a positive relationship with the same.  
Regarding the influence of a financial distress on CSR strategies, we find that 
distressed firms in Industrials sector increase their CSR strength valuation, once the 
symptoms have been identified while the opposite effect occurs in distressed firms 
operating in Utilities sector.  
On the other side, with regard to CSR concerns overall assessment, surprisingly, 
the economic performance, the current ratio and financial distress do not have any 
significant influence on the CSR concerns strategies in none of the sectors analyzed. In 
this sense, the so called reactive behaviors appear to depend more on other issues such 
as the attitude of the company towards CSR.  
Tables 7.10 to 7.16 gather the CSR strength valuation of each sector, considering 
the seven individual dimensions of the KLD database. In all the dimensions, the 
valuation of the previous year has a positive and significant effect on the assessment of 
CSR in the year after symptoms of distress could show up and this effect is independent 
from the sector of operation. The economic performance of firms is relevant for sectors 
such as Basic Materials, Communications and Industrials. It has a positive influence on 
CSR value of Community, Corporate Governance, Environment and Product 
dimensions. As it can be seen, the dimensions which require more investment such as 
Environment or Product need an economic performance that only sectors with strong 
effects on both dimensions can provide. On the other side, firm’s ability to satisfy 
creditors demand is positively related to CSR performance for sectors such as 
Communications, Consumer cyclical and Non-cyclical. For these sectors, the current 
ratio affects the Corporate Governance dimension. For the Energy sector, the positive 
Chapter VII. Do firms change their CSR behavior when signals of financial 




effect is observed only for Diversity while for Technology sector, it is observed in both 
Corporate Governance and Environment. Surprisingly, Industrials sector showed a 
negative relationship between Current Ratio and Product dimension. This effect could 
imply that the higher their ability to pay debts the lower they need to invest in new 
products to gain customers trust. These firms could redirect their CSR actions on 
dimensions such as Community or Corporate Governance to continue and maintain 
customers and society trust. Regarding distressed firms, they show a positive effect on 
CSR for Communication sector in Corporate Governance dimension, for Industrials 
sector in Community and Corporate Governance while for Consumer cyclical this effect 
is observed in Environment dimension. These firms show a higher CSR strength 
dimension value when compared to healthy firms as they make a greater effort in 
maintaining their favorable valuations even if that means increasing non costly 
dimension scores such as Community or Corporate Governance. The opposite effect is 
observed for sectors Technology in Environment dimension and Utilities in Corporate 
Governance dimension. This negative but significant effect could be explained by the 
fact that when distress symptoms are identified, companies reduce their investment on 
costly dimensions, such as Environment, and try to heal their situation as soon as 
possible. As it occurred for the general CSR strength valuations, firm size is an 
important variable in all the CSR strength dimensions assessment and for almost every 
sector. 
As to the same dimensions but on the concerns side (Table 7.17 to Table 7.23), we 
find that economic performance is not significant in any of the sectors but 
Communication. For this latter sector the higher the economic performance the higher 
the score of Product concern dimension. This fact may be explained by the capacity of 
these high performers to fulfill the payment of all the penalties for product safety, 
marketing or contracting controversies or antitrust violations. Current ratio also results 
in a significant and positive influence on Product concern dimension, but for the Energy 
sector. The higher the capacity of a firm to satisfy creditors, the higher the score 
obtained in concern Product dimension. Using the same reasoning exposed for high 
performers, these companies have high current assets which allows them accomplish the 
short term liabilities, and caring less about Product concerns. Moreover, current ratio is 
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also significant and has a positive relation with Diversity concern dimension for Basic 
Materials sector. Given the peculiarities of the sector, dealing with mining and refining 
minerals and being characterized by the non-presence of women in the directive board 
and other controversies, may cause an increase in the concerns side of Diversity. 
The situation of financial distress is significant for firms operating in Consumer 
non-cyclical which have higher scores in Product concerns than healthy firms. Due to 
the existence of distress, firms in Consumer Non-cyclical sector are more carefree on 
CSR behavior, compared to healthy firms, and try to resolve their difficulties. 
Surprisingly, distressed firms of Technology sector have a better performance in CSR 
Corporate Governance concerns than firms showing a stable situation. Once again, it is 
confirmed that distressed firms try to have a socially responsible behavior in order to 
mitigate the weak image given by their financial statements and they do so by acting on 
CSR non costly dimensions. Finally, as it could be expected, companies in distress in 
Basic Materials sector, have a higher and significant level of concerns in Environmental 
dimension. The characteristics of this sector make it more vulnerable to accomplishing 
the environmental compromise when symptoms of distress are displayed. 
The regression results for individual dimensions allow confirming our H4 and H5 
hypothesis, although it is necessary to make some incisions. It is indeed confirmed that 
the conducts of companies, once financial distress is identified, are independent from 
the sector where they operate given that their behaviors vary towards certain dimensions 
based on the activity performed and on how the dimensions affect this activity. For this 
reason, H4 can be confirmed but on a sectorial context. The influence of a firm’s the 
possible economic or financial weaknesses on the incentives to modify the attitude 
towards CSR actions also depend on the sectors being considered. 




Table 7.10. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Community Dimension assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Com t ,827 ,000 ,937 ,000 ,936 ,000 ,959 ,000 ,736 ,000 ,764 ,000 ,971 ,000 ,826 ,000 
ROAt ,026 ,482 -,020 ,422 ,006 ,597 ,011 ,333 -,030 ,467 ,040 ,002 ,015 ,358 ,004 ,978 
CACLt -,003 ,542 ,000 ,641 ,000 ,918 ,000 ,839 -,001 ,823 ,000 ,455 ,000 ,924 ,000 ,980 
LnTA ,001 ,674 ,001 ,446 ,003 ,045 ,001 ,427 ,003 ,291 ,002 ,027 ,008 ,000 -,001 ,620 
FinDiss ,002 ,870 -,008 ,317 ,004 ,446 ,001 ,832 ,001 ,892 ,008 ,038 ,004 ,441 ,011 ,116 
R square 86,50% 81,50% 80,00% 87,60% 79,10% 76,50% 86,00% 86,80% 
 
Table 7.11. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Corporate Governance Dimension assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Cgov t ,488 ,000 ,451 ,000 ,674 ,000 ,839 ,000 ,715 ,000 ,575 ,000 ,799 ,000 ,569 ,000 
ROAt ,023 ,736 ,112 ,059 ,006 ,789 ,019 ,506 ,109 ,107 ,022 ,511 ,013 ,651 -,062 ,882 
CACLt -,002 ,791 ,004 ,037 ,004 ,058 ,003 ,061 ,000 ,997 ,002 ,201 ,003 ,002 -,011 ,448 
LnTA ,017 ,003 ,001 ,738 ,002 ,304 ,005 ,007 ,001 ,775 ,004 ,066 ,010 ,000 ,002 ,738 
FinDiss ,018 ,356 ,031 ,092 ,009 ,360 -,005 ,584 -,017 ,278 ,019 ,053 ,001 ,883 -,045 ,024 
R square 39,90% 46,10% 44,40% 53,50% 50,50% 32,20% 59,70% 38,80% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
 




Table 7.12. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Diversity Dimension assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Div t ,753 ,000 ,876 ,000 ,947 ,000 ,931 ,000 ,833 ,000 ,903 ,000 ,911 ,000 ,804 ,000 
ROAt ,055 ,355 ,107 ,106 ,005 ,764 ,010 ,711 ,039 ,351 -,013 ,640 -,004 ,900 -,363 ,430 
CACLt -,006 ,409 ,000 ,956 ,001 ,572 ,000 ,908 ,005 ,067 ,000 ,866 -,001 ,335 -,011 ,469 
LnTA ,007 ,249 ,019 ,001 ,005 ,031 ,007 ,000 ,010 ,000 ,007 ,000 ,012 ,000 ,013 ,100 
FinDiss -,003 ,862 ,000 ,991 ,003 ,764 -,007 ,460 ,014 ,131 ,010 ,252 ,010 ,336 -,048 ,032 
R square 77,40% 90,10% 85,90% 87,30% 78,30% 78,20% 90,00% 77,60% 
 
Table 7.13. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Employee Relation Dimension assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Emp t ,877 ,000 1,050 ,000 ,955 ,000 ,909 ,000 ,864 ,000 ,849 ,000 ,883 ,000 ,997 ,000 
ROAt ,013 ,855 ,042 ,357 ,004 ,749 ,026 ,181 -,043 ,537 -,012 ,664 ,019 ,544 ,360 ,212 
CACLt ,008 ,357 -,001 ,499 -,001 ,557 ,001 ,614 -,007 ,143 ,001 ,353 ,000 ,908 -,004 ,647 
LnTA ,014 ,025 ,007 ,022 ,001 ,394 ,003 ,038 ,009 ,078 ,008 ,000 ,009 ,001 ,003 ,503 
FinDiss -,014 ,519 -,009 ,530 ,006 ,342 ,002 ,737 -,014 ,386 ,012 ,159 -,007 ,535 -,014 ,322 
R square 77,60% 79,40% 85,30% 73,50% 77,80% 68,70% 79,00% 70,20% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
 




Table 7.14. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Environment Dimension assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Env t ,915 ,000 
N/A 
,985 ,000 1,053 ,000 ,566 ,000 ,938 ,000 1,025 ,000 ,705 ,000 
ROAt ,087 ,080 ,010 ,273 ,017 ,191 ,002 ,964 ,006 ,759 -,009 ,637 -,076 ,707 
CACLt ,000 ,993 ,000 ,687 ,000 ,898 ,000 ,887 ,000 ,865 ,001 ,088 -,006 ,412 
LnTA ,013 ,003 ,004 ,000 ,004 ,000 ,004 ,058 ,007 ,000 ,006 ,000 ,004 ,193 
FinDiss ,007 ,610 ,010 ,017 ,001 ,733 -,008 ,364 ,002 ,770 -,012 ,053 -,016 ,108 
R square 84,00% 79,50% 85,00% 30,60% 75,70% 80,10% 72,80% 
 
Table 7.15. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Human Rights Dimension assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Hum t 
N/A N/A 
,989 ,000 ,750 ,000 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ROAt ,003 ,529 -,007 ,145 
CACLt ,000 ,770 ,000 ,608 
LnTA ,001 ,091 -,001 ,086 
FinDiss -,001 ,673 ,001 ,630 
R square 71,30% 75,10% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
 




Table 7.16. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Product Dimension assessment - STRENGHTS 
Strengths 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Pro t ,871 ,000 ,812 ,000 ,778 ,000 ,923 ,000 ,460 ,000 ,978 ,000 ,845 ,000 
N/A 
ROAt -,019 ,679 ,073 ,138 ,003 ,764 ,018 ,266 ,047 ,250 ,033 ,044 -,021 ,336 
CACLt -,003 ,633 ,001 ,715 ,000 ,967 ,000 ,859 ,003 ,264 -,001 ,090 ,000 ,737 
LnTA -,002 ,572 ,008 ,054 ,003 ,013 ,003 ,007 ,003 ,260 ,000 ,989 ,001 ,722 
FinDiss -,004 ,741 -,004 ,798 -,003 ,647 ,005 ,344 ,007 ,457 -,004 ,445 -,002 ,751 
R square 79,00% 82,30% 68,20% 77,30% 18,20% 91,40% 66,60% 
 
Table 7.17. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Community Dimension assessment – CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Com t ,444 ,000 
N/A 
,739 ,000 ,905 ,000 ,774 ,000 ,786 ,000 ,771 ,000 ,861 ,000 
ROAt -,020 ,764 -,001 ,934 ,005 ,669 -,038 ,569 -,002 ,894 ,015 ,402 ,266 ,387 
CACLt ,011 ,225 ,000 ,739 ,000 ,604 -,002 ,748 ,000 ,962 ,000 ,930 -,001 ,894 
LnTA ,022 ,000 ,003 ,016 ,001 ,229 ,016 ,002 ,003 ,002 ,005 ,000 ,003 ,659 
FinDiss -,017 ,383 ,000 ,948 -,001 ,895 -,021 ,183 ,005 ,323 ,001 ,831 -,001 ,927 
R square 41,60% 49,30% 72,50% 77,70% 59,70% 57,00% 72,30% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
 




Table 7.18. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Corporate Governance Dimension assessment – CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Cgov t ,752 ,000 ,495 ,000 ,583 ,000 ,533 ,000 ,733 ,000 ,641 ,000 ,662 ,000 ,800 ,000 
ROAt -,006 ,928 ,058 ,454 ,028 ,241 ,055 ,138 ,123 ,109 ,006 ,870 -,009 ,798 -,040 ,900 
CACLt ,008 ,324 -,004 ,137 -,002 ,486 -,001 ,544 ,001 ,786 ,001 ,708 ,001 ,683 ,003 ,791 
LnTA ,006 ,270 ,010 ,096 ,011 ,000 ,017 ,000 ,013 ,022 ,010 ,000 ,012 ,000 ,001 ,844 
FinDiss ,005 ,814 -,008 ,739 ,007 ,536 ,003 ,822 ,019 ,276 ,004 ,699 -,024 ,052 -,001 ,924 
R square 56,40% 41,50% 40,80% 45,00% 68,90% 47,50% 54,80% 67,00% 
 
Table 7.19. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Diversity Dimension assessment – CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Div t ,830 ,000 ,867 ,000 ,848 ,000 ,788 ,000 ,796 ,000 ,763 ,000 ,853 ,000 
N/A 
ROAt -,049 ,578 -,091 ,360 -,038 ,220 -,010 ,808 ,146 ,183 -,056 ,361 -,037 ,343 
CACLt ,019 ,076 ,003 ,366 ,001 ,830 ,000 ,992 -,002 ,809 ,000 ,995 ,001 ,484 
LnTA -,005 ,477 ,002 ,818 ,003 ,382 ,000 ,966 -,017 ,010 -,002 ,534 -,009 ,003 
FinDiss -,041 ,112 ,002 ,951 ,013 ,385 -,011 ,439 -,008 ,762 -,013 ,470 -,002 ,880 
R square 65,60% 75,70% 72,80% 60,90% 64,80% 56,40% 78,00% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
 




Table 7.20. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Employee Relation Dimension assessment – CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Emp t ,662 ,000 ,825 ,000 ,866 ,000 ,860 ,000 ,671 ,000 ,673 ,000 ,768 ,000 ,591 ,000 
ROAt -,023 ,834 -,094 ,443 -,028 ,339 -,052 ,231 -,077 ,522 ,060 ,263 ,016 ,643 -,553 ,257 
CACLt -,021 ,121 -,003 ,490 ,001 ,678 -,003 ,199 ,009 ,336 -,003 ,113 -,001 ,500 -,004 ,811 
LnTA ,005 ,512 -,003 ,698 ,009 ,009 ,006 ,054 ,028 ,003 ,017 ,000 ,004 ,110 ,003 ,753 
FinDiss ,020 ,525 ,022 ,571 ,001 ,958 -,001 ,956 -,009 ,760 ,004 ,794 ,011 ,354 ,011 ,622 
R square 50,60% 44,70% 63,40% 64,50% 66,10% 51,10% 57,60% 48,70% 
 
Table 7.21. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Environment Dimension assessment – CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Env t ,778 ,000 
N/A 
,936 ,000 ,926 ,000 ,911 ,000 ,868 ,000 1,010 ,000 ,865 ,000 
ROAt ,045 ,593 ,004 ,683 ,016 ,351 ,063 ,346 ,009 ,718 -,004 ,689 -,005 ,987 
CACLt -,003 ,734 -,001 ,449 ,000 ,801 ,003 ,538 ,000 ,810 ,000 ,663 -,006 ,611 
LnTA ,024 ,009 ,001 ,308 ,004 ,003 ,017 ,001 ,010 ,000 ,002 ,015 ,014 ,048 
FinDiss ,041 ,098 -,001 ,804 ,009 ,122 -,003 ,844 -,001 ,944 -,002 ,499 -,017 ,272 
R square 81,70% 84,60% 83,50% 91,60% 78,00% 80,60% 90,40% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
 




Table 7.22. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Human Rights Dimension assessment – CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Hum t ,959 ,000 ,692 ,000 ,646 ,000 ,842 ,000 ,953 ,000 ,412 ,000 ,544 ,000 ,841 ,000 
ROAt -,034 ,269 -,004 ,913 ,019 ,105 ,001 ,936 -,014 ,635 -,013 ,361 -,012 ,486 ,119 ,232 
CACLt ,000 ,929 ,001 ,265 ,001 ,604 ,000 ,816 ,000 ,999 ,001 ,350 ,001 ,275 ,003 ,305 
LnTA ,004 ,160 ,004 ,098 ,009 ,000 ,002 ,004 ,004 ,031 ,003 ,001 ,007 ,000 ,004 ,039 
FinDiss -,006 ,482 -,006 ,583 ,003 ,642 ,004 ,258 -,007 ,320 -,001 ,725 ,003 ,547 ,004 ,380 
R square 84,80% 53,00% 61,10% 61,80% 90,90% 25,90% 43,20% 87,20% 
 
Table 7.23. Regression coefficient for each sector in the Product Dimension assessment – CONCERNS 
Concerns 
Basic Mat. Communic. Cons. Cyclic Con. Non-Cyc Energy Industrials Technology Utilities 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Pro t ,846 ,000 ,640 ,000 ,834 ,000 ,895 ,000 ,614 ,000 ,859 ,000 ,635 ,000 ,690 ,000 
ROAt ,056 ,543 ,137 ,061 ,001 ,938 ,046 ,219 ,096 ,288 -,023 ,456 ,108 ,000 -,258 ,636 
CACLt ,008 ,503 ,004 ,133 ,001 ,485 ,000 ,917 ,013 ,070 ,000 ,797 ,000 ,676 -,009 ,623 
LnTA ,012 ,129 ,027 ,000 ,008 ,000 ,013 ,000 ,020 ,003 ,006 ,003 ,008 ,000 ,040 ,000 
FinDiss -,016 ,540 ,002 ,937 ,001 ,895 ,023 ,073 ,028 ,197 -,008 ,359 ,024 ,013 -,040 ,121 
R square 76,90% 72,10% 76,80% 85,80% 70,10% 75,60% 53,90% 75,20% 
 
Note: In italic, significant at 90% level of confidence. 
         In bold, significant at 99% level of confidence. 
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7.4. Conclusions 
We found that healthy firms present changes in all the year windows analyzed 
while distressed firms tend to increase their concern valuation or reduce their strength 
valuation one year after identifying the symptoms of economic and financial 
weaknesses. However, when observed separately these differences do not occur in all 
the dimensions of CSR. Although we observed changes in distressed companies, they 
cannot be generalized as a pattern occurring during all the periods analyzed. Distressed 
firms maintain their CSR investment, so that they do not worsen their CSR worries 
despite their deteriorated situation.  
In fact, we observe an increase in actions on non-costly dimensions such as 
Diversity or Human rights, where distressed firms show different behavior from healthy 
firms.  Differences between the two groups of firms already appear during the year 
symptoms of crisis occur, thus we can affirm that distressed firms start their attitude 
change the year they suspect will incur into economic and financial problems. 
Distressed firms disinvest in actions related to product, one of the most expensive 
dimensions and with major repercussion on the deteriorated income statement. The 
same behavior is also observed in the environmental dimension. While healthy firms try 
to reduce their concerns in the latter dimension, for distressed firms it does not occur, 
during the same period. In this sense, economic performance resulted relevant in certain 
sectors and in the most costly dimensions of CSR. In this way, it is somehow confirmed 
that certain CSR investments could be performed when there is certainty on firm’s 
capacity to generate funds and invest. 
In general, the different analyzed variables were mainly significant when the 
models of responsible behavior were applied to individual dimensions and depended on 
the sector. The latter is one of the aspects that could influence more on the incentive of 
financial distress companies to maintain, increase or decrease their actions on CSR. 
Sectors more sensible to the stakeholder’s attitude, but with deficiencies on economic 
performance, will try to maintain the society confidence through actions that do not 
affect their deteriorated situation.  
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In many CSR dimensions the changes observed between the year t and t+1 are 
independent of the fact of being distressed or healthy. As a consequence, despite their 
problematic situation, distressed firms continue to wager in CSR investment and on 
those dimensions that are apparently valued by the market in that instant. The 
differences in the profiles allow us affirming that, as Mackey et al. (2007) state, CSR 
investment is a matter of supply and demand coming from the market in that particular 
moment of time. 
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A. Definition of sectors of operational activity. 
Sector Definition 
Basic materials Companies involved with the discovery, development and 
processing of raw materials. The activities include mining and 
refining of metals, chemical producers and forestry products. 
Communications Companies whose activities regard the fixed-line and wireless 
telecommunication networks for voice, data and high-density 
data. 
Consumer cyclical A sector that includes industries such as automotive, housing, 
entertainment and retail.  
Consumer  
non-cyclical 
Companies operating in fishing and farming operations; the 
processing and production of food, beverages and tobacco; 
manufacturers of household and personal products; and providers 
of personal services. 
Energy Companies 0producing or supplying energy and also the 
exploration and development of oil or gas reserves, oil and gas 
drilling, or integrated power firms. 
Industrials Companies producing goods used in construction and 
manufacturing and includes companies involved with aerospace 
and defense, manufacturing machinery, tools, lumber production, 
construction, cement and metal fabrication.  
Technology Companies engaged with research, development and/or 
distribution of technologically based goods and services 
including businesses operating around the manufacturing of 
electronics, creation of software, computers or products and 
services relating to information technology. 
Utilities  Companies offering utilities such as gas and power and includes 

























In spite of the outcome of failure prediction models, a group of firms presenting 
what in literature are known as symptoms of distress, continue their activity in the 
market 10 years after the crisis was identified. The most surprising fact is that none of 
the companies identified as facing a financial distress situation at the beginning of the 
analysis, entered in a bankruptcy process during the same, despite of their high failure 
index value, such as Z-score.   
This fact allows considering that failure is a reversible process and it is not 
necessarily degenerative if the company is able to achieve an effort in its economic 
performance. In case of weak crisis situations, companies tend to show a natural 
evolution throughout the “exit” and may solve it by simply making “routine” decisions. 
The “momentary” character of these situations may be one of the reasons that these 
companies end up in a similar situation at the end of the period of analysis.  
The curious side of the outcome consists when companies initiate with a severe 
crisis situation, presenting critical financial values, have been able to resolve it. Most of 
the companies with similar “degenerated” economic and financial structures are more 
exposed to an evolutionary-degenerative process although they maintain themselves in 
the market throughout the years. The resolution of the critical situation was possible due 
to the important effort achieved by companies in the economic performance, which 
allowed them not only solve the situation but also reinforce it. 
Another reason to resolve distress was that distressed firms shared common 
structural characteristics with companies that showed less and slighter symptoms of 
crisis. This fact allows affirming that the symptoms are only manifestations of an 
underlying situation. The deficiencies and gravities of this situation are the factors that 
determine the changes in the crisis situation. Severity of the initial situation does not 
have to be a crucial factor in the outcome of the crisis and distressed firms with 
remarkable financial reaction capability and/or a solid financial structure evolve mainly 




Once the existence of differences and similarities was identified, the next step was 
identifying the relationship that could exist between some control variables such as size, 
industry, macroeconomic factor, etc. and the possibility of revolving the situation.  
Understanding what factors affect the success to overcome a crisis situation is 
crucial in order to improve the decision making process of managers. Several researches 
have shown that issues such as severity of the initial situation or size condition the 
recovery process. Moreover, implementing strategies oriented towards efficiency has 
also resulted to be fundamental in encountering a better and improved path. We 
obtained that the final post-distress position can be explained by certain variables and 
under certain circumstances.  
First of all, the relationship between Reaction Capability of distressed firms and 
the final fit state depends on whether the general model or the individual sectors model 
is considered.  
Second, and in contrast with other researches, the Severity degree does not 
determine a negative outcome of the situation or a negative survival capacity in 
appropriate conditions. In agreement with Reaction Capability results, it is the 
underlying structural capacities, and not the distress symptoms, that determine the way 
by which a firm faces its critical situation.  
When bearing in mind the difference between recovery periods, it can be 
considered that a long term actually permits an effective outcome of a crisis situation. 
Regarding profitability, although it is an important factor in representing a low risk 
situation the results were not sufficient to affirm that continuous profitable performance 
is a necessary condition to overcome a difficult situation.  
Regarding the size of a company, big firms tend to present a better situation and a 
lower risk after the initial distress situation and the industry where companies develop 
its activity has an influence on the outcome of a difficult situation. Certain specific 
characteristics of each sector may contribute or inhibit the evolution of the recovery 
process and as a consequence on the outcome of the strategies implied by the firms to 




Besides the strategies oriented towards profitability by means of modifications of 
the economic and financial structure in order to overcome a problematic situation, we 
also consider the possibility of managers to “handle” the image of the weak financial 
situation throughout investments in responsible actions as a mechanism in order to 
supply future solidity to the firm. In this way, not only investors but also the market 
itself would be infected by this behavior of future expectations of the managers. We 
obtained no differences between distressed and healthy firms, in structural CSR 
behavior in aspects considered as strengths. This means that the managerial decisions on 
responsible behavior are independent from the financial situation. Yet, it could also 
mean that managers of companies in decline have a responsible behavior strategy to 
smoothen the image given by their weak economic and financial indicators. 
Furthermore, there exist differences in the valuation of concerns so that 
companies in crisis obtain worse valuations with respect to the negative items included 
in the KLD database. This fact could be a consequence of the tendency to 
reduce costs and investments in actions that would continue weakening an already 
deteriorated financial situation. However, these companies follow a CSR strategy aimed 
at investing in responsible behavior with a high level of social or reputational impact 
but with a low investment cost, such as gender diversity.  
As a consequence, we find that the crisis variable, indeed, as well as the type and 
severity of the same, discriminates companies with similar proactive and/or reactive 
patterns. Moreover, these common patterns usually are more highlighted one year after 
the company has identified certain deteriorated economic and financial indicators.  
One year after the crisis situation reveals, companies seem to have a common 
profile regarding social responsible behavior, which was not observed previously. Yet, 
the only characteristic that discriminates these companies from the general profile of 
healthy companies is their weak wager on actions that could strengthen their 
environmental position. This fact can be explained by the associated costs that these 
actions require and which may impact an already deteriorated economic position. 
Distressed firms modify their responsible behavior in a way that is not reflected in 




concerns, distressed firms do not have a differentiated specific profile, yet their situation 
has changed after the starting of the deficient state, as if they simply had decided to join 
the more common behaviors among companies to avoid being valued negatively. 
Distinct profiles exist when we consider the type and origin of the crisis, mainly 
differentiating the existence of a deficit in the income statement. This agglomeration 
could be related to strategies implemented by the company for the recovery process. 
The differences in the responsible behaviors for weak firms from an 
operational performance view and weak firms from a financial structure view can be 
caused, to some extent, by such situations. Companies weak in performance need 
to improve their short-term income statement and this can be seen in the tendency to cut 
costs and invest in stocks with a direct benefit on turnover rather than social standing.  
In general, when analyzing the factors that influence the final CSR strategy 
followed by companies once distress is identified, we found that healthy firms present 
changes in all the year windows analyzed while distressed firms tend to increase their 
concern valuation or reduce their strength valuation one year after identifying the 
symptoms of economic and financial weaknesses. However, when observed separately 
these differences do not occur in all the dimensions of CSR. Although we observed 
changes in distressed companies, they cannot be generalized as a pattern occurring 
during all the periods analyzed. Distressed firms maintain their CSR investment, so that 
they do not worsen their CSR worries despite their deteriorated situation.  
An increase in actions in non-costly dimensions such as Diversity or Human 
rights, where distressed firms show different behavior from healthy firms, is observed.  
Differences between the two groups of firms already appear during the year when 
distress occur, thus we can affirm that distressed firms start their attitude change the 
year they start to suspect that they will incur into economic and financial problems. 
Distressed firms reduce their investments in actions related to product, one of the 
most expensive dimensions and with major repercussion on the deteriorated income 
statement. The same behavior is also observed in the environmental dimension. While 
healthy firms try to reduce their concerns in the latter dimension, for distressed firms it 




relevant in certain sectors and in the most costly dimensions of CSR. In this way, it is 
somehow confirmed that certain CSR investments could be performed when there is 
certainty on firm’s capacity to generate funds and invest. 
When the models of responsible behavior were applied to individual dimensions 
and depending on the sector, the different analyzed variables were basically significant. 
The sector variable is one of the aspects that could influence more on the incentive of 
financial distress companies to maintain, increase or decrease their actions on CSR. 
Sectors sensible to the stakeholder’s attitude but with deficiencies on economic 
performance, will try to maintain the society confidence through actions that do not 
affect their deteriorated situation.  
Being distressed or having a stable situation is independent of the changes 
observed in many CSR dimensions between the year t and t+1. As a consequence, 
despite their problematic situation, distressed firms continue to wager on CSR 
investment and on those dimensions that are apparently valued by the market in that 
moment of time. The differences in the profiles allow us affirming that CSR investment 




































Spanish summary - Resumen en español 
INTRODUCCIÓN 
Cada organización está inevitablemente expuesta a subidas y bajadas durante su 
ciclo de vida (Krueger y Willard, 1991; Burbank, 2005) y el fracaso no es un 
acontecimiento repentino (Agarwal y Taffler, 2008). La teoría ecológica de las 
organizaciones afirma que, en un proceso continuo, las empresas que sobreviven están 
en mejores condiciones para competir. Kahl (2001) define "las empresas más aptas" 
como las que tienen más posibilidades de sobrevivir. De esta manera, el proceso de 
financial distress debe entenderse como un mecanismo de selección por medio del cual 
las empresas con buenos resultados sobreviven y las empresas con malos resultados no 
lo hacen. En esta misma línea, Sheppard y Chowdhury (2005) consideran que el fracaso 
es el desajuste de una empresa con su entorno.   
La investigación sobre situaciones de crisis empresarial ha estado vinculada 
estrechamente a la determinación de modelos de predicción de fracaso como desenlace 
a un proceso evolutivo, donde la idea subyacente es la posibilidad de que la crisis puede 
efectivamente ser anticipada (Balcaen y Ooghe, 2006). 
Los primeros modelos de predicción, como el propuesto por Altman (1968), han 
construido los fundamentos de la investigación basada en predicción. Estas 
investigaciones se centraban principalmente en minimizar errores de clasificación y 
maximizar las medidas de bondad de ajuste mediante la aplicación de ciertas variables 
en un período de tiempo amplio. En este contexto, los modelos de predicción se 
evaluaban en base a su porcentaje de éxito en la clasificación de las empresas de la 
muestra de control (Smith y Graves, 2005). La existencia de un error en la clasificación 
de las empresas que aunque clasificadas como fracasadas al final no lo hacían, fue 
considerada como un error del modelo propuesto. Sin embargo, estos resultados dejan 
una puerta abierta a la posibilidad de que las empresas pueden sobrevivir a una 
situación difícil o también subsistir en una situación de crisis permanente. Este enfoque 
permitiría considerar la posibilidad de que el fracaso puede a veces no ser un proceso 
evolutivo-degenerativo, sino puede revertir de una manera que las empresas son capaces 




de subsistir, aunque aún presenten ciertas situaciones que pueden condicionar su 
supervivencia. En este sentido, los modelos de predicción no sólo proporcionan 
información esencial a fin de tomar acciones contra la probabilidad de fracaso, pero 
también alertan sobre un resultado futuro que, en muchos casos, puede que no se 
materialice. 
Este uso "pasivo" de los modelos de predicción del fracaso se ha puesto de 
manifiesto de Altman y Hotchkiss (2006) quienes afirman que los stakeholders deberían 
tener una participación más activa en lugar de ser simples espectadores de una 
determinada "probabilidad de default". Básicamente, esta probabilidad de fracaso debe 
ser considerada como información vital por parte de los administradores no sólo para 
mejorar las estrategias de negocio con el fin de administrar una situación problemática y 
volver a una situación financiera sana, sino también para desarrollar estrategias de 
inversión para los inversores potenciales o para los auditores que emiten una opinión 
con salvedades (Barniv et al., 2002). 
El fracaso es un proceso reversible y no necesariamente degenerativo si la 
empresa es capaz de detectar las señales de  bajo rendimiento y de conseguir un 
esfuerzo en su rendimiento económico. En este sentido, gestionar una situación de crisis 
es una cuestión fundamental, ya que no es un proceso espontáneo. Sin embargo, como 
Barniv et al., (2002) afirma, es más difícil establecer patrones del resultado final de una 
situación de financial distress que discriminar entre empresas sanas y con problemas 
porque las empresas con dificultades en la situación financiera suelen compartir una 
serie de patrones comunes que hacen que sea difícil de estimar un resultado posible de 
esta situación. Estos patrones se hacen evidentes en algunos indicadores, como las 
ventas, patrimonio neto o la rentabilidad. Entre las empresas con dificultades hay pocas 
divergencias en los indicadores de la debilidad financiera indicadores en los diferentes 
procesos de fracaso (Ooghe y Prijcker, 2008). Las diferencias entre las fases del fracaso 
y la efectividad de la recuperación, se ponen de manifiesto en la rapidez de la evolución 
de los indicadores y en la capacidad de la gestión de reaccionar una vez que se han 
detectado las señales de alerta. Ignorar estas señales de alerta puede conducir a un 
continuo proceso de declive que puede terminar en un fracaso sin siquiera intentar 
cualquier estrategia de recuperación (Burbank, 2005).  




La reorganización financiera durante una situación de distress no es un problema 
sencillo y la probabilidad de una salida satisfactoria es muy baja. Sin embargo, el 
porcentaje de las empresas que consiguen superar un declive con éxito no se puede no 
tener en cuenta. Barniv et al. (2002) encontraron que el 50% de las empresas incluidas 
en la muestra que presentó quiebra de la Oficina del Consejo General de la SEC ha 
resuelto su situación como empresas emergentes. Un tercio de las dificultades 
financieras de las empresas del estudio de Kahl (2001) sobrevivieron como empresas 
independientes. Sin embargo, debemos considerar que la salida de una condición difícil, 
como Moulton y Thomas (1993) sostienen, es sólo el principio de la historia. 
Además, no todas las empresas que consiguen salir con éxito son capaces de 
mantener la nueva situación estable. Para algunas empresas, operar en una situación de 
crisis constituye su entorno normal, con períodos de crisis que pueden atenuarse o 
reducirse. De todos modos, el hecho de poder mantener este tipo de estado es también 
una forma de sobrevivir. En este sentido, Kahl (2002) afirma que la crisis financiera se 
debe considerar un proceso de largo plazo que hace que las empresas terminan 
debilitadas aún después de haber recuperado el declive. Esta debilidad es observada en 
un bajo rendimiento que inevitablemente puede volver a arrastrar las empresas a una 
nueva situación de peligro financiero. En este sentido, Hotchkiss (1995), demuestra que 
durante los primeros cinco años después de salir de una quiebra, un 35% a 40% de las 
empresas muestran un resultado de explotación negativo y hasta un tercio de las 
empresas que consiguen aliviar su situación de dificultades mediante la reestructuración 
de la deuda vuelva a entrar en una situación de peligro en los siguientes años.  
Varios estudios han mostrado que son varios los  factores que pueden determinar 
la salida de una situación de crisis (Robbins y Pearce, 1992; Pearce y Robbins, 1993, 
1994; Barker y Duhaime, 1997; Cascio et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1999). Estos factores 
pueden tener una influencia directa en el proceso de recuperación o en la capacidad de 
la empresa para desarrollar estrategias apropiadas de redirección. El grado de severidad 
de partida es considerado como un importante obstáculo para aplicar medidas de éxito. 
En esta línea, Smith y Graves (2005) encontraron que, entre todas las variables del 
estudio, la severidad y el tamaño de la empresa fueron las únicas variables significativas 
durante un proceso de recuperación. Otros autores (Robbins y Pearce, 1992; Pearce y 




Robbins, 1993; Harker y Harker, 1998) afirman que las estrategias orientadas a reducir 
los costes y mejorar la eficiencia son apuestas seguras para un resultado favorable. Sin 
embargo, Castrogiovani y Bruton (2000), Sudarsanam y Lai (2001) o Smith y Graves 
(2005) afirman que no existe una relación positiva entre ciertas estrategias y éxito. Estos 
resultados indican que la severidad, a través de su influencia en la estrategia 
seleccionada, podría ser un factor indirecto en proceso de recuperación (Robbins y 
Pearce, 1992). 
Resultados más consensuales se obtuvieron al afirmar que el rendimiento durante 
una crisis es fundamental para el desenlace de la difícil situación. En particular, se 
observa que las empresas de éxito muestran mejores rendimientos en comparación con 
las empresas sin éxito (Routledge y Gadene, 2000; Pearce y Doh, 2002; Kahl, 2001). 
Por otro lado, la información contable que evidencia cierta situación de 
dificultades financieras, constituye una señal de alerta cuando los inversores evalúan el 
estado de supervivencia de una empresa. Cuando una situación de crisis se produce 
durante el ciclo de vida de una empresa, es fundamental mantener el apoyo y la 
confianza de los accionistas. Prahalad y Hamel (1994) consideran que los 
comportamientos sociales pueden asegurar el éxito futuro de la empresa,  fomentando el 
apoyo y la confianza de los stakeholders. En esta línea, se puede plantear la siguiente 
pregunta: ¿Puede el comportamiento responsable actuar como un factor mitigante de los 
problemas de las empresas cuando se manifiestan ciertas dificultades financieras? Si la 
inversión en RSC crea reputación para los stakeholders, contribuyendo en la sinceridad 
y credibilidad de la empresa (McWilliams y Siegel, 2001; Schnietz y Epsteinm, 2005), 
entonces puede mitigar la imagen ofrecida por los deteriorados estados financieros y 
añadir valor económico a la empresa. 
Frente a una situación de crisis inicia un largo proceso de recuperación cuyo 
resultado no está garantizado y que implica una amplia gama de estrategias y acciones 
que tienen que ser coherentes con las debilidades de la empresa (Robbins y Pearce, 
1992; Pearce y Robbins, 1993; Castrogiovanni y Burton, 2000; Smith y Graves, 2005; 
Pretorius, 2008). Mantener el apoyo de los accionistas es fundamental para asegurar la 
situación financiera de una empresa o para obtener fondos adicionales a fin de poner en 




práctica estrategias que permitan a la entidad dirigirse hacia una reorientación de la 
situación con el apoyo de otros grupos. En el largo plazo, la supervivencia de una 
empresa está estrictamente relacionada con la capacidad de la empresa para ajustar sus 
valores a las expectativas de las partes interesadas (Freeman, 1984; Becchetti et al., 
2007). Por lo tanto, las acciones de responsabilidad social pueden permitir consolidar el 
apoyo si garantizan y/o mejoran las valoraciones que los diferentes grupos atribuyen a 
la empresa. Aunque los inversionistas son prudentes a la presencia del riesgo que una 
situación de crisis implica, autores como Devinney (2009) defienden que el 
comportamiento responsable puede reducir el riesgo específico de una empresa, 
convirtiéndose en una de las razones por las cuales los gerentes de las empresas 
participan en iniciativas de responsabilidad social.  El comportamiento responsable 
reduce la percepción de riesgo mientras refuerza la imagen de la empresa y ésta última 
consigue mejores tasas de descuento y un menor coste de capital (Feldman et al., 1997; 
Miles y Covin, 2000; Heal, 2005; Goss, 2007; Ghoul et al., 2011). 
Las expectativas de los inversores en la conducta futura de una empresa 
basándose en la información financiera se modifican cuando se considera información 
extra financiera. Es interesante saber en qué medida la modificación de las expectativas 
se produce en las empresas que presentan algún tipo de dificultades financieras que a 
priori las hacen poco atractivas para los inversionistas. Las empresas que se encuentran 
en una situación de distress pueden sufrir reducción de ventas y de los ingresos debido a 
que los clientes comienzan a perder su confianza en ellas. En este caso, las prácticas de 
RSC pueden recompensar esta desconfianza inicial de los clientes para que, a pesar de 
todo, ellos las puedan considerar atractivas y fiables para continuar su relación de 
compras con las mismas. En este sentido, Ruf et al. (2001) muestran que hay una 
continua relación positiva entre la RSC y el aumento de las ventas. Otros (Heal, 2005) 
enumeran una serie de ventajas de las prácticas de RSC que hacen que una empresa sea 
más atractiva para los inversores, tales como la reducción de los conflictos con la 
empresa, la reducción de residuos, generación de valor de la marca, la productividad de 
los trabajadores o el menor coste de capital. 
Este es el criterio seguido por Goss (2009) cuando demuestra que, a partir de la 
consideración de la RSC como una "proxy" de la buena gestión de las empresas, existe 




una sólida relación negativa entre la RSC y la crisis financiera donde esta última se 
calcula como la probabilidad de default, siguiendo el Modelo de Merton. Goss (2007) 
llegó a la conclusión de que existe una relación entre la RSC y el distress, es decir, la 
información sobre las prácticas de RSC complementa y aporta información adicional a 
la ofrecida por los datos financieros. Sin embargo, no se ha podido establecer una clara 
demostración de que la inversión en RSC reduce el riesgo de crisis. 
Partiendo de esta premisa, es interesante considerar la posibilidad de que los 
gestores de las empresas que se enfrentan en un determinado momento a situaciones de 
dificultad, inviertan en acciones de RSC como un camino para crear expectativas 
favorables que mitiguen los resultados ofrecidos por sus indicadores financieros. En 
este sentido, autores como de Ho y Taylor (2007) argumentan la existencia de 
incentivos a emitir información de carácter social y medioambiental por aquellas 
empresas que presentan desfavorables beneficios para poder ayudar a la compañía a 
reconducir su trayectoria. De una forma más precisa,  trabajos como los de Goss (2007) 
y (2009) concluyen con la existencia de una relación positiva entre RSC y situaciones 
de crisis, aunque sin conseguir evidencia de que los comportamientos responsables 
reduzcan el riesgo de fracaso final. 
Este trabajo tiene su punto de partida en la observación de la realidad en los 
Estados Unidos de un conjunto de empresas que en un momento determinado de tiempo 
muestran una situación de crisis. En particular, se observó que en el año 1993, un 
número de 753 empresas presentan algunos de los síntomas, más o menos graves, de 
una situación de inestabilidad a través de la identificación de algunos de los indicadores 
de crisis. Una parte de la situación analizada implicaría, desde el punto de vista de la 
teoría financiera, poner en duda la continuidad de la empresa en ese momento. Sin 
embargo, durante el período analizado, todas las empresas, excepto dos, estaban 
presentes en el mercado después de 10 años. Este hecho proporciona pruebas suficientes 
de la existencia de una alta tasa de supervivencia, a pesar de haber sufrido una grave 
crisis. Sin embargo, la evolución de este conjunto de empresas en todo el período de 10 
años es diferente. Algunas empresas logran resolver su situación de crisis, mientras que 
otras siguen un patrón degenerativo, similar a una enfermedad con efectos 
degenerativos. Es interesante el hecho de que un porcentaje considerable de las 




empresas parece mantenerse en la línea de límite entre la crisis y la estabilidad, con 
períodos de salud y enfermedad, de modo que se podría afirmar que hay una "especie" 
de la empresa para la que sobrevivir en crisis constituye su forma habitual de existir. 
Los argumentos anteriores incitar a proponer las siguientes preguntas:  
-  ¿Qué patrones  caracterizan a las empresas que se enfrentan a una situación de 
crisis en un momento determinado de tiempo, y que factores pueden determinar el 
proceso evolutivo?  
- ¿Qué tipo de estrategias ponen en práctica las empresas en una situación de 
crisis para resolver o mitigar esta situación? 
Siguiendo estas cuestiones, el presente trabajo está estructurado en siete capítulos 
y consiste principalmente de dos partes. En la primera parte, se analiza si la evolución 
de una situación de crisis depende de las características iniciales de la misma o si tiene 
que ver con determinadas características de las empresas, y los factores determinantes 
de los resultados finales. Sin embargo, es de destacar que el propósito de este estudio no 
se centra en la predicción. Más bien se centra en analizar los factores y los patrones que 
pueden determinar el proceso de recuperación. 
El capítulo I se ofrece el marco teórico de la primera parte de esta investigación y 
expone el modelo de recuperación y los diferentes factores que influyen en el resultado 
final de la crisis. 
El Capítulo II se dedica a un análisis descriptivo de la muestra de las empresas 
que presenten una situación de crisis y se representan en un mapa basándose en los 
síntomas de crisis ampliamente aceptados en la literatura, diferenciando entre variables 
de reacción y variables de recuperación. El objetivo es analizar las similitudes y 
diferencias entre las características estructurales de una muestra de empresas por medio 
de los cambios en su posición de crisis dada por: i) situación económica y financiera 
inicial; ii) capacidad de reacción y iii) la fuerza de la situación final. 




Es en el Capítulo III donde las diferencias o similitudes existentes entre los dos 
grupos de empresas son empíricamente estudiadas a fin de determinar las asociaciones 
entre las variables y el resultado final. Consideramos que la recuperación (estado Post-
distress) debe evaluar no sólo si una empresa logra resolver su estado crítico sino 
también la calidad de la posición final, considerando el riesgo de volver a entrar en 
distress. Podemos crear un indicador del bienestar que discrimina las empresas con buen 
desempeño, que solo consiguen salir de la crisis de las empresas con mejor desempeño, 
las cuales se posicionan en un nuevo escenario de bienestar, minimizando la 
probabilidad de recaer en una situación de dificultad. 
La segunda parte de este estudio se inicia en el capítulo IV. Aunque muchos 
estudios se han centrado en la relación entre comportamiento económico y financiero de 
las empresas y sus acciones de responsabilidad social corporativa (RSC), son escasos 
los trabajos que analizan las acciones de responsabilidad social de las empresas que se 
enfrentan a una crisis. Los gerentes de las empresas que en cierto momento del tiempo 
se enfrentan a una situación de distress,  podrían estar incentivados a invertir en 
acciones de responsabilidad social entre sus estrategias de recuperación. Estas últimas 
pueden ser utilizadas para complementar estrategias de eficiencia orientados a obtener 
beneficios asociados con las inversiones, para reducir los gastos en determinadas 
acciones con el fin de desarrollar las estrategias de reducción de costes, o para crear 
expectativas favorables que podrían mitigar los resultados débiles de sus indicadores 
financieros. 
Muchos estudios relacionados con la RSC y los resultados económicos y 
financieros de las empresas han sido prueba de la asociación positiva entre las acciones 
de RSC y los resultados financieros, pero otros han encontrado pruebas de que esta 
relación es negativa o neutral. En el capítulo V analizamos si las empresas que se 
enfrentan a una situación de dificultades financieras incorporan la inversión en 
comportamientos responsables entre sus estrategias como un mecanismo para crear 
expectativas favorables que mitigan la debilitada imagen de algunos indicadores 
financieros. 




En el capítulo VI se analizan los patrones de comportamiento responsable con el 
fin de determinar las marcas de identidad de las diferentes empresas y explorar si los 
perfiles de su conducta pueden estar asociados a la existencia o no de una situación de 
crisis. 
Por último, el Capítulo VII estudia si una reconocida situación de crisis financiera 
tiene un impacto sobre las estrategias de RSC y modifica la actitud de un conjunto de 
empresas hacia un comportamiento más responsable. Se utiliza la información de RSC 
de las empresas sanas y con problemas para evidenciar los cambios en la actitud de RSC 
inducidos por la posición de distress y se determinan las variables más relevantes del 
comportamiento responsable, una vez identificados los síntomas de crisis, para la 
evaluación general, así como para la valoración de cada dimensión de RSC, teniendo en 
cuenta el sector donde las empresas desarrollan su actividad normal. 
CAPITULO I. El proceso evolutivo del financial distress 
A lo largo de los años, y tomando como referencia los iniciales trabajos de Beaver 
(1967) y posteriormente Altman (1968), las investigaciones se han orientado hacia la 
determinación de cuáles son esas estructuras que diferencian a las empresas fracasadas 
de las no fracasadas con el fin de poder determinar los estados de alerta (Altman et al., 
1977; Altman, 1984; Dimitras, et al., 1996; Cybinsky, 2001; Balcaen y Ooghe, 2006, 
Ravi y Ravi, 2007). Estas investigaciones han ido variando respecto de la utilización de 
distintas técnicas estadísticas para la creación de modelos o la utilización de distintas 
variables predictivas, pero todas ellas se caracterizaban por la vinculación del término 
fracaso generalmente a la quiebra o desaparición de la empresa o la utilización de 
muestras pareadas de empresas fracasadas y no fracasadas, y no han estado exentas de 
críticas asociadas a los modelos utilizados, a las variables o a la selección de la muestra 
(Laitinen, 1991; Cybinski, 2001; Balcaen y Ooghe, 2006). Las distintas investigaciones 
han aportado conclusiones interesantes en relación con la crisis empresarial. Muchas de 
estas aportaciones son consecuencia de planteamientos que intentaron solventar algunas 
de las deficiencias metodológicas que tenían los iniciales estudios sobre crisis 
empresarial, como la utilización de técnicas deterministas que no permitían analizar el 
fracaso como un proceso continuo (Luoma y Laitinen, 1991; Catanach y Perry, 2001; 




Shumway, 2001), el evidenciar problemas para distinguir el desenlace de las empresas 
en situación de crisis (Barniv et al., 2002; Gilbert et al., 1990; Poston et al., 1994) o el 
no considerar que las situaciones de fracaso pueden entenderse en cualquier punto 
donde una empresa pueda tener serios o preocupantes problemas que introduzcan 
incertidumbre y riesgo en su futuro (Turetsky y McEwen, 2001). 
En este sentido, en los últimos años, diversas investigaciones han introducido una 
variante sobre los modelos de predicción al considerar que los procesos de fracaso son 
continuos y que además no son idénticos para todas las empresas (Bardos, 2001). 
Trabajos como los de Laitinen (1991), Luoma y Laitinen (1991), Shumway (2001) o 
Laitinen (2005), introduciendo técnicas como el análisis de supervivencia, apuestan por 
escenarios que ya habían sido introducidos por otros autores como Argenti (1976): el 
fracaso tiene distintas fases y distintos patrones de fases. El estado de fracaso es 
idéntico para todas las empresas que fracasan, pero su evolución es diferente, y las 
variables explicativas comúnmente asociadas al proceso de fracaso varían dependiendo 
de la fase en la que la empresa se encuentre (Laitinen, 1993; Laitinen, 2005). Este 
planteamiento puede ser encontrado en otros estudios que han “catalogado” a las 
empresas en función del proceso que deriva en un desenlace determinado (Laitinen, 
1991; Bardos, 1995; Abad et al., 2007; Ooghe y Prijcker, 2008). La relación síntomas-
fracaso ya no es directa, sino que el desenlace se hace depender de variables externas 
(entorno económico) e internas o estructurales (decisiones de gestión). En este sentido, 
algunos autores han sugerido, tal y como ya recogieron Bruno et al. (1987), que las 
empresas pequeñas parecen fracasar por problemas financieros mientras que las grandes 
empresas lo hacen por problemas asociados a la gestión. 
Los síntomas que catalogan a una empresa en crisis son comunes en la mayor 
parte de los trabajos que han investigado sobre este tema. Hay determinadas variables 
que se repiten de forma significativa y que resultan evidentes a la hora de que la 
información económica y financiera contenida en los Estados Financieros refleje 
problemas en la salud de la empresa. Entre estas variables destacan Resultados 
negativos (en algunos casos se concretaba en Resultados de explotación), Fondo de 
Maniobra negativo, Cash-Flow negativo (en algunos casos se diferenciaba con el Cash-
Flow de las operaciones), Patrimonio neto negativo o Pérdidas acumuladas en ejercicios 




anteriores (Raghunadan y Rama, 1995; Geiger et al., 1995,  Mutcher y Williams, 1990; 
Mutchler, 1985). Ponemon y Shick (1991) realizan una selección inversa. Es decir, 
seleccionan aquellas que no tenían problemas cuando con dos o más años presentaban 
resultados positivos, suficiente Activo Corriente, Cash Flow de las operaciones positivo 
y positivos ratios de endeudamiento. Poston et al. (1994) utilizan también para clasificar 
empresas en crisis aquellas que tienen un ratio de solvencia menor a la unidad. Martin 
(2000) asocia como criterio de empresas que pueden encontrarse en una situación de 
dificultad (y ser susceptibles de recibir una calificación de gestión continuada en su 
auditoría), el criterio de rentabilidad de las acciones porque reacciona tanto a las 
características financieras como no financieras. Otros criterios seguidos son también 
que una empresa manifieste unos Beneficios de explotación menores que sus gastos 
financieros (Jostarndt, 2006). En la mayor parte de los casos la existencia de una 
situación de crisis era considerada cuando se combinaban varios síntomas de los 
anteriores, no obstante, en algunos trabajos como Mutchler, (1985),  Mutchler y 
Williams (1990) o Raghunadan y Rama (1995), una empresa se consideraba en 
situación problemática al cumplir tan sólo alguno de ellos. Junto con los criterios 
anteriores también es usual utilizar la existencia de un informe de auditoría calificado en 
gestión continuada para catalogar a una empresas en crisis (Ponemon y Shick, 1991; 
Raghunadan y Rama, 1995) o para clasificarla a efectos de otorgar mayor evidencia a la 
situación por la que atraviesa (Mutcher y Williams, 1990).  
Las variables seleccionadas anteriormente son simplemente síntomas de que una 
situación de crisis se produce. La cuestión diferencial son los factores latentes 
(Catanach y Perry, 2001) que subyacen a los mismos, es decir, las debilidades y 
deficiencias en la gestión de la empresa que se traducen en esa incapacidad desde el 
punto de vista económico o financiero. En este sentido, trabajos como los de Geiger et 
al. (1995) agrupan a las empresas quebradas en tres tipos dependiendo de 
sintomatologías asociadas a Cash Flow negativo de forma recurrente; pérdidas de 
explotación recurrentes o Fondo de maniobra negativo, asumiendo así que pueden 
existir estructuras diferentes subyacentes en los procesos de crisis. Esta distinción entre 
síntomas y causas es fácilmente visible también en los distintos trabajos que han 
investigado sobre crisis empresarial, cuando se han introducido como variables 




explicativas de los modelos determinados ratios o variables como traducción numérica 
de las deficiencias. Neophytou y Mar Molinero (2005) hablan en este sentido de 
variables latentes que describen varios aspectos de una empresa; y con bastante 
consenso se hace referencia a dimensiones como: liquidez, riesgo, rentabilidad, calidad 
de los activos, liquidez, actividad o gestión. 
El modelo de recuperación incorpora varias variables que pudieran ser 
catalogadas como capacitadores del distress. Estas variables son: 
- la severidad de la situación de partida 
- la capacidad de reacción frente a una situación de dificultades 
- el tamaño de la empresa 
- la actuación durante el periodo de crisis 
- el estado post crisis. 
En consecuencia, la estado post crisis evalúa la calidad del bienestar de las 
empresas considerando el riesgo de re-entrada en distress y discrimina los buenos 
performers de los mejores performers en la gestión de crisis. En un contexto de crisis, 
una empresa con buena performance sólo logra el objetivo (es decir salir de la situación 
de crisis) mientras que una empresa con la mejor performance se encuentra en un nuevo 
escenario sano, reduciendo al mínimo la probabilidad de volver a entrar en una 
situación de dificultad. 
El enfoque de la Figura 1.1 encierra una cuestión principal: ¿Cuando una empresa 
se enfrenta a una situación de crisis, puede el deterioro evolutivo siempre ser revertido 
por medio de ciertas acciones estratégicas o el éxito puede estar afectado por los puntos 
fuertes/débiles de la estructura de la empresa? Utilizando un razonamiento metafórico, 
cuando una empresa se enfrenta a una enfermedad como dificultades financieras, 
¿podría volver a un estado saludable sólo por medio de acciones terapéuticas o la cura 
depende de la ausencia de algunas características estructurales? 
 




CAPITULO II. Patrones estructurales y evolutivos de las empresas en situación de 
crisis 
En este capítulo se analizan las similitudes y diferencias entre las características 
estructurales de un conjunto de 526 empresas que se enfrentan a un cierto grado de 
dificultades financieras debido a la existencia de cierto grupo de síntomas generalmente 
aceptados. Este análisis puede ser visto a través de los cambios de situación de las 
empresas 10 años más tarde, según algunos de los indicadores del proceso de "gestión" 
de esta situación de crisis. Para valorar el proceso de "gestión de la crisis" se consideran 
tres dimensiones de análisis: a) situación económica y financiera en el primer año del 
análisis, b) capacidad de reacción  y c) fortaleza de la situación. A los efectos del 
análisis, hemos optado por utilizar el escalamiento multidimensional (MDS), que 
proporciona una representación visual de la estructura de proximidades (es decir, las 
similitudes o distancias) entre un conjunto de objetos. Esta técnica también ha sido 
utilizada en otros trabajos que han estudiado el fracaso (Mar Molinero y Ezzamel, 1991; 
Mar Molinero y Cerrano-Cinca, 2001; Neophytou y Mar Molinero, 2004 y 2005).  Esta 
metodología nos permite analizar los perfiles de las empresas en una situación 
específica de crisis financiera sin ninguna hipótesis a priori sobre las relaciones causales 
que pueden ser usados como predictores de la situación al final del período analizado. 
El objetivo final es explorar la posibilidad de la existencia de este vínculo a través del 
análisis del mapa de las empresas en dificultades y los cambios en sus posiciones, de 
acuerdo con su estructura económica y financiera y su situación inicial. 
Teniendo en cuenta algunas de las ideas expuestas en el Capítulo I con respecto a 
los procesos evolutivos relacionados con las empresas en crisis se espera y conseguimos 
que: 
1. Existen diferencias estructurales entre las empresas que presentan diferentes 
síntomas de crisis. Si el fracaso es un proceso continuo y, a veces 
degenerativo, podemos esperar que las empresas con graves síntomas de crisis 
están colocadas claramente separadas de aquellas que presentan una débil 
crisis, de acuerdo con las estructuras de sus variables. 




2. El resultado, o la posición alcanzada por una empresa tras superar un período 
de crisis, es independiente de la condición de partida. Al final del período de 
análisis, las empresas estarán en una nueva posición de "crisis" o de 
"seguridad" en función de 
a. Las características estructurales, a pesar de los síntomas que mostraron 
al comienzo del análisis. Autores como Ooghe y Prijcker (2008) 
afirman que la diferencia entre los procesos de fracaso depende de los 
defectos de la situación inicial. 
b. El esfuerzo en la "gestión" de la crisis. Las empresas con un mayor 
esfuerzo en la actividad operativa pueden mejorar su situación a pesar 
de los síntomas iniciales que presentaban. En este sentido, Kahl (2001) 
y Routledge y Gadenne (2000) afirman que "la rentabilidad operativa" 
refleja el esfuerzo realizado durante una situación de crisis y determina 
el éxito del proceso evolutivo hacia la salida de esa situación. 
 
CAPITULO III. Superar un declive en empresas con dificultades financieras. 
Factores determinantes del proceso de recuperación. 
Los resultados del capítulo anterior han demostrado que la situación inicial de 
crisis de las empresas puede influir en el proceso de evolución. Ciertas situaciones de 
crisis débil parecen seguir una evolución natural en un sentido positivo, de tal manera 
que las empresas consiguen mantener sus circunstancias sin mayor esfuerzo, que 
posteriormente las colocan en un escenario seguro. En la misma línea, algunas 
situaciones de crisis fuerte parecen seguir un proceso degenerativo, manteniendo su 
posición inicial deficiente o incluso empeorando la situación. Sin embargo, los 
resultados también prueban que, en muchos casos, las empresas con diferentes síntomas 
de crisis comparten características estructurales que las hacen evolucionar en la misma 
dirección. 
El modelo expuesto en el Capítulo I proponía que el estado post distress es una 
consecuencia de la gravedad inicial de la crisis, así como de ciertas características que 




permiten actuar como herramienta de mejora o reductores de la resolución final de un 
proceso de crisis. Sin embargo, el modelo también incluye otra serie de factores, tales 
como las diferentes estrategias que pueden llevar una empresa a salida con éxito de la 
situación de crisis, o las cuestiones relacionadas con el comportamiento durante el 
proceso de crisis. 
La evidencia recogida en los estudios expuestos en el capítulo I, en relación con el 
hecho de que las empresas que resuelven su situación de crisis muestran una alta 
rentabilidad durante el proceso de recuperación también se observa en los resultados 
obtenidos en el capítulo II. El retorno a un escenario saludable se asocia con la 
rentabilidad. Este asunto parece ser la garantía para mantener el nuevo estado.  
El estado post distress evalúa no sólo si una empresa resuelve la crisis inicial, sino 
también la calidad del bienestar considerando el riesgo de que vuelva a entrar en crisis. 
Esta línea permite considerar un indicador de Fitness, que discrimina entre las empresas 
con buena performance de las empresas con mejor performance, las cuales se 
encuentran en un nuevo escenario saludable reduciendo al mínimo la probabilidad de 
volver a entrar en distress. 
Este enfoque nos permite testar el modelo de recuperación de las empresas que se 
enfrentan a una situación de crisis cuando la condición del post crisis podría ser influida 
por variables específicas relacionadas con características estructurales iniciales de una 
empresa, así como de las estrategias empleadas durante el distress. 
Continuando con los resultados exploratorios de los patrones evolutivos análisis 
financieros en una situación de peligro, y de conformidad con el modelo de 
recuperación expuesta en el capítulo I, testamos las siguientes hipótesis: 
- H1: El grado de severidad de las empresas en dificultades financieras está 
probablemente asociado con el estado post distress. 
- H2: La capacidad de reacción de las empresas en distress se relaciona 
positivamente con una sana posición final tras el proceso de recuperación. 




- H3: El rendimiento durante el distress está positivamente relacionad con el 
bienestar del estado post distress. 
- H4: Las estrategias de recorte tienen una influencia positiva en el desenlace de 
una situación de crisis. 
- H5: El tamaño de las empresas en dificultades financieras está relacionada con 
la posición final después del proceso de recuperación. 
Para testar las hipótesis propuestas, se utiliza la misma muestra de 526 empresas 
de Estados Unidos, identificadas como empresas que atraviesan una situación de crisis. 
Teniendo en cuenta el escenario más amplio de Poston et al. (1994), nuestro análisis se 
realizará durante los años 1993 hasta el año 2000. La economía de los EE.UU. ha 
experimentado una expansión económica en el período analizado. Según la Oficina 
Nacional de Investigación Económica (2001), un pico en la actividad de la empresa se 
produjo en la economía de los Estados Unidos en marzo de 2001. Un pico marca el final 
de la expansión y el inicio de una recesión. Por lo tanto, el año 2001 estuvo marcado por 
los acontecimientos tales como la burbuja Puntocom, la caída del Mercado de Valores, 
la pérdida de la confianza de los inversores en el Mercado de Valores o la aparición de 
fraudes corporativos y de gobierno corporativo. Los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 
2001 también pueden haber sido un factor importante en el deterioro de la economía 
hacia una recesión. Los datos financieros para los años después de 2000 serían, en 
mayor o menor grado, influenciados por todos estos factores externos. Detener el 
análisis en el año 2000 podría ser más apropiado para la estabilidad del mismo. 
Los resultados obtenidos sugieren que la posición final del distress puede ser 
explicada por algunas de las variables y en determinadas circunstancias. En primer 
lugar, la hipótesis de que la capacidad de reacción de las empresas en crisis se relaciona 
positivamente con el estado final después de la recuperación no ha sido confirmada. Sin 
embargo, los resultados muestran que la interpretación es diferente si consideramos el 
modelo global o si se analizan las industrias por separado. 
En segundo lugar, y en contraste con otras investigaciones, el grado de severidad 
no determina un resultado negativo de la situación negativa o capacidad de 




supervivencia en las condiciones adecuadas. De acuerdo con los resultados sobre la 
capacidad de reacción, es la capacidad estructural subyacente, y no los síntomas de 
distress, que determinan la forma en la que la empresa enfrenta la crítica situación por la 
que atraviesa. 
Cuando se examina la diferencia entre los tiempos de recuperación (escenario de 3 
y 8 años), puede considerarse que el largo plazo permite un resultado eficaz de una 
situación de crisis. En cuanto a la rentabilidad, a pesar de que es un factor importante ya 
que representa una situación de bajo riesgo, los resultados no fueron suficientes para 
afirmar que una continua performance rentable es una condición necesaria para superar 
una situación difícil. 
Como era de esperar, el tamaño de la empresa influye en la evolución del distress. 
Las empresas grandes tienden a presentar una situación mejor y un menor riesgo 
después de la situación inicial de crisis. Sin embargo, en cuanto a la influencia de las 
estrategias de recorte, no hay evidencia suficiente para concluir que tiene una influencia 
positiva en los resultados de una situación de distress. Por último, la industria en la que 
una empresa está desarrollando su actividad tiene una influencia en el resultado de una 
situación difícil. Algunas características específicas del sector pueden contribuir o 
inhibir la evolución del proceso de recuperación y, como consecuencia en los resultados 
de las estrategias de las empresas para solucionar los problemas. 
CAPITULO IV. Estrategias de RSC en empresas que se enfrentan a un 
declive 
En los últimos años, "revolver" una situación de crisis ha sido de mucho interés en 
muchos trabajos de investigación cuyo objetivo es identificar los patrones que 
diferencian las compañías en situación de crisis que son capaces de resolver sus 
problemas con las que no lo consiguen. Estos estudios muestran que existen diferentes 
estrategias que pueden dirigir con éxito una empresa hacia la salida de la situación de 
crisis (Robbins y Pearce, 1992; Pearce y Robbins, 1993, 1994; Barker y Duhaime, 1997; 
Cascio et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1999). 




Por otra parte, también se han producido muchos estudios relacionados con la 
RSC y los resultados económicos y financieros de las empresas. Algunos de ellos han 
sido prueba de la asociación positiva entre las acciones de RSC y los resultados 
financieros, pero otros han encontrado pruebas de que esta relación era negativa o 
neutral (Aupperle et al., 1985; Davidson y Worrell, 1992; Brown y Perry, 1994; 
Waddock y Graves, 1997; Griffin y Mahon, 1997; Dowell et al., 2000; Hillman y Keim, 
2001; Orlizky et al., 2003; Brammer y Millington, 2008; Nelling y Webb, 2009; Jong-
Seo et al., 2010; Peters y Mullen, 2009; Mishra y Suar, 2010; Byus et al. 2010).  
Murphy (2002) realiza una revisión exhaustiva de los estudios que han analizado la 
relación entre comportamiento responsable y los resultados financieros, de lo que se 
concluye que existe una base sólida que demuestra una relación positiva entre la 
conducta ambiental responsable y un sólido rendimiento financiero. En cuanto a la 
conducta social, Margolis y Walsh (2001) afirman que la relación positiva con el 
desempeño financiero no puede asumir ni para todas las empresas ni para todo tipo de 
actividades sociales. 
Los diferentes resultados de la investigación que estudian la RSC y la 
performance corporativa hacen posible afirmar que el comportamiento responsable no 
afecta negativamente a los resultados de una empresa pero no hay pruebas explícitas 
sobre el conseguimiento de resultados anormales. Como consecuencia de ello, aunque 
hay amplia evidencia que pruebe que la responsabilidad genera resultados positivos para 
las empresas, no hay una prueba irrefutable de una relación de causa y efecto 
(Schadewitz y Niskala, 2010).  Por otro lado, la relación no tiene que ser 
necesariamente de la RSC sobre el rendimiento, sino también es plausible que la 
rentabilidad afecte a la RSC o que ambas situaciones pueden ocurrir (Devinney, 2009).  
En este sentido, algunos estudios afirman rendimiento financiero histórico de la 
empresa contribuye a las inversiones actuales en responsabilidad social, según la 
relación de causalidad entre ambos términos (Hillman y Keim, 2001; Xueming y 
Bhattacharya, 2006).  Este enfoque se basa en considerar que los buenos resultados 
financieros permiten reorientar recursos excesivos a las actividades sociales. Esto 
significa que un buen rendimiento financiero deriva en prácticas socialmente 
responsables, por lo tanto, influyendo en los perfiles de RSC. 




Sin embargo, si invertir en comportamiento responsable produce efectos positivos 
sobre el desempeño financiero futuro, el mercado debe evaluar este comportamiento 
para que los inversores recompensen el valor que se atribuye a las empresas socialmente 
responsables. De esta manera, las empresas que satisfacen a los stakeholders recibirán 
su apoyo. Esta opinión ha abierto una línea de investigación que trata de conectar las 
acciones de RSC con el valor de mercado de las empresas. A pesar de que estos estudios 
no son concluyentes, Statman et al. (2006) afirman que, aunque no exista una mayor 
valoración para ser socialmente responsable, no hay una penalización asociada a estos 
comportamientos. Sin embargo, una amplia gama de estudios han demostrado que las 
empresas socialmente responsables se valoran positivamente por el mercado (Cormier y 
Magnan, 1997; Graves y Waddock, 2000; Konar y Cohen, 2001; Orlizky et al., 2003; 
Schadewitz y Niskala, 2010; Semenova et al., 2010; Lo y Sheu, 2007).  La inversión en 
comportamientos responsables puede ser entendida como un "producto" que se ofrece a 
los inversores, algunos de los cuales están dispuestos a comprarlo a pesar de que pueda 
suponer una reducción en el valor actual de sus flujos de efectivo u obtener menos 
beneficios en comparación con las empresas no responsables (Mackey et al., 2007). 
Incorporar acciones de RSC en un proceso de recuperación. 
Una empresa que se enfrenta a una situación de dificultades financieras debe 
adoptar una serie de estrategias específicas con el fin de volver a un escenario saludable 
(Robbins y Pearce, 1992; Pearce y Robbins, 1993 y 1994; Barker y Duhaime, 1997; 
Castrogiovanni y Burton, 2000; Smith y Graves, 2005; Pretorius, 2008).  En una fase de 
declive, y bajo la visión de una recuperación,  tres aspectos son fundamentales: i) 
preservar la confianza y el apoyo de los accionistas; ii) mejorar la rentabilidad actuando 
sobre las ganancias; y iii) atraer fondos para el corto y mediano plazo en los casos en 
que la empresa presenta debilidades de cash flow o financieras. Es en esta zona, donde 
la RSC puede jugar un papel clave como estrategia a fin de apoyar un proceso de 
recuperación. En este sentido, Hernández-Murillo y Martinek (2009) afirman que 
ciertas acciones enmarcadas como comportamiento responsable pueden ser interesantes 
para las empresas porque pueden crear oportunidades para generar beneficios 
económicos adicionales por medio de los cuales un mal rendimiento económico puede 
restaurarse. Entre esos beneficios, los autores enumeran una mejor reputación, la 




generación de beneficios por la diversidad de productos o la posibilidad de obtener una 
prima para los productos, de tal manera que se pueden convertir en otros beneficios en 
el futuro. Heal (2005) afirma que las acciones sociales y ambientales pueden aumentar 
los beneficios a largo plazo a través de una reducción en los costes de conflictos de 
intereses con la empresa, la reducción de los costes, la productividad de los empleados, 
y el valor de la marca que hace la empresa más atractiva para los inversores. Otras 
posibles ventajas podrían ser una mejor manera de obtener recursos, el aumento de la 
demanda de productos o una reducción de los costes del proceso de producción 
(Waddock y Graves, 1997; Sen y Bhattacharya, 2001; Konar y Cohen, 2001). 
Las empresas que se enfrentan a una situación  de dificultades financieras 
transmiten riesgos para los inversionistas, los cuales serán prudentes en el momento de 
aportar fondos a la empresa. Las acciones de RSC podrían ayudar a mitigar los riesgos 
financieros percibidos modificando las expectativas futuras y la imagen de la empresa. 
Los gerentes de empresas que atraviesan una situación de crisis en un momento 
determinado de tiempo, pueden tener un incentivo para invertir en acciones de 
responsabilidad social entre sus estrategias de recuperación con el fin de: i) 
complementar estrategias de eficiencia orientadas hacia la rentabilidad de la inversión; 
ii) reducir el coste de algunas de las medidas destinadas a desarrollar las estrategias de 
reducción de costes o iii) crear expectativas favorables que mitigan los resultados 
financieros débiles de sus ratios financieros. Por lo tanto, existen diversas motivaciones 
para realizar mayores esfuerzos "en beneficio" de la comunidad, a fin de compensar los 
malos resultados financieros publicados. Los directivos de las empresas en una 
situación de distress pueden tratar de "manejar" la imagen de la precaria situación 
financiera través  de comportamientos responsables como una reacción a un conflicto 
discrecional en la organización. Esta actitud es una forma de dar fuerza a su futuro, de 
modo que los directivos puedan difundir sus expectativas de futuro a los inversores y al 
mercado. Sin embargo, una vez identificada una fase decreciente, no existe, a priori, un 
razonamiento claro sobre la forma en la que los administradores deciden integrar la 
responsabilidad social en el marco de las actividades que se llevarán a cabo debido a las 
diferentes posibilidades de acción y los posibles efectos de tales inversiones. 
 




Enfoque de reputación y confianza 
Las acciones de RSC pueden modificar la percepción del riesgo y, de forma 
indirecta, influir en las posibilidades de acceso a la financiación externa, así como el 
coste de capital que la empresa soporta. Diversos trabajos recogen la existencia de 
rendimientos positivos para las empresas que invierten en comportamiento socialmente 
responsable a través de una mejora en el coste de capital. Feldman et al. (1997) 
encontraron que las empresas que adoptan las acciones proactivas en el ámbito de la 
RSC experimentan una profunda reducción del riesgo de los inversores, lo cual puede 
conducir a un menor coste de capital. Fortalecer la imagen corporativa, mediante el 
aumento de la reputación hacia los stakeholders, mitiga el riesgo de tal manera que el 
comportamiento responsable se convierte en una mejor tasa de descuento, lo que 
permite un menor coste de capital (Miles y Covin, 2000; Heal, 2005; Lee et al., 2009; 
Cheung et al., 2010; Ghoul et al., 2011).  Esta ventaja de coste de financiación se pone 
de manifiesto en estudios tales como Goss (2007) que muestra que las empresas con 
malos resultados de RSC pagan un mayor coste de la deuda. Las empresas no son ajenas 
a esta relación dado que, como Devinney (2009) señala, junto con otros directamente 
implicados en el desempeño, una de las razones por las que las empresas y sus 
directivos están involucrados en las iniciativas de RSC es el impacto sobre el riesgo 
(coste de capital). 
Según Godfrey et al. (2009), la RSC podría ofrecer un mecanismo de seguridad 
para las empresas con el fin de preservar sus resultados financieros. Algunas acciones 
de RSC crean el llamado capital moral o de buena voluntad., el cual mitiga la sanción 
que los stakeholders pueden realizar bajo eventos negativos. Estos autores argumentan 
que el capital moral no tiene ningún efecto en la generación de valor, sin embargo, 
preserva el valor económico de la empresa. En este sentido, las acciones de RSC 
condensan el efecto negativo entregando a la empresa el "beneficio de la duda". 
 
 




El riesgo de responsabilidad. 
En cuanto a la responsabilidad, la llamada teoría de la sanción social sostiene que 
las empresas están sujetas a las reclamaciones sobre aquellos comportamientos que no 
contribuyen al crecimiento y desarrollo de la sociedad (Devinney, 2009), en la medida 
en que no se están comportando dentro de las normas y las costumbres de las sociedades 
en las que operan. Reinhardt (1999) hace mención al riesgo de responsabilidad o daños 
a la reputación en el cual se debe considerar no sólo el riesgo de un evento adverso, sino 
también los costes asociados a las pérdidas que se producen. Las acciones responsables 
reducen al mínimo los costes de transacción y reducen el riesgo de conflictos jurídicos 
con ellos (Becchetti et al., 2012).  Como afirma Levine (2008), los programas de RSC 
garantizan el cumplimiento de las responsabilidades,  gestionando el riesgo de 
reputación  o legal al cual las empresas están expuestas en este contexto actual de 
necesidades de la sociedad. En este sentido, Hassel et al. (2005)  también, afirman  que 
la rentabilidad  de la  "ecologización", refiriéndose a la reducción de la contaminación 
del medio ambiente, reduce la futura responsabilidad ambiental. 
El enfoque de vulnerabilidad económica. 
El riesgo de vulnerabilidad económica está relacionado con la capacidad de una 
empresa para alinearse con su entorno. Las empresas sanas tienen mayor oportunidad de 
sobrevivir en un contexto de competencia permanente por medio de la continua 
adaptación al medio ambiente. Prácticas socialmente responsables permiten la mejora 
de competitividad de una empresa, la creación de oportunidades para generar beneficios 
económicos y diferenciar la empresa de sus competidores (Miles y Covin, 2000; 
Hernández-Murillo y Martinek, 2009).  Así las empresas con buen desempeño se 
vuelven menos vulnerables a las situaciones adversas o a las fases de declive, lo que 
reduce el riesgo de no superar estas situaciones. 
Buscando la mejora de los resultados es una característica de la primera etapa de 
las denominadas estrategias de eficiencia que son aplicadas por los gestores de las 
empresas que se enfrentan a dificultades y están fuertemente relacionadas con la 
recuperación de una situación estable (Robbins y Pearce, 1992; Campbell, 1996; 




Routledge y Gadenne, 2000; Castrogiovanni y Burton, 2000; Smith y Graves, 2005).  
La relación positiva entre la inversión en RSC y resultados, y también entre un buen 
rendimiento y recuperación después de las crisis, permiten argumentar la existencia de 
incentivos para implementar acciones de responsabilidad social, entre las estrategias 
adoptadas por los directivos de las empresas que se enfrentan a dificultades a fin de 
iniciar un proceso de recuperación. 
El enfoque de reducción de costes. 
La inexistencia de un consenso sobre la investigación enfocada en la relación 
entre el rendimiento financiero y comportamiento social de las empresas permite 
evaluar la existencia de una relación bidireccional entre esos dos conceptos. De este 
modo, un incremento en desempeño social también puede ser interpretado como una  
actividad discrecional que se financia cuando la empresa tiene un exceso de fondos, es 
decir, un buen rendimiento financiero (Hillman y Keim, 2001).  Adicionalmente, la 
teoría de recursos escasos (Miles y Covin, 2000) sostiene que ciertos comportamientos 
ambientales se implementan como consecuencia de buenos resultados financieros, lo 
que permite realizar inversiones adicionales asignando fondos, así como tomando las 
decisiones de inversión discrecional. 
Las inversiones en el ámbito de la RSC también se han interpretado como un 
coste a expensas del valor de los accionistas, especialmente en los procesos relativos a 
ciertas dimensiones de la RSC. Estas dimensiones implican un considerable gasto 
económico con una gran repercusión en la actual cuenta de pérdidas y ganancias debido 
a la dificultad de cuantificarlas como actuaciones que generan beneficios futuros. Esta 
hipótesis está en línea con los resultados obtenidos por Lo y Sheu (2007) que indican 
que los inversores pueden ser reacios a las acciones de RSC de una empresa si 
consideran que estas acciones aumentan  los costes operacionales y de producción. 
El argumento anterior tiene sentido si consideramos que, como indican Hassel et 
al. (2005), que el mercado es de corto plazo y los inversores no consideran el impacto 
de largo plazo en sus decisiones. Así, según el enfoque de amenaza de los costes, las 
empresas con dificultades financieras, tienden a disminuir su inversión en determinadas 




dimensiones de la RSC que los accionistas consideran como un gasto. Los directivos de 
estas empresas prefieren a "redirigir" los ingresos de la empresa en un corto intervalo de 
tiempo, reduciendo los costes y gastos que no producen beneficios inmediatos. Esta 
evaluación se basa en la paradoja de considerar acciones responsables como un coste o 
como una inversión y es más evidente en dimensiones relacionadas con la 
responsabilidad ambiental. Esta paradoja de la responsabilidad medioambiental - una 
oportunidad reduciendo costes futuros o la amenaza reduciendo los gastos corrientes, 
permite tener en cuenta que las estrategias seguidas por los gerentes de las empresas en 
dificultades no presentan una clara dirección a priori en esta dimensión. Siguiente 
Waddock y Graves (1997), podemos suponer:  
- Asociación negativa: acciones vinculadas con el medio ambiente causan, por lo 
general, importantes costes que pueden ser difícilmente asequible para empresas en 
dificultades financieras. Las empresas inmersas en dificultades financieras, tienden a 
reducir este tipo de inversión. 
- Asociación positiva: la falta de inversión en acciones de medio ambiente causa 
responsabilidad jurídica con sus costes asociados. Algunos de ellos están implícitos, 
como la percepción de los accionistas y futuros inversores, y a veces pueden superar los 
costes explícitos. 
Sobre la base de los anteriores argumentos, nuestro propósito es analizar en qué 
medida las empresas que se enfrentan a situaciones de riesgo financiero incorporan la 
inversión en conductas responsables entre sus estrategias como un mecanismo para 
crear expectativas favorables para mitigar la debilitada imagen de algunos indicadores 
financieros. Vamos a estudiar los diferentes modelos de implementación de estas 
estrategias que están condicionadas por el grado de dificultades financieras y de las 
debilidades de esta situación, de modo que podamos mostrar los mecanismos de 
selección entre las distintas dimensiones que forman el constructo RSC en función de: i) 
los costes asociados a estas conductas responsables; y/o ii) el período en que se supone 
que debe obtener los rendimientos o beneficios de la inversión en RSC. 




Es necesario considerar que la diferencia en la percepción de estrategias de RSC 
(costo amenaza u oportunidad de inversión) está asociado con el nivel o etapa de la 
crisis de la compañía o situación de distress. Si el origen de la crisis es una situación de 
desequilibrio económico hay una mayor tendencia a considerar las prácticas de RSC 
como una amenaza debido al efecto que tienen sobre los costes del ejercicio, ergo, se 
espera una relación negativa en este tipo de empresas. Por el contrario, si el origen de la 
crisis de la empresa es un desequilibrio financiero, es razonable pensar en una 
asociación positiva de la RSC como una forma de mejorar la confianza de los inversores 
y acreedores en el futuro. 
Por último, centrándonos en las empresas con problemas financieros, se debe 
tener en cuenta la fase del distress en la que la empresa se encuentra inmersa. Las 
empresas que enfrentan una grave situación de crisis, derivada por muchos factores, es 
más probable que centren su prioridad en la supervivencia a corto plazo y cualquier 
iniciativa relacionada con las prácticas de RSC sería considerado como un coste 
negativo con impacto inmediato en el objetivo de la supervivencia. 
CAPITULO V. Patrones en acciones de RSC para mitigar una imagen 
financiera débil. 
El objetivo de este capítulo es evidenciar si las empresas que se enfrentan a 
situaciones de crisis incorporan la inversión en conductas responsables entre sus 
estrategias como un mecanismo para crear expectativas favorables que mitigan la 
debilitada imagen de algunos indicadores financieros. Para ello, vamos a realizar un 
análisis de las similitudes o diferencias en la actitud de las empresas hacia las acciones 
de RSE a fin de determinar si existe una relación entre esta actitud y la situación 
económico-financiera de la empresa. 
El análisis de las similitudes y las diferencias en los comportamientos de la RSC 
se realiza mediante un conjunto de 392 las empresas clasificadas, en función de su 
estructura financiera, en empresas sanas y en crisis. El desempeño en RSC se calcula 
utilizando la calificación alcanzada por las empresas en la base de datos KLD, 
considerando las debilidades y las fortalezas obtenidas en las siete dimensiones de 




KLD: comunidad, gobierno corporativo, diversidad, empleados, medio ambiente, 
derechos humanos y el producto. De esta evaluación, hemos optado por utilizar 
escalamiento multidimensional (MDS), que proporciona una representación visual de 
los patrones de proximidades (es decir, las similitudes o distancias) entre un conjunto de 
observaciones. Este estudio no empieza con una relación directa entre la crisis de 
empresa y algunas estrategias de RSC. La metodología MDS nos permite analizar los 
perfiles de las empresas en una determinada situación de dificultades financieras sin 
ninguna hipótesis a priori sobre las relaciones causales que se podrían utilizar como 
predictores del desempeño en RSC. 
Teniendo en cuenta las argumentaciones del Capítulo IV, en relación con los 
incentivos de los administradores de las empresas que enfrentan algunos rey situación 
de dificultades financieras para invertir en las prácticas de RSE y de acuerdo a las 
características de la metodología que se va a utilizar, es de esperar que las posiciones de 
las empresas analizadas en el grafico puedan verificar lo siguiente: 
- La inexistencia de diferencias estructurales de RSC entre las empresas que 
presentan síntomas de una crisis y las sanas. Si los administradores de las empresas en 
un proceso de declive usan los comportamientos responsables como una estrategia para 
"mitigar" la débil imagen que se manifiesta por sus datos económicos y financieros, 
suponemos que las posiciones de las empresas en las variables asociadas a la evaluación 
de su desempeño en el ámbito de la RSC es independiente de su estructura financiera. 
Sin embargo, esperamos que el grado de severidad de la crisis vaya a marcar las 
diferencias en la actitud de la empresa hacia la responsabilidad social de las empresas y 
las inversiones en comportamientos responsables. De esta manera, la posición alcanzada 
por una empresa no es independiente de la condición de partida. 
- La existencia de diferencias estructurales en el ámbito de las debilidades de  
RSC entre las empresas que muestran crisis y las sanas, teniendo en cuenta los 
argumentos del enfoque Coste Actual. 
- La existencia de diferencias estructurales en comportamientos de RSC según las 
debilidades financieras de una empresa. Teniendo en cuenta el enfoque amenaza-




oportunidad, esperamos que exista una diferencia de posicionamiento entre las empresas 
que presenten deficiencias económicas y a las empresas que muestran debilidades 
financieras. 
El comportamiento socialmente responsable se mide mediante la calificación de 
las empresas en cada una de las dimensiones de la base de datos Kinder, y Domini 
Lyndenberg (KLD). KLD es una herramienta ampliamente aceptada para medir las la 
responsabilidad social de empresas de Estados Unidos (Wood y Jones, 1995; Ruf et al., 
2001) ya que refleja realmente las acciones y comportamientos de la RSC y no se basa 
únicamente en la información publicada por las empresas (Iannou y Serafeim, 2010).  
KLD se utiliza en un gran número de estudios como Graves y Waddock (1994), 
Waddock y Graves (1997), Hillman y Keim (2001), Ruf et al. (2001), Siegel y Vitalino 
(2006), Hull y Rothenberg (2008), Kacperczyk (2009), Peters y Mullen (2009), Ioannou 
y Serafeim (2010), Melo y Galán (2010), Melo y Garrido-Morgado (2012), Bear et al. 
(2010), Boesso y Michelón (2010). 
KLD evalúa la RSC considerando 7 dimensiones que representan el desempeño 
ambiental, social y de buen gobierno de las empresas (Comunidad, gobierno 
corporativo, diversidad, relaciones con los empleados, derechos humanos, el medio 
ambiente y producto).  Cada dimensión se mide por medio de una serie de indicadores 
que representan las acciones positivas (como fortalezas) y las acciones negativas (como 
debilidades) con un sistema binario (0, ausencia; 1; presencia).  
Llevamos a cabo el análisis teniendo en cuenta la puntuación global en 
fortalezas/debilidades, agrupando las evaluaciones individuales obtenidas en cada una 
de las dimensiones, así como la puntuación individual en cada una de estas 
dimensiones.  Por lo tanto, hemos seguido el criterio utilizado por Griffin y Mahon 
(1997), quienes creen que la creación de un índice único que valora la 
fortaleza/debilidad de una empresa en una sola variable puede disimular las 
dimensiones individuales que son importantes para una empresa o industria y, también, 
el esfuerzo efectivo que una empresa realiza en cada uno de ellos. Sin embargo, a pesar 
de defender el enfoque, la variable de evaluación global se incluye con el fin de analizar 
en qué medida puede ser representativa de las posibles diferencias entre las empresas. 




Los resultados evidencian la inexistencia de diferencias estructurales en RSC 
entre las empresas que presentan síntomas de una crisis y las empresas sanas, con 
respecto a los aspectos considerados como fortalezas en el ámbito de la RSC. En este 
sentido, la actitud responsable es inherente a la filosofía de la gestión y es independiente 
de la situación financiera, o los directivos de las empresas en un proceso de declive 
tienen, en efecto, una estrategia para "suavizar" la imagen que se muestra por sus 
débiles datos económicos y financieros por medio de un comportamiento responsable. 
Por otra parte, hemos obtenido evidencia de que existen diferencias en la 
valoración de las debilidades. Las empresas en crisis están peor valoradas en cuanto a 
los elementos negativos que se incluyen en la KLD y esto podría ser una consecuencia 
de la tendencia a reducir los costes y las inversiones que pueden seguir debilitando a 
una ya de por sí deteriorada situación financiera. Estas empresas se caracterizan por una 
estrategia de RSC dirigida a invertir en conducta responsable con un alto nivel o 
impacto de reputación social, pero con un bajo coste de inversión, tal como es la 
diversidad de género. 
CAPITULO VI. La inversión en Responsabilidad Social como estrategia para 
la recuperación de una crisis. 
En el capítulo anterior hemos obtenido evidencia de que existen características 
estructurales subyacentes que marcan las diferencias y similitudes entre las empresas 
teniendo en cuenta el hecho de que tienen que hacer frente a una situación financiera 
precaria. Por medio del mapa consensual obtenida por MDS, que permite representar, al 
mismo tiempo, los individuos y las variables que se utilizan en el análisis, no podemos 
determinar si existen grupos de empresas que comparten el mismo perfil específico. Al 
mismo tiempo, la información disponible sobre las variables de RSE individualmente 
consideradas impidió su proyección  en el mismo mapa con el fin de determinar las 
pautas de una manera más efectiva. 
El presente capítulo se orienta hacia un análisis de los perfiles de RSC de las 
empresas de los EE.UU. con el fin de identificar los posibles clústeres para determinar 
si estos grupos son o podrían ser vinculados a la existencia de una situación de distress. 




Al igual que en el capítulo anterior, empezamos con la existencia de un incentivo para 
la modificación del comportamiento responsable de las empresas ante una situación de 
crisis. Con respecto al capítulo anterior, las diferencias fundamentales consisten en: 
- Una definición más precisa de las empresas analizadas. 
 Nos centramos en el análisis del segundo bienio dado que los resultados 
mostraron un cambio en la actitud de las empresas, independientemente de 
sus condiciones de crisis, a partir de 2001, y con una diferencia 
significativa entre los valores obtenidos en el año 2000 y en 2001. El 
hecho de que este cambio podría estar motivado por la incorporación en la 
base KLD de las 1000 empresas más grandes de EE. UU. en el año 2001, 
nos permite considerar más razonables tomar este año como referencia 
básica. 
 Realizamos un filtro adicional, de manera que en el año 2000 ninguna 
empresa presentaba síntomas de distress. De esta manera, nos aseguramos 
de que la diferenciación entre las empresas sanas y con problemas en 
efecto se produjo en el año t. 
- Para la identificación del clúster, se seleccionó la metodología de los 
conglomerados en dos etapas que permite descubrir agrupaciones naturales de los 
individuos que son difíciles de observar en forma directa. Al mismo tiempo, permite 
obtener de manera automática el número óptimo de clústeres. 
Para este objetivo, analizamos los patrones de comportamiento responsable para 
determinar las marcas de identidad de las empresas y estudiar si los perfiles de 
comportamiento podrían estar relacionados con la existencia de una situación de crisis. 
El análisis se realiza sobre la valoración de comportamientos responsables de las 
1000 empresas más capitalizadas en Estados Unidos en el año 2001, según la base de 
datos KLD. La información de la base de datos Thompson fue utilizada en la 
clasificación de las empresas en crisis, basándonos en las características económicas y 
financieras y los síntomas descritos en los capítulos anteriores. La coincidencia de las 




dos bases dio como resultado 392 empresas. A fin de evitar influencias arrastradas por 
años anteriores, sólo las empresas que muestran una situación sana en el año 2000 
fueron seleccionados de manera que la muestra final se compone de 248 empresas. De 
esta manera, nos aseguramos de que las empresas clasificadas como en crisis en el año 
2001 vinieron de, al menos, un año de estabilidad. 
La metodología de clústeres en dos etapas nos permitió explorar la posible 
existencia de aglomeraciones naturales de empresas, sobre la base de sus 
comportamientos responsables, que se caracteriza por la presencia o no de dificultades 
problemas. Los resultados muestran que la variable crisis, de hecho, así como el tipo y 
la gravedad de la misma, discriminan las empresas con actividades similares proactivas  
y/o reactivas. Además, estos patrones comunes son generalmente más destacados un 
año después de que la empresa ha identificado ciertos deteriorados indicadores 
económicos y financieros. 
Las empresas en crisis obtienen una mayor valoración de los comportamientos 
calificados como positivos, pero también en las dimensiones de las debilidades 
comparadas con las empresas sanas. Este aumento de las valoraciones de las fortalezas 
sigue el mismo patrón que la observada para las empresas sanas, por lo que no puede ser 
derivado de que, en general, la apuesta en la responsabilidad es una consecuencia frente 
a la situación de declive. 
Los comportamientos de las empresas en crisis han resultado estadísticamente 
diferentes, con respecto a las empresas sanas, en las acciones calificadas en sentido 
negativo. Sin embargo, el hecho de que estas diferencias se producen en los dos años 
del análisis no permite afirmar la existencia de una asociación entre la crisis y las 
acciones responsables. 
CAPITULO VII. ¿Cambian las empresas su comportamiento en RSC cuando 
se manifiestan señales de crisis? 
Los capítulos anteriores demuestran ciertos cambios en la actitud de las empresas 
frente a una situación financiera precaria, justificada por la existencia de incentivos para 




los administradores para mitigar la débil imagen dada por la cuenta de resultados de la 
empresa. En algunos casos, el análisis sólo era exploratorio, tales como escalamiento 
multidimensional, y no empieza de una relación causal entre las variables. Sin embargo, 
los resultados obtenidos son una base útil para posteriormente proponer estas relaciones. 
Por otra parte, el análisis se realizó durante un año específico, siendo los primeros años 
de la década 2000, en coincidencia con el aumento en el número de empresas que 
constituyen la base de datos KLD. Este aumento en el número de empresas nos hace 
pensar que en los años después, las empresas se preocupan más por su valoración de 
RSC en esta base de datos. De esta manera, la inversión en acciones de responsabilidad 
puede ser considerada como un mecanismo para "ajustar" su imagen responsable hacia 
la sociedad. 
En este capítulo, ampliamos el período de análisis de 2000 a 2007, lo que permite 
determinar en qué medida las evidencias obtenidas por un período de tiempo específico 
podría ocurrir en un período de tiempo continuo. De esta manera, mantenemos la 
cuestión básica: ¿Puede el comportamiento responsable actuar como un factor de 
mitigación de las empresas cuando cierta situación de dificultades financieras tiene 
lugar? 
Considerando el enfoque de la disminución de la percepción del riesgo, si los 
inversores son cautelosos en la presencia de los riesgos financieros de una empresa, los 
factores atenuantes de una a priori poco atractiva empresa para los inversores están 
determinados por los posibles efectos que una inversión en RSC puede tener sobre el 
desempeño de la empresa (Orlitzky et al., 2003).  Se podría esperar que los gerentes de 
las empresas en dificultades financieras pudieran estar incentivados a realizar un mayor 
esfuerzo en el ámbito de determinados comportamientos de la RSC con el fin de mitigar 
los malos resultados financieros, para garantizar la confianza y el apoyo de los 
stakeholders cuando la supervivencia de la empresa podría estar comprometida. Basado 
en el planteamiento anterior, proponemos la siguiente hipótesis general:  
- H1: a pesar de los costes asociados, las empresas en distress tienden a invertir, o 
mantener su inversión en acciones de RSC con el fin de compensar su débil 
imagen financiera. 




En particular, derivando de esta primera hipótesis, también vamos a testar: 
- H1.1: a pesar de los costes asociados, las empresas en distress tienden a invertir, 
o mantener sus inversiones en acciones que tienen una repercusión directa en la 
generación de beneficios, para reestablecer su delicada situación económica. 
Bajo el enfoque de reducción de costes, las inversiones en acciones de 
responsabilidad también pueden ser interpretadas como un coste que afecta los 
beneficios futuros de una empresa. En el corto plazo, la conducta responsable aumenta 
los costes que influyen en forma directa en los resultados financieros (Belu, 2009).  Por 
otra parte, podrían implicar una reorientación de los recursos necesarios para otros 
ámbitos pertinentes de la empresa que podría afectar la viabilidad de la empresa 
(Hillman y Keim, 2001).  Sin embargo, el coste de ser responsable afecta de forma 
diferente en cada una de las dimensiones del comportamiento socialmente responsable, 
lo que hace que sea difícil estimar el posible impacto del coste de las acciones 
responsables. Este es el caso de las acciones ambientales o producto que implican, en la 
mayoría de los casos, una inversión asociada a I+D.  La selección de la inversión en la  
estrategia de comportamiento responsable se determinará en función de su 
coste/beneficio. 
Frente a los rangos de coste asociados a diferentes alternativas, proponemos que:  
- H2: Empresas que presentan síntomas de distress, redirigen su desempeño en 
RSC, mitigando en esas líneas que implican un mayor deterioro de sus cuentas, e 
invierten en acciones no costosas que permitan mantener el apoyo de los 
stakeholders. 
Por otro lado, teniendo en cuenta los resultados obtenidos en el capítulo anterior, 
hemos encontrado que, entre otras cuestiones: 
- En algunos casos no hubo cambios en la conducta de las empresas en 
responsabilidad social entre el año catalogadas como en crisis y el año después. Este 
hecho indica que, en algunas ocasiones, las empresas ya habían puesto en marcha un 
cambio de comportamiento en el año en el que se esperaba que los indicadores 




financieros fueran a ser débiles. Esta afirmación tiene sentido si tenemos en cuenta que 
las empresas saben de antemano cómo serán sus resultados de la actividad. En este 
sentido, cuando se espera que indicador negativo presente una débil imagen a los 
accionistas y a los stakeholders, las empresas tratan de mitigar esta imagen por medio 
de una adecuada valoración de acciones responsables. 
- Se detectaron ciertas diferencias en función del tipo de crisis, asociadas a 
problemas económicos o financieros. Este hecho puede ejercer una influencia sobre el 
tipo de acciones donde la empresa invierte. Las empresas con una debilitada cuenta de 
resultados tratarán de desinvertir en las acciones costosas e invertir en aquellos aspectos 
que podrían promover los ingresos. Por otra parte, las empresas con dificultades 
financieras tienden a invertir en acciones de responsabilidad a los efectos de la 
reputación y la imagen con el fin de minimizar el riesgo estimado de presentes y/o 
futuros inversores. 
- Por último, el sector donde las empresas operan normalmente también puede 
condicionar el mantenimiento de determinados comportamientos responsables, a pesar 
de los costes asociados y su repercusión en la situación financiera. Es el caso de las 
acciones en materia de medio ambiente, que pueden ser esenciales para la supervivencia 
"reputacional" en ciertos sectores comprometidos con el medio ambiente, o en sectores 
que dependen de la innovación de producto y de las necesidades de los clientes. 
Teniendo en cuenta estos argumentos, proponemos las siguientes hipótesis: 
- H3: El comportamiento de RSC del año cuando los síntomas de distress se 
identifican tiene una influencia positiva sobre la conducta de RSC un año 
después. 
- H4: Empresas que presentan síntomas de distress, reorientan su comportamiento 
de RSC dependiendo de la situación económica o las debilidades financieras que 
definen su crisis. 
- H5: El sector donde operan las empresas influye en la reacción del 
comportamiento responsable, una vez que se ha detectado una situación de 
crisis. 




Los resultados indican que las empresas sanas presentan cambios en todos los 
bloques de año analizados mientras que las empresas en crisis tienden a aumentar su 
valoración de debilidades o reducir la intensidad de la valoración un año después de 
identificar los síntomas de debilidades económicas y financieras. Sin embargo, cuando 
se observan por separado, estas diferencias no se producen en todas las dimensiones de 
la RSC. A pesar de observar cambios en las empresas con problemas, éstos se pueden 
generalizar como un patrón que ocurre durante todos los períodos analizados. Las 
empresas en crisis mantienen su inversión en RSC, así  las debilidades de RSC no 
empeoran a pesar del deterioro de su situación. 
De hecho, se observa un incremento de las acciones en dimensiones no costosas 
tales como la diversidad y los derechos humanos, donde las empresas en distress 
muestran un comportamiento diferente de las empresas sanas. Las diferencias entre los 
dos grupos de empresas ya aparecen durante el año en el que se producen síntomas de la 
crisis, por lo tanto se puede afirmar que las empresas con problemas comienzan su 
cambio de actitud el año en el que se sospecha que van a incurrir en problemas 














A pesar de los resultados de los modelos de predicción del fracaso, un grupo de 
empresas que presentan lo que en la literatura se conoce como síntomas de distress, 
continúan su actividad en el mercado 10 años después de la identificación de la crisis. 
El hecho más sorprendente es que ninguna de las empresas identificadas en una 
situación de dificultades al comienzo del análisis, entró en un proceso de quiebra 
durante el mismo, a pesar de sus elevados valores del índice de fracaso, como es el Z-
score. 
Este hecho permite tener en cuenta que el fracaso es un proceso reversible y que 
no es necesariamente degenerativo si la empresa es capaz de lograr un esfuerzo en sus 
resultados económicos. En el caso de una situación de crisis débil, las empresas tienden 
a mostrar una evolución natural durante la “salida” y pueden resolver el problema 
mediante simples decisiones de "rutina". El carácter "momentáneo" de estas situaciones 
puede ser una de las razones por las que estas empresas terminan en una situación 
similar al final del período analizado. 
El lado más curioso de los resultados consiste en que las empresas que inician con 
una grave situación de crisis, presentando valores financieros críticos, han sido capaces 
de resolverla. La mayoría de las empresas con similares "degeneradas" estructuras 
económicas y financieras están más expuestas a un proceso evolutivo-degenerativo, aún 
así se mantienen en el mercado a lo largo de los años. La resolución de la situación 
crítica fue posible gracias al importante esfuerzo logrado por las empresas en los 
resultados económicos, que les ha permitido no sólo resolver la situación, sino también 
reforzarla. 
Otra razón para resolver las dificultades fue el hecho de que las empresas con 
dificultades compartían características estructurales comunes con las empresas que 
mostraron menores y más leves síntomas de crisis. Este hecho nos permite afirmar que 
los síntomas sólo son manifestaciones de una situación subyacente. Las deficiencias y 
gravedad de la situación son los factores que determinan los cambios en la situación de 
crisis. La severidad de la situación inicial no tiene por qué ser un factor decisivo en el 




desenlace de la crisis y las empresas con dificultades financieras con una notable 
capacidad de reacción y/o una sólida estructura financiera evolucionan principalmente 
hacia una zona sana.  
Una vez que la existencia de las diferencias y similitudes se identificó, el siguiente 
paso fue identificar la relación que pudiera existir entre algunas variables de control 
como el tamaño, la industria, factores macroeconómicos, etc. y la posibilidad de revertir 
la situación. 
Comprender qué factores influyen en el éxito de superar una situación de crisis es 
fundamental para mejorar el proceso de toma de decisiones de los directivos. Varias 
investigaciones han demostrado que las cuestiones tales como la gravedad de la 
situación inicial o el tamaño condicionan el proceso de recuperación. Por otra parte, 
implementar estrategias orientadas a la eficiencia también ha resultado ser fundamental 
para encontrar un camino mejor. De los resultados hemos obtenido que la posición final 
del post-distress puede ser explicado por determinadas variables y en determinadas 
circunstancias. 
En primer lugar, la relación entre capacidad de reacción de las empresas y del 
estado final depende de si se considera el modelo general o los distintos sectores. 
En segundo lugar, y en contraste con otras investigaciones, el grado de severidad 
no determina un resultado negativo de la situación o una  capacidad negativa de 
supervivencia en las condiciones adecuadas. De acuerdo con los resultados de la 
capacidad de reacción, es la capacidad estructural subyacente, y no los síntomas de 
crisis, que determinan la forma en la que la empresa enfrenta la crítica situación por la 
que atraviesa. 
Si se tiene en cuenta la diferencia entre los periodos de recuperación, se puede 
considerar que el largo plazo permite un desenlace eficaz de una situación de crisis. En 
cuanto a la rentabilidad, a pesar de que es un factor importante en representar una 
situación de riesgo bajo, los resultados no fueron suficientes para afirmar que el 
rendimiento constante es una condición necesaria para superar una situación difícil. 




En cuanto al tamaño de la empresa, las grandes empresas tienden a presentar una 
mejor situación y un menor riesgo después de la situación inicial de crisis y la industria 
en la que las empresas desarrollan su actividad tiene una influencia en el desenlace de 
una situación de distress. Algunas características específicas de cada sector pueden 
contribuir o impedir la evolución del proceso de recuperación y, como consecuencia, en 
los resultados de las estrategias implementadas por parte de las empresas para resolver 
la crisis. 
Además de las estrategias orientadas hacia la rentabilidad a través de las 
modificaciones de la estructura económica y financiera para superar una situación 
problemática, también consideramos la posibilidad de los directivos para "gestionar" la 
imagen débil de la situación financiera a través de las inversiones en acciones 
responsables como un mecanismo para proporcionar solidez futura a la empresa. De 
esta manera, no sólo los inversores, sino también el propio mercado estarían afectados 
por este comportamiento de las futuras expectativas de los directivos. No hemos 
obtenido diferencias entre empresas sanas y con problemas, en comportamiento 
responsable estructural en los aspectos considerados como fortalezas. Esto significa que 
las decisiones de gestión en comportamientos responsables son independientes de la 
situación financiera. Sin embargo, también podría significar que los gerentes de las 
empresas en declive tienen un comportamiento responsable estratégico para suavizar la 
imagen dada por sus débiles indicadores económicos y financieros. 
Por otra parte, existen diferencias en la valoración de las debilidades por lo que 
las empresas en crisis obtienen peores valoraciones en cuanto a las dimensiones 
negativas incluidos en la base de datos KLD. Este hecho podría ser una consecuencia de 
la tendencia a reducir los costes y las inversiones en acciones que podrían seguir 
debilitando a una ya deteriorada situación financiera. Sin embargo, estas empresas 
siguen una estrategia de RSC dirigida a invertir en conducta responsable con un alto 
nivel de impacto o reputación social pero con un bajo coste de inversión, tal como la 
diversidad de género. 
Como consecuencia, nos encontramos con que la variable crisis, de hecho, así 
como el tipo y la severidad de la misma, discrimina las empresas con patrones proactivo 




y/o reactivos. Además, estos patrones comunes son generalmente más destacados un 
año después de que la empresa ha identificado ciertos deteriorados indicadores 
económicos y financieros. 
Un año después de la manifestación de la situación de crisis, las empresas parecen 
tener un perfil común de comportamiento socialmente responsable, cosa que no se 
observó anteriormente. Sin embargo, la única característica que discrimina estas 
empresas del perfil general de empresas sanas es la debilidad en apostar por las acciones 
que pudieran fortalecer su posición medioambiental. Este hecho puede ser explicado por 
el coste asociado que estas acciones requieren y que pueden tener un impacto negativo 
añadido a una posición económica ya deteriorada. 
Las empresas con problemas modifican su comportamiento responsable de tal 
manera que no se refleja en una mayor y positiva valoración general. Dichas empresas 
actúan sobre determinadas acciones. Con respecto a las debilidades, las empresas en 
distress no tienen un perfil específico distinto, sin embargo, su situación ha cambiado 
tras el inicio del estado de crisis, como si simplemente hubieran decidido unirse a los 
comportamientos más comunes entre las empresas, para evitar que se valoren 
negativamente. 
Existen distintos perfiles cuando consideramos el tipo y el origen de la crisis, 
fundamentalmente diferenciando la existencia de un déficit en la cuenta de pérdidas y 
ganancias. Esta aglomeración podría estar relacionada con las estrategias 
implementadas por la empresa para el proceso de recuperación. 
Las diferencias en el comportamiento responsable de las empresas con problemas 
desde el punto de vista de rentabilidad operativa y desde el punto de vista de la 
estructura financiera pueden ser causadas, en cierta medida, como consecuencia de 
dichas situaciones. Las empresas débiles en rentabilidad necesitan mejorar sus ingresos 
en el corto plazo y esto se puede observar en la tendencia a reducir los costes y en la 
inversión con un beneficio directo sobre la recuperación, en lugar de obtener una 
posición social. 




En general, al analizar los factores que influyen en la estrategia final de RSC de 
las empresas, una vez los síntomas de distress se han identificado, nos encontramos con 
que las empresas sanas presentan cambios en todos los años analizados, mientras que 
las empresas en distress presentan una tendencia a aumentar su valoración en 
debilidades o reducir la valoración de las fortalezas, un año después de haber 
identificado los síntomas de debilidades económicas y financieras. Sin embargo, cuando 
se observan por separado estas diferencias no se producen en todas las dimensiones de 
la RSC. A pesar de observar cambios en las empresas con problemas, éstos no se 
pueden generalizar como un patrón durante todos los períodos analizados. Las empresas 
en distress mantienen su inversión en RSC, para no empeorar sus debilidades de RSC a 
pesar de su situación deteriorada. 
Se observa un aumento en las acciones en dimensiones no costosas tales como la 
diversidad y los derechos humanos, donde las empresas con problemas muestran un 
comportamiento diferente de las empresas sanas. Las diferencias entre los dos grupos de 
empresas ya aparecen durante el año cuando se produce la crisis, por lo tanto, podemos 
afirmar que las empresas en distress inician su cambio de actitud el año en que 
empiezan a sospechar que van a incurrir en problemas económicos y financieros. 
Las empresas en crisis reducen sus inversiones en acciones relacionadas con 
productos, uno de los aspectos más costosos y con importante repercusión en los 
deteriorados estados financieros. El mismo comportamiento se observó también en la 
dimensión de medioambiente. Si bien las empresas sanas tratan de reducir sus 
debilidades en esta última dimensión, para las empresas con problemas este hecho no se 
produce, durante el mismo período. En este sentido, la rentabilidad económica resultó 
relevante en determinados sectores y en las dimensiones más costosas de la RSC. De 
esta manera, se puede in cierto modo, confirmar que algunas de las inversiones en 
responsabilidad social se pueden realizar cuando hay certeza sobre la capacidad de la 
empresa de generar fondos e invertir. 
Cuando los modelos de comportamiento responsable se aplicaron a dimensiones 
individuales y en función del sector, las diferentes variables analizadas fueron 
básicamente importantes. La variable sectores constituye uno de los aspectos que 




pueden influir más en el incentivo de las empresas en dificultades financieras para 
mantener, aumentar o disminuir sus acciones en materia de RSC. Los sectores sensibles 
a la actitud de los stakeholders pero con deficiencias en la rentabilidad económica, 
intentan mantener la confianza de la sociedad a través de acciones que no afectan a su 
situación deteriorada. 
Estar en distress o tener una situación estable es un factor independiente de los 
cambios observados en muchas de las dimensiones de RSC entre el año t y t+1. Como 
consecuencia de ello, a pesar de su situación problemática, las empresas en distress 
siguen apostando por las inversiones en RSC y en esas dimensiones que aparentemente 
son valoradas por el mercado en ese determinado momento. Las diferencias en los 
perfiles nos permiten afirmar que la inversión RSC es una cuestión que depende de la 
oferta y la demanda procedente de los mercados en ese determinado periodo de tiempo. 
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